Napoleon's Egypt

Las Cases: Bonaparte on Officer Mutinies in Egypt

2008-06-26T00:49:00.003-04:00

The Count de Las Cases, Memorial de Sainte Helene: Journal of the Private Life and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon at Saint Helena, Vol. I, Part the First (London: Henry Colburn & Co., 1823), pp. 204-207

As I am on the subject of Egypt, I will here note
down all the information I collected in my detached
conversations, and which may possibly not be
found in the Campaign of Egypt, dictated by Napoleon
to the Grand Marshal.

The campaign of Italy exhibits all the most
brilliant and decisive results to which military
genius and conception ever gave birth. Diplomatic
views, administrative talents, legislative measures,
are there uniformly blended in harmony
with the prodigies of war. But the most striking
and the finishing touch in the picture, is the sudden and irresistible ascendancy which the young
General acquired: — the anarchy of equality — the
jealousy of republican principles — every thing
vanished before him: there was not a power,
even to the ridiculous sovereignty of the Directory,
which was not immediately suspended. The Directory
required no accounts from the General-in-
chief of the army of Italy; it was left to himself
to send them : no plan, no system was prescribed
to him; but accounts of victories, and conclusions
of armistices, of the destruction of old states,
and the creation of new ones, were constantly
received from him.

In the expedition of Egypt may be retraced all
that is admired in the campaign of Italy. The
reflecting observer will even perceive, that in
the Egyptian expedition, the points of resemblance
are of a more important nature, from the difficulties of every kind which gave character to
the campaign, and required greater genius and
resources on the part of its conductor. In
Egypt, a new order of things appeared : climate,
country, inhabitants, religion, manners, and
mode of fighting, all were different.

1st. The expedition of Egypt was undertaken
at the earnest and mutual desire of the Directory
and the General-in-chief.

2d. The taking of Malta was not the consequence
of a private understanding, but of the wisdom
of the General-in-chief. " It was in Mantua"
that I took Malta," said the Emperor one day;"
it was the generous treatment observed towards "
Wurmser, that secured to me the submission of "
the Grand Master and his Knights."

3d. The conquest of Egypt was calculated
with as much judgment as it was executed with skill. If Saint Jean d'Acre had surrendered to
the French army, a great revolution would have •
taken place in the east; the General-in-chief
would have established an empire there, and the
destinies of France would have taken a different
turn.

4th. On its return from the campaign of Syria,
the French army had scarcely sustained any loss :
it remained in the most formidable and prosperous
condition.

5th. The departure of the General-in-chief for
France was the result of a grand and magnanimous
plan. How ridiculous is the imbecility of
those who consider that departure as an evasion
or a desertion.

6th. Kleber fell a victim to Musulmanic fanaticism.
There is not the slightest foundation for
the absurd calumny which would have attributed
this catastrophe to the policy of his predecessor,
or to the intrigues of his successor.

7th, and lastly. It is pretty well proved that
Egypt would have remained for ever a French
province, if any other but Menou had been appointed
for her defence ; nothing but the gross
errors of that general could have lost us the possession of Egypt.

The Emperor said, that no army in the world
was less fit for the Egyptian expedition than that
which he led there — the army of Italy. It would
be difficult to describe the disgust, the discontent, the melancholy, the despair of that army, on its first arrival in Egypt. The Emperor himself saw two dragoons run out of the ranks and throw themselves into the Nile. Bertrand had seen the most distinguished generals, such as Lannes, and
Murat, in momentary fits of rage, throw their
laced hats on the sand and trample on them in
the presence of the soldiers. The Emperor explained
these feelings surprisingly well. " This
army," said he, "had fulfilled its career. All the "
individuals belonging to it were satiated with"
wealth, rank, pleasure, and consideration; they"
were not fit for the Deserts and the fatigues of"
Egypt ; and, "continued he, "had that army"
been placed in other hands than mine, it is dif-"
ficult to say what excesses might not have "
been committed."

More than one conspiracy was formed to carry
away the flags to Alexandria, and other things
of the same sort. The influence, the character,
and the glory of the General, could alone restrain
the troops. One day Napoleon, losing his temper
in his turn, rushed among a group of discontented
generals, and addressing himself to the
tallest, " You have held mutinous language," said
he, with vehemence, "take care that I do not "
fulfil my duty; your five foot ten* should not "
save you from being shot in a couple of hours." [*French feet are of course here alluded to.]

British Attempt to Repulse French Invasion

2008-03-27T04:32:00.000-04:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 47-51.

TIGRE, at Anchor off Jaffa, May 30, 1799.

MY LORD,

The providence of Almighty God has been wonderfully manifested in the defeat and precipitate retreat of the French army. The means we had of opposing its gigantic efforts against us being totally inadequate of themselves to the production of such a result. The measure of their iniquities seems to have been filled by the massacre of the Turkish prisoners at Jaffa, in cool blood, three days after their capture; and the plain of Nazareth has been the boundary of Bonaparte’s extraordinary career. He raised the siege of Acre on the 20th May, leaving all his heavy artillery behind him, either buried or thrown into the sea, where, however, it is visible, and can easily be weighed. The circumstances which led to this event, subsequent to my last dispatch on the 9th instant, are as follow:--Conceiving that the ideas of the Syrians, as to the supposed irresistible prowls of these invaders, must be changed, since they had witnessed the checks which the besieging army daily meet with in their operations before the town of Acre, I wrote a circular letter to the Princess and Chiefs of the Christians of mount Lebanon, and also to the Sheiks of the Druses, recalling them to a sense of their duty, and engaging them to cut off the supplies from the French camp. I sent them at the same time, a copy of Bonaparte’s impious proclamation, in which he boasts at having overthrown all Christian establishments, accompanied by a suitable exhortation, calling upon them to choose between the friendship of a Christian knight and that of an unprincipled renegade. This letter had all the effect I could desire. They immediately sent me two Ambassadors, professing not only friendship, but obedience; assuring me, that in proof of the latter, they had sent out parties to arrest such of the mountaineers as should be found carrying wine and gun powder to the French camp, and placing eighty prisoners of this description at my disposal. I had thus the satisfaction to find Bonaparte’s career farther northward effectually stopped by a warlike people inhabiting an impenetrable country. General Kleber’s division was sent eastward, towards the ford of the Jordan, to oppose the Damascus army; it was recalled from thence to take its turn in the daily efforts to mount the breach at Acre, in which every other division in succession had failed, with the loss of their brave men, and above three-fourths of their officers. It seems much was hoped from this division, as it had, by its fierceness, and the steady front it opposed in the form of a hollow square, kept upwards of 10,000 men in check, during a whole day, in the plain between Nazareth and Mount Tabor, till Bonaparte came with his horse-artillery, and extricated these troops, dispersing the multitude of irregular cavalry, by which they were completely surrounded.

A Turkish Regiment having been censured due to the ill success of their sally, and their unsteadiness in the attack of the garden, made a fresh sally the next right. Solimon Aga, the Lieutenant Colonel, being determined to retrieve the honor of the regiment by the punctual execution of the orders I had given him to make himself master of the enemy’s third parallel, and this he did most effectually; but the impetuosity of a few carried them on to the second trench where they lost some of their standards, though they spiked four guns before their retreat. Kleber’s division, instead of mounting the breach according to Bonaparte’s intention, was thus obliged to spend its time and its strength in recovering these works, in which it succeeded, after a conflict of three hours, leaving everything in status quo, except the loss of men, which was very considerable on both sides. After this failure, the French grenadiers absolutely refused to mount the breach any more over the putrid bodies of their unburied companions, sacrificed in former attacks by Bonaparte’s impatience and precipitation, which led him to commit such palpable errors as even seamen could take advantage of. He seemed to have no principle of action but that of pressing forward, and appeared to stick at nothing to obtain the object of his ambition, although it must be evident to everybody else, that even if he succeeded to take the town, the fire of the shipping must drive him out of it again in a short time; however, the knowledge the garrison had of the inhuman massacre at Jaffa rendered them desperate in their personal defense. Two attempts to assassinate me in the town having failed, recourse was had to a most flagrant breach of every law of honor and of war. A flag of truce was sent into the town by the hand of an Arab Dervice, with a letter to the Pasha, proposing a cessation of arms, for the purpose of burying the dead bodies, the French became intolerable, and threatened the existence of every one of us on both sides, many having suffered diseases within a few hours after being seized with the symptoms of infection. It was natural that we should gladly listen to the proposition, and that we should consequently be off our guard during the conference. A volley of shot on a sudden announced an assault, which, however, the garrison was ready to receive, and the assailants only contributed to increase the number of dead bodies in question to the eternal disgrace of the general, who thus disloyally sacrificed them. I saved the life of the Arab from the effect of the indignation of the Turks, and took him off to the Tigre with me, from whence I sent him back to the General, with a message, which made the army ashamed of having been exposed to such a merited reproof. Subordination was now at an end, and all hopes of success had now vanished, the enemy had no alternative left but a precipitate retreat, which was put in execution in the night between the 20th and 21st. I have above said, that the battering train of artillery (Except the carriages, which were burnt) is now in our hands, amounting to 23 pieces. The howitzers and medium twelve-pounders, originally conveyed by land with much difficulty, and successfully employed to make the first breach, were embarked in the country vessels at Jaffa, to be conveyed coastwise; together with the worst among the two thousand wounded, which embarrassed the march of the army. This operation was to be expected: I took care, therefore, to be between Jaffa and Damietta before the French army could get at the former place. The vessels being hurried to sea without seamen to navigate them, and the wounded being in want of every necessary, even water and provisions, they steered straight to His Majesty’s ships, in full confidence of receiving the succors of humanity, in which they were not disappointed. I have sent them on to Damietta, where they will receive such farther aid as their situation requires, and which it was out of my power to give to so many. Their expressions of gratitude to us were mingled with execrations on the name of their General, who had, as they said, thus exposed them to peril rather than fairly and honorably renew the intercourse with the English, which he had broken off by a false and malicious assertion, that I had intentionally exposed the former prisoners to the infection of the plague. To honor the French army be it said, this assertion was not received by them, and it thus recoiled on its author. The intention of it was evidently to do away the effect which the Proclamation of the Porte began to make on the soldiers, whose eager hands were held above the parapet of their works to receive them when thrown from the breach. He cannot plead misinformation as his excuse, his Aid-de-camp, Mr Laliemand, having had free intercourse with these prisoners on board the Tigre when he came to treat about them; and having been ordered, though too late, not to repeat their expressions of contentment at the prospect of going home. It was evident to both sides, that when a general had recourse to such a shallow, and, at the same time, to such a mean artifice, as a malicious falsehood, all better resources were at an end, and the disaffection in his army was consequently increased to the highest pitch.

The utmost disorder has been manifested in the retreat, and the whole track between Acre and Gaza is strewed with the dead bodies of those who had sunk under their fatigue, or the effect of slight wounds; such as could walk, unfortunately for them, not having been embarked. The rowing gun boats annoyed the van column of the retreating army in its march along the beach, and the Arabs harassed its rear when it turned inland to avoid their fire. We observed the smoke of musquetry behind the sand hills from the attack of a party of them which came down to our boats, and touched our flag, with every token of union and respect. Ismael Pasha, governor of Jerusalem, to whom notice was sent of Bonaparte’s preparations for retreat, having entered this town by land at the same time that we brought our guns to bear on it by sea, a stop was put to the massacre and pillage already begun by the Naplousians. The English flag, re-hoisted on the consort’s house (under which the Pasha met him), serves as an asylum for all religions, and every description of the surviving inhabitants. The heaps of unburied Frenchmen lying on the bodies of those whom they massacred two months ago, afford another proof of Divine Justice, which has caused these murderers to perish by the infection arising from their own atrocious act. Seven poor wretches are left alive in the hospital, where they are protected, and shall be taken care of. We have had a most dangerous and painful duty in disembarking here to protect the inhabitants, but it has been effectually done; and Ismael Pasha deserves every credit for his humane exertions and cordial cooperation to that effect. Two thousand cavalry are just dispatched to harass the French rear, and I am in hopes to overtake their van in time to profit by their disorder; but this will depend on the assembling of sufficient force, and on exertions of which I am not absolutely master, though I do my utmost to give the necessary impulse, and a right direction. I have every confidence that the officers and men of the three ships under my orders, who, in the face of a most formidable enemy, have fortified a town that had not a single heavy gun mounted on the land side, and who have carried on all intercourse by boats, under a constant fire of musquetry and grape, will be efficaciously to assist the army in its future operations. This letter will be delivered to your Lordship by Lieutenant Canes, first of the Tigre, whom I have judged worthy to command the Theseus, as captain, ever since the death of my much lamented friend and coadjutor Captain Miller. I have taken Lieutenant England first of that ship, to my assistance in the Tigre, by whose exertions, and those of Lieutenant Summers, and Mr. Atkinson, together with the bravery of the rest of the officers and men, that ship was saved, though on fire in five places at once, from a deposit of French shells bursting on board her. I have the honor to be,

W. Sidney Smith.

British and Turks Defend Acre from French Attack

2008-03-25T12:44:00.000-04:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 43-47.

Copy of a Letter from Captain Sir William Sidney Smith, of his Majesty’s ship Tigre, to Evan Napean, Esq. dated off Mount Lebanon, June 16, 1799.

Sir Morten Eden has forwarded a duplicate of your letter of the 4th of May, informing me of the sailing of the French fleet from Brest. I take for granted this fleet is bound for these seas to support Bonaparte’s operations, not knowing that his expedition to Syria has completely failed, as the enclosed duplicates will inform their lordships.

My Lord, Tigre, Acre, May 9, 1799.

I had the honor to inform your lordship by my letter of the 2d instant, (in which Sir Sidney states the heroism and perseverance of the English and Turks to be almost unexampled; and that the repeated efforts of the French to take Acre by storm had been uniformly unsuccessful: But the nature of these proceedings is so fully and clearly given in the present dispatch as to supercede the necessity of inserting that of the 2d.) that we were busily employed in completing two ravelins for the reception of cannon to flank the enemy’s nearest approaches, distant only ten yards from them. They were attacked that very night, and almost every night since, but the enemy have each time been repulsed with very considerable loss; the enemy continued to batter in breach with progressive success, and have nine several attempted to storm, but have as often been beaten back with immense slaughter. Our best mode of defense have been frequent sorties to keep them on the defensive, and impede the progress of their covering works. We have thus been in one continued battle ever since the beginning of the siege, interrupted only as short intervals by the excessive fatigue of every individual on both sides. We had been long anxiously looking for a reinforcement, without which we could not expect to be able to keep the place so long as we have. The delay of its arrival being occasioned by Hassan Bey’s having originally received orders to join me in Egypt, I was obliged to be very peremptory in the repetition of my orders for him to join me here; it was not, however, till the evening of the day before yesterday, the fifty first day of the siege, that this fleet of corvettes and transports made its appearance. The approach of this additional strength was the signal to Bonaparte for a most vigorous and persevering assault, in hopes to get possession of the town before the reinforcement to the garrison could disembark.

The constant fire of the besiegers was suddenly increased ten fold. Our flanking fire from afloat was, as usual, plied to the utmost; but with less effect than heretofore, as the enemy had thrown up epaulments and traversers of sufficient thickness to protect him from it. The guns that could be worked to the Greatest advantage were a French crass eighteen-pounder in the Light house castle, manned from the Theseus under the direction of Mr. Scroder, master’s mate, and the last mounted twenty four pounder in the North Ravelin, manned from the Tigre, under the direction of Mr. Jones, midshipman. These guns being within grape distance of the head of attacking column, added to the Turkish musquetry, did great execution; and I take this opportunity of recommending these two petty officers, whose indefatigable vigilance and zeal merit my warmest praise. The Tigre’s two 68 pound cannonades, mounted in two germes lying in the mole; and worked under the direction of Mr. Bray, carpenter of the Tigre (one of the bravest and most intelligent men I have served with,) threw shells into the center of this column with evident effect, and checked it considerably. Still, however, the enemy gained ground, and made a lodgment in the second story of the north-east Tomer: the upper part being entirely battered down, and the ruins in the ditch forming the ascent by which they mounted. Day light shewed us the French standard on the outer angle of the tower. The fire of the besieged was much slackened in comparison to that of the besiegers, and our flanking fire was become of less effect, the enemy having covered themselves in this lodgment and the approach to it by two traverses across the ditch, which they had constructed under the fire that had been opposed to them during the whole of the night, and which were now seen composed of sand bags, and the bodies of their dead built in them, their bayonets only been visible above them. Hassan Bey’s troops were in the boats, though as yet but half was to shore. This was a most critical point of the contest; and an effort was necessary to preserve the place for a short time till their arrival.

I accordingly landed the boats at the mole, and took the crews up to the breach armed with pikes. The enthusiastic gratitude of the Turks, men, women, and children, at the sight of such a reinforcement, at such a time is not to be described. Many fugitives returned with us to the breach, which we found defended by a few brave Turks, whose most destructive missile weapons were heavy stones, which striking the assailants on the head, overthrew the foremost down the slope, and impeded the progress of the rest. A succession, however, ascended to the assault, the heap of ruins between the two parties serving as a breast work for both, the muzzles of their muskets touching, and the spear heads of the standards locked. Gezza Pacha, hearing the English were on the breach, quitted his station, where, according to the ancient Turkish custom, he was fitting to reward such as should bring him the heads of the enemy, and distributing musket cartridges with his own hands. The energetic old man coming behind us, pulled us down with violence, saying, if any harm happened to his English friends, all was lost. This amicable contest, as to who should defend the breach, occasioned, a rush of Turks to the spot, and thus time was gained for the arrival of the first body of Hassan Bey’s troops. I had now to combat the Pacha’s repugnance to admitting any troops but his Albanians into the garden of his ferraglio, become a very important post, as occupying the terre-plein of the rampart. There was not above 200 of the original 1000 Albanians left alive. This was no time for debate, and I over ruled his objections by introducing the Chisslick regiment 1000 men armed with bayonets, disciplined after the European method under Sultan Selim’s own eye, and placed by his Imperial Majesty’s express commands at my disposal. The garrison animated by the appearance of such a reinforcement, was now all on foot, and there being consequently enough to defend the breach, I proposed to the Pacha to get rid of the objects of his jealousy, by opening his gates to let them make a sally and take the assailants in flank: He readily complied, and I gave directions to the Colonel to get possession of the enemy’s third parallel or nearest trench, and there fortify himself by shifting the parapet outwards. This order being clearly, understood, the gates were opened: and the Turks rushed out; but they were not equal to such a movement, and were driven back to the town with loss. Mr Bray, however, as usual, protected the town gate efficaciously with grape from the sixty eight pounders. The sortie had this good effect, that it obliged the enemy to expose themselves above their parapets, so that our flanking fire brought down numbers of them, and drew their force from the breach, so that a small number remaining on the lodgment were killed or dispersed by our few remaining hand grenades, thrown by Mr. Savage, midshipman of the Theseus. The enemy began a new breach by an incessant fire directed to the southward of the lodgment, every shot knocking down the whole sheets of a wall much less solid than that of the tower on which they had expended so much time and ammunition. The group of Generals and Aid-du-camp which the shells from the 68 pounders had frequently dispersed, was now re-assembled on Richard Coeur de Lion’s Mount. Bonaparte was distinguishable in the centre of a semicircle; his gesticulations indicated a renewal of attack, and his dispatching an Aid-du-camp to the camp shewed that we waited only for a reinforcement. I gave directions for Hassan Bey’s ships to take their stations in the shoal water to the southward, and made the Tigre’s signal to join the Theseus to the northward. A massive column appeared advancing into the breach with a solemn step. The Pacha’s idea was no: to defend the brink this time, but rather to let a certain number of the enemy in, and then close with them, according to the Turkish mode of war. The column thus mounted the breach unmolested, and descending from the rampart into Pacha’s garden, where, in a very few minutes, the bravest and most advanced among them lay headless corpses. The sabre, with the addition of a dagger in the other hand, proving more than a match for the bayonet; the rest retreated precipitately; and the commanding officer, who was seen manfully encouraging his men to mount the breach, and who we have since learnt to be General Lasne, was carried off, wounded by a musquet shot. General Rambaud was killed. Much confusion arose in the town from the actual entry of the enemy, it having been impossible, nay impolitic, to give previous information to every body of the mode of defense adopted, lest the enemy should come at a knowledge of it by means of their numerous emissaries. The English uniform which had hitherto served as a rallying point for the old garrison wherever it appeared was now in the dusk mistaken for French, and newly arrived Turks not distinguishing between one hat and another in the crowd, and thus many a severe blow of sabre was parried by our officers, among which Colonel Douglas, Mr. Ives, and Mr. Jones, had nearly lost their lives, as they were forcing their way through a torrent of fugitives. Calm was restored by the Pacha’s exertions, aided by Mr. Trotter, who had just arrived with Hassan Bey, and thus the contest of twenty five hours ended, both parties being so fatigued as to be unable to move. Bonaparte will, no doubt, renew the attack, the breach being, as above described, perfectly practicable for fifty men abreast; indeed the town is not, nor ever has been defensive according to the rules of art, but, according to every other rule, it must and shall be defended, not that it is in itself worth defending but we feel that it is by this breach Bonaparte means to march to farther conquests. It is on the issue of this conflict that depends the opinion of the multitude of spectators on the surrounding hills, who wait only to join the victor, and with such reinforcement for the execution of his known projects. Be assured my Lord, the magnitude of our obligations does but increase the energy of our efforts to discharge our duty, and though we may, and probably shall by overpowered, I can venture to say that the French will be so much farther weakened before it prevails, as to be little able to profit by its dear bought victory.

W. Sidney Smith.

French Announce Victory at Aboukir

2008-03-20T02:27:00.000-04:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 39-42.  

Battle of Aboukir.  

Head Quarters, Alexandria, 11th Thermidor, (July 29.)

The army began to move at daybreak on the 7th thermidor. The advanced guard was commanded by General Murat, who had under his order 400 cavalry, and the brigadier general Destaing, with three battalions, and two pieces of cannon. Brigadier General Davoust, with two squadrons, and 100 dromedaries, was ordered to take a position between Alexandria and the army, in order to oppose the Arabs and Murad Bey, who were every moment expected to arrive, with the design of joining the Turkish army, and in order to preserve the communication with Alexandria.

The General of division, Menou, who had proceeded to Rosetta, was ordered to take post by the day-break at the extremity of the bar of Rosetta, at Aboukir, and near the entrance of the Lake Madie, in order to cannonade such of the enemy’s vessels as he might find on the Lake, and to harass his left.

The enemy’s first line was posted about half a league in front of the fort of Aboukir. About 1000 men occupied a mount of sand, defended on its right towards the sea by entrenchments, and supported by a village to the distance of about 300 toises, which was occupied by 1200 men, and four pieces of cannon. The left was upon a detached sand hill, to the left of the peninsula, and about 600 toises in front of the first line. This position was very badly fortified, and was besides of no real importance; but the enemy occupied it in order to cover the most plentiful wells of Aboukir. Some gun-boats appeared to be stationed so as to protect the space between this position and the second line, which was also occupied by 2000 men, provided with six pieces of cannon. The enemy’s second position was about 300 toises in the rear of the first village; his centre at the redoubt which he had taken form us; his right behind and entrenchment which he had extended from his redboubt to the sea, a space of about 150 toises; his left was posted between the redoubt and the sea, on some low land hills and the shore, commanded by the fire form the redoubt and the gun-boats. In this position there was about 7000 men, and twelve pieces of cannon. About 100 toises behind the redoubt lay the village and fort of Aboukir, occupied by nearly 1500 men. The train of the pacha, who had the chief command, consisted of 80 horsemen.

Bonaparte ordered the columns to halt, and made his dispositions for the attack.

Brigadier-General Destaing, with his three battalions, was to carry the height of the enemy’s right, which was occupied by 1000 men, while a piquet of cavalry was at the same time to cut off the retreat of this corps upon the village.

The division of Lannes was ordered to advance upon the sand hill, to the left of the first line of the enemy, where he had 2000 men, and six pieces of cannon. A squadron of cavalry was ordered to observe the motions of this corps, and to cut off its retreat.

General Destaing adanved upon the enemy at the charge of bayonet. He abandoned his entrenchments, and retreated towards the village. The fugitives were cut in pieces by the cavalry.

The corps against which the division of Lannes marched, seeing the first line give way, and the cavalry about to turn its position, fired only a few shot, and immediately quitted it. Two squadrons of cavalry, and a platoon of guides on horseback cut off their retreat, and killed or drive into the sea this body of 2000 men, of which not an individual escaped.

The village was then carried, and the enemy pursued as far as the redoubt, in the centre of the second position.

This second position was very strong, the redoubt being flanked by a ditch of communication, which secured the peninsula on the right as far as the sea. Another ditch of the like kind stretched along on the left, at a small distance from the redoubt.

The remaining space was occupied by the enemy stationed on the sand hills and in the batteries. In this position the enemy had from 8 to 9000 men.

Whilst the troops took breath, some pieces of artillery were planted in the village, and long the shore on our left. A fire was opened on the redoubt, and on the enemy’s right.

The cavalry on our right attacked the enemy’s left, which it repeatedly charged with the greatest impetuosity, cutting down or driving into the sea, every one that came in their way. But they could not penetrate beyond the redoubt without being put between its fire and that of the gun boats. Hurried by their bravery into this terrible defile, they fell back at each charge, and the enemy made a stand with fresh forces on the dead bodies of their companions.

The chief of brigade Duvivier was killed, but the Adjutant General Rouize continued to direct their movement with distinguished ability and coolness. The Adjutant-General Leturc, the chief of brigade Bessieres, and the cavalry guides, were at the head of the charging column. Leturc thought that it was necessary to have a reinforcement of infantry: on communicating his desire, the General in chief sent him a battalion of the 75th. He again joined the cavalry; his horse was shot; he then put himself at the head of the infantry, and flew from the centre to the left, in order to join the van of the 18th, which he saw on their march to attack the enemy’s right.

The 18th marched towards the entrenchments; the enemy at the same instant sallied upon the right: the heads of the columns sought body to body; the Turks endeavoured to wrest from our men the bayonets, which proved fatal to them. They flung their muskets behind them, and fought with their sabers and pistols, for every Turk carries a musket, two pistols in his girdle, and a sabre. The 18th at length reached the entrenchments; but the fire from the redoubt, which every where flanked the entrenchments, where the enemy again rallied, checked the column at the moment when every thing yielded to its impulse, General Fuguieres and Adjutant-General Leturc performed prodigies of valour. The former received a wound in the head, but he still continued to fight; a ball then shot off his left arm, and he was obliged to follow the 18th, which retreated to the village, keeping up however, a hot fire during the movement. The adjutant General Leturc, having in vain exhorted the column to throw itself into the enemy’s entrenchments, rushed into them himself, he was unsupported, and met a glorious death. The chief of brigade Monrangie was wounded.

The General in Chief direct a battalion of the 23d light infantry, and one of the 69th, to advance upon the left of the enemy. General Lannes, who was at the head of these troops, seized the moment when the enemy had imprudently left his entrenchments. He attacked the redoubt vigorously upon its left and on the breast work. The 22d and 69th leaped into the ditch, and were soon upon the parapet, and within the redoubt. Meanwhile the 18th pushed forward at the charging step of the enemy.

General Murat, who followed every movement, who commanded the advanced guard, who was constantly with the sharp shooters, and who on this day displayed as much coolness as talent, seized the moment when General Lannes attacked the redoubt to order a corps of infantry to charge and traverse all the enemy’s positions as far as the ditch of the fort of Aboukir. This movement was executed with so much impetuosity, and so opportunely, that at the moment the redoubt was forced, this corps had already reached its destination, and entirely cut off the enemy’s retreat to the fort. The route was complete. Confused and terrified, the enemy found every where the bayonet and death. The cavalry cut them down with their sabers. They believed they had no resource left but to fly to the sea, into which 6 or 7,000 threw themselves. There they were assailed by muskets and grape-shot. Never was so terrible a spectacle exhibited before. Not a man escaped—the ships were two leagues distant in the road of Aboukir.

Mustapha Pacha, Commander in Chief of the Turkish army, was taken, with about 200 Turks; two thousand men lay on the field of battle. All the tents, the baggage, and 20 pieces of cannon (two of which were English, being given by the court of London to the Grand Seignior) fell into our hands. Two English boats fled from our grape shot. Ten thousand Turks were drowned.

We took a near position, and removed the killed and wounded. Our loss, in this action, was 150 killed, and 750 wounded; among the latter was General Murat, who was wounded in the head, but not dangerously. The chief of the brigade of engineers, died of his wounds, as also did Citizen Guibert.

During the night the enemy’s squadron communicates with the fort. The troops are re-organized—the fort defends itself. We have established batteries or mortars and cannon to batter it, and it is to be presumed that it will soon be in our power. General Lannes was wounded in the leg.

In expectation of the fort surrendering, Bonaparte returned to Alexandria, where he examined the state of the garrison. Too much praise cannot be given to General Maramont, with respect to the works of that place, which he has extended and increased with equal industry and judgment. Every part of the service is completely organized. In a word, General Marmont has fully justified the confidence the General in Chief placed in him, when he entrusted him with so important a command.

ALEX BERTHIER,

General of Division, Chief of the Staff.

French Poised to Attack Aboukir

2008-03-13T02:52:00.001-04:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 36-39.

Battle of Aboukir.

Head Quarters, Alexandria, 11th Thermidor, (July 29.)

IMMEDIATELY upon his return to Cairo form the Syrian Expedition, Bonaparte directed his attention to the formation of different corps. He soon put the army in a state to march to new combats. He had destroyed one part of the general plan of attack combined between the Porte and England, and he every moment expected that he would have to attack the other parts.

The march of Murad Bey, and the movements of the Arabs on the Lakes of Natron and at Marjout, indicated a plan for protecting a descent either at the Tour of the Anates, or at Aboukir.

General Lagrance, with a movable column, left Cairo on the 22d Messidor (July 10), and arrived at Sababiar, where he surprised the Mamelukes in their camp. They had scarcely time to escape, and abandon all their baggage, and 700 camels. We took fifty of their horses. The Mamelukes fled into the Desert.

General Murat, with another movable column, received orders to proceed to the Lakes of Natron, disperse the Arabs collected there, second the operations of General Destaing, and cut off the retreat of Murad Bey. This General arrived at the Lakes of Natron at Kischef, and thirty Mamelukes were pursued, along with some Arabs, by General Destaing. Murad Bey, when near the Lakes of Natron, learned that the French were there, and made a retrograde movement. On the 25th (July 13), he rested near the Pyramids of Gizeh on the side of the Desert.

Bonaparte being informed of these movements, left Cairo on the 26th Messidor (July 14th), with the horse and foot guides, the grenadiers of the 32d and 18th demi-brigades, the pioneers, and two pieces of cannon. He determined to stop all night at the Pyramids, where he ordered General Murat to join him: arrived at the Pyramids, his advanced guard pursued the Arabs who followed Murad Bey, and who had begun in the morning to return towards the Fayum. A number of Arabs were killed, and some camels taken.

The General in Chief, with the head quarters, left Gizeh, on the 28th Messidor (July 16), stopped that night at Wardan, the next at Terrane, and on the 30th at Schabours. He arrived on the 1st Thermidor (July 19), at Rhamanie, where the division of the army formed a junction on the 2d and 3d.

Bonaparte received intelligence that the 100 sail of Turkish vessels, which anchored off Aboukir on the 24th (July 12), had landed about 3000 men, and some artillery, on the 27th (july 15), and attacked the redoubt of Aboukir, which they carried by storm. The fort of Aboukir, the commandant of which was killed, surrendered by one of those acts of cowardice which merit a severe example on the part of the government.

The fort is defended by a ditch twenty feet wide, and has a counterscarp cut in the rock. The interior works are in a good condition, and it might have held out until it was relieved. Adjutant-General Jellien displayed much ability in his conduct both in a political and military point of view. He placed in the front of Rosetta all his provisions and ammunition, and the sick of his corps; but he remained in the town with about 100 men under his command. He preserved confidence and tranquility in his province, and repressed the agents of the enemy.

General Marmont wrote, that the enemy had taken Aboukir by capitulation; that he was employed in landing his artillery; that he had cut the pontoons which we had constructed for the communication with Rosetta, on the passage which joins Lake Madie to the road of Aboukir; that the spies he had sent out brought intelligence that the enemy intended to besiege Alexandria, and was about 15,000 men strong.

Bonaparte was sensible that the enemy daily acquired new strength: that it was important to take a position, from which he might be equally well attacked, whether he proceeded to Rosetta, or invested Alexandria; and finally, such a position as would afford the opportunity of marching to Aboukir, if the enemy should remain there, attacking him, seizing his artillery, driving him into the sea, bombarding him in the fort, and retaking it from him.

Bonaparte determined to take a position at the village of Birket, situated near one of the angles of Lake Madie, from which we could march with equal felicity to Lecco, Rosetta, Alexandria, and Aboukir. The position had likewise the advantage of confining the enemy to the peninsula of Aboukir, of interrupting his communication with the country, and intercepting the reinforcements which he might expect from the Mamelukes and Arabs.

General Murat, with the cavalry, the dromedaries, the grenadiers, and the first battalion of the 69th demi-brigade, departed from Rhamanie on the 2d Thermidor (July 20), in the evening, to proceed to Birket. He was ordered to preserve a communication with Alexandria by detachments.

The army and the head-quarters removed from Rhamanie on the 4th Thermidor (July 22). On the 5th, it took a position at Birket. The miners were sent to Leda to gid wells; springs were discovered; the wells formed and guarded.

General Mormount was reinforced at Alexandria by the General of Brigade Destaing, who returned with a movable column from Mariout, where he had defeated a corps of Arabs and Mamelukes. In a consequence of the orders of the Commander in Chief, he sent to General Murat 150 cavalry, 40 dromedaries, and two 18 pounders, belonging to General Destaing’s column. This enabled General Murat to form a corps of 600 cavalry, 100 dromedaries, and five pieces of light artillery.

The army departed from Birket in the night of the 5th. One division took a position at Hafr-Lin, and another at Leda. The head quarters proceeded to Alexandria.

In the afternoon Bonaparte left Alexandria with the head quarters, and took position at the wells between Alexandria and Aboukir.

The cavalry of General Murat, the divisions of Lannes, and Rampon, were ordered to proceed to the same position. They arrived there at midnight on the 6th, and likewise 400 cavalry from Upper Egypt.

French Ravage the Countryside in Retaliatory Attacks

2008-03-10T02:00:00.001-04:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 33-36.

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

Prairial 1.—The enemy, who had been bombarded and cannonaded by a very severe fire, and who saw the destruction of the palace of Dgezzar [Jazzar, Cezzar], of that part of their fortifications which had not yet been attacked, and of all the public edifices, attempted another sortie at the 1st prarial, at day break; they were again repulsed. At three in the afternoon they rushed forward, and attacked every point. They availed themselves of the reinforcements they had received, and their object was to throw themselves into our batteries. This attack was made with more than their usual ferocity; they were, however, repulsed on all sides, except at the turn of the glacis, near the breach tower, of which they took possession; but it was soon retaken by General Lagrange, who attacked the enemy with two companies of grenadiers, and even pursued them into their external armed post, of which he made himself master, and compelled the enemy to retire into the place.—The enemy, in that reconnoiter, lost a considerable number of their bravest troops.

The whole of the siege artillery was now removed. It was replaced in the batteries by some field piece. What was useful was thrown into the sea. By means of a mine, and sapping, we destroyed an aqueduct of several leagues in length, with which Acre was supplied with fresh water; all the magazines and the harvest in the environs of Acre were reduced to ashes. At nine in the evening of the 1st Prairial, the drums were beat to march, and the siege, which lasted sixty-one days after the opening of the trenches, was raised. When they had passed the bridge, the division of Kleber began likewise to move. It was followed by the cavalry, who left 100 dragoons dismounted to protect, the workmen employed in destroying the two bridges. They had orders not to quit the banks of the river till two hours after the last of the infantry had crossed. General Junot, with his corps, had proceeded to the mill of Kerdanna, to cover the left wing of the army.

The enemy continued to fire upon our parallels during the whole night, and did not perceive till next day that the siege was raised. They had suffered so much, that they did not attempt any movement to follow us.

The army conducted the march with the greatest order. On the 2d we arrived at Cantoura, a port which had been our landing place for the articles coming from Damietta to Jaffa, and where it had been landing our besieging artillery, and the Turkish field pieces taken at Jaffa. This artillery, consisting of forty pieces, had been, from time to time, carried to the camp of Acre, to supply the place of the French field-pieces which we were obliged to employ as battering pieces in the siege. Bonaparte had not horses sufficient to draw this immense quantity of Turkish artillery. He preferred the mode of carrying off by sea to Jaffa his sick and wounded. He resolved to carry off only twenty Turkish pieces. He caused twenty to be thrown into the sea, and burnt the carriages and cases on the harbor of Cantoura.

On the 3rd the army slept upon the ruins of Cesarea. The following day several Naplousians appeared at the port of Abouzaboura. Some of them were taken and shot; the rest retired. Their purpose was to plunder the stragglers who are to be found about an army.

On the 4th the army encamped four leagues from Jaffa, up on a river which formed a kind of creek. Detachments were sent to burn the villages which had sent parties to harass out convoys during the siege. The grain was burnt, and the cattle carried off.

On the 5th the army arrived at Jaffa. A bridge of boats had been thrown over the little river of Bahahia, which is with difficulty passed at a ford along the bar, formed at the place where it falls into the sea. On the 6th, 7th, and 8th, the army stopped at Jaffa. This interval was employed in punishing the villages which had conducted themselves improperly. The corn, as well as the cattle, was carried off. The fortifications of Jaffa were blown up. The merchants of Jaffa paid a contribution of 150,000 livres.

General Dugna wrote to Bonaparte from Egypt, informing him that symptoms of revolt had manifested themselves in the provinces of Benisness, Carkie, and especially in that of Bahire; that the English had made their appearance at Suez: that the Mamelukes who were driven from Upper Egypt, and who had descended into the provinces of Lower Egypt, made several attempts to stimulate the people to insurrection; but every thing was quieted by the activity of the troops; and the vigilant conduct of the generals, but that the city of Cairo, and the other principal cities of Egypt, had remained in the most perfect tranquility.

These insurrections were a ramification of the plan of a general attack, which was to have been made upon the French in Egypt, and that at the time Dgezzar was to go into Syria, and when the Anglo-Turkish fleet was to present itself before Damietta.

The army set out on the 9th; Regnier’s division forming the left column, marching by Ramie, with orders to burn the villages, and destroy all the harvest. The head quarters, the division of Bon, and that of Lannes, took the central road, and likewise burnt the villages and the corn harvest. A column of cavalry was detached to the right along the coast. They scoured the downs, and drove in all the cattle that had there been collected. Kleber’s division formed the rear guard, and had orders not to quit Jaffa until the 10th. In this order the army marched as far as Jounisse; that immense plain presented but one blaze of fire; so dreadful was the vengeance inflicted for the assassinations committed on our troops, and for the very frequent attacks on our convoys, while this severe measure, rendered necessary by the laws of war, deprived the enemy of all means of furnishing magazines and securing provisions. The army encamped on the 10th at Mecheltal, and arrived on the 11th at Gaza, form which it moved again on the 12th. That city had conducted itself very peaceably: it was therefore entitled to protection of persons and property. The fortress was blown up, and three of the rich inhabitants, whose conduct had been very hostile, we taxed with a contribution of one hundred thousand livres. Kleber’s division continued a day’s march behind. The army arrived at Kan-Jounesse on the 12th, and again pursued their march on the 13th. They entered the Desert, followed by an immense quantity of cattle which they had taken from the enemy, and with which they intended to provision El-arisch. The desert between this place and Kan-Jounesse comprises a space of eleven leagues, inhabited by the Arabs, who had frequently attacked our convoys. We burnt several of their camps; we carried away a great number of their cattle and camels, and set fire to a small harvest that was collected in some parts of the desert.

On the 14th, the army stopped for the day at El-arisch. Bonaparte there left a garrison. He ordered new works to be constructed for the defense of the fort. He caused it to be supplied with stores and provisions. The army continued its march to Cathich, where it arrived on the 19th. The divisions, although marching successively, sustained great inconvenience from want of water. The desert is 22 leagues in extent, in which there is no supply to be had, except about half way, where there is a bad well of brackish water.

On the 18th the army continued its march. The head quarters were removed on the 19th, in order to proceed to Salchich. The division of Kleber marched to Tiach, to embark for Damietta.—The rest of the army was collected at Cathich, where it remained for some time, and then proceeded to Cairo, where it arrived on the 26th. The natives were astonished to see the army in the same state as it just came out of barracks. The soldiers considered themselves as it were in their native country in returning to Cairo, and the inhabitants received us as their compatriots.

The army engaged in the Syrian Expedition, in four months lost about 700 men by disease, 500 killed in battle, and about 1000 wounded, 90 of whom underwent amputation, and were rendered incapable of serving but in the invalids. Almost all the other wounded men are cured, and have joined their corps.

(Signed)

Alexander Berthier.

General of Division, Chief of Staff.

Cairo, 6 Messidor, Year 7.

French Further Isolated as Britain Signs Treaty with the Porte

2008-03-07T01:49:00.001-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 30-33.

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

Floreal 12.—We now vigorously attacked the breach, and carried it. About a hundred men had descended into the place; orders had been given that at the same time our troops that were in the breach-tower, should attack some of the enemy who had posted themselves on the ruins of a second tower which commanded the right of the breach. Orders had also been issued to fall upon the outer armed posts of the enemy. The enemy, as they came out from their outer armed posts, fled off in the ditch to the right and left, and commenced a fire of musquetry, which attacked the rear of the breach; some Turks who had not been dislodged from the second tower which commanded the right of the breach also began a fire of musquetry, which took us in flank. They threw down combustible materials, which struck confusion into those who were engaged in sealing the breach; the fire from the houses, the streets, the palace of Dgezzar, &c. &c. which came on the rear of those who descended from the breach into the town, produced a retrograde movement among some of those who had already got into the town, and who had succeeded in taking two pieces of cannon, and two mortars. Night now came on, and orders were given to retreat. General Rambeaud was killed in the place.

We learnt, as we returned to the camp, that Rear-Admiral Perree had taken, upon a cruize before Jaffa, two ships belonging to the Turkish fleet, on board of which were four hundred men, six pieces of field artillery, and a considerable quantity of harnesses, provisions, and 150,000 livres in specie, and the inspector of the Turkish fleet, who had given in an account of the forces embarked in the flotilla, and also a statement of the quantity of warlike armaments.

On the 21st, at two o’clock in the morning, Bonaparte advanced to the foot of the breach; the pioneers belonging to the divisions, the grenadiers of the 75th, and of the 19th, the carabineers of the 2d light infantry, were ordered to advance and to surprise the enemy. They arrived at the appointed spot, and put the outposts to the sword, but they discovered a series of internal entrenchments which stopped their progress.

In these assaults we lost about 500 men in killed and wounded. Adjutant General Fouler and the Chief of the 25th, Citizen Venoux, were killed, and General Bon was mortally wounded: the assistant Adjutant Netherwood and Montpatis, and Citizen Arrighy, my Aid-de-Camp, were severely wounded;--Adjutant Pinault was killed; and the assistant adjutant Genbault was mortally wounded; as also citizen Crosier, Aid-de-camp of the General in Chief. General Verdier commanded in these two affairs the grenadiers and the pioneers.

22—On the morning of the 22d, Bonaparte sent a flag of truce to Dgezzar, by a Turk who had been taken as a spy(with barbarians you cannot venture to follow the usages of civilized nations!). He was fired at, and the fire of the place continued. On the 24th the flag of truce was again sent in. He now got into the town; but they still continued their fire. There was no appearance of our receiving an answer: on the contrary, about six in the evening, on the signal of a cannonshot, the enemy came out from the right and left, but they were repulsed. Bonaparte beheld the object of his expedition accomplished. The army had traversed the Desert which separates Africa from Asia and had surmounted every obstacle with more firmness and perseverance than an army of Arabs. They had taken possession of all the fortresses which defend the wells of the Desert; they had dispersed, in the plains of Esdrelon and of Mount Tabor, an army of 28,000 horses assembled from all parts of Asia, in the hopes of plundering Egypt, thirty ships with a Turkish army destined to besiege the ports of Egypt, had been compelled to hasten to Acre, where that squadron closed its destiny. In fine, with about 10,000 men they succeeded in keeping up the war during three months, in the very heart of Syria; they took forty field pieces, killed or made prisoners of 7,000 men, carried away fifty stand of colours, opened the fortresses of Gaza, Jaffa, Caissa, Acre, destroyed the enemy that was marching to invade Egypt, took their field equipage, their camels, their General, &c. The season of embarking for Egypt called him thither imperiously; diseases of different kinds, were making a dreadful havoc in Syria; 700 men had already fallen victims to them; and by the accounts that came from Sour, we learnt that more than 60 men died daily in the fortresses of Acre from these distempers.

Bonaparte did not think advisable farther to prolong his stay before Acre, where a few days more would give him hope to take the Pacha himself in the midst of his palace. He imagined that, during that season, the capture of the fortress of Acre, would not compensate the loss of a few days, and of some brave men whom he might be obliged to leave there, and who would be absolutely necessary to him in more essential operations. All those who have carried on sieges against the Turks are well apprised that they all, even women and children, expose themselves to death, and defend to the last heap of stones that remains. They place no reliance in the good faith of capitulations, because they know of nothing else than murdering their enemies. Bonaparte decided upon raising the siege; but several days would be requisite for the removal of the sick and wounded. During that interval, he ordered all the batteries, both of cannon and mortars, to be directed against the palace of Dgezzar, and that all the siege ammunition should be expended in demolishing it, together with the fortifications, and other public buildings.

On the 27th, about half past two in the morning, the enemy made a sortie, but he was repulsed; at seven in the morning, he made another sortie on all points: He was again repulsed: the ground was every where strewd with their dead. We lost 60 men killed and wounded. General Verdiere commanded the attack on the trenches.

On the 28th, an English flag of truce advanced towards us, and brought back the Turks whom we had sent as a flag of truce to Dgezzar on the 2d. The flag of truce brought a letter from the English Commodore, the purport of which was to inform us, that at Dgezzar was under the protection of the English fleet, he could make no reply to us, but through the medium of the English Commodore. A packet was also brought to us, containing suppositious proclamations of the Porte, and certified by the signature—“Sidney Smith.”—These proclamations, charging us with violating the Rights of Nations, and forgetting treaties, were read by the whole army, who returned no other answer to them, but that contempt with which a dastardly action inspires true honor. The English Admiral informed us that a treaty was agreed upon between England and the Porte—signed the 5th of January, 1799. The English canoe, and the officer, were sent back without any answer. The fire was continued on both sides.

Berthier Describes Siege Warfare

2008-03-03T19:28:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 29-30.

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

Four pieces of 18 pounders were on the 12th playing from the battery; their direction was to continue to demolish the tower at the breach; the other batteries were directed against the rampart, and the out-works of the enemy.—In the evening, thirty of our men were ordered to take their post in the tower. The succeeding evening the enemy. Availing themselves of a serpentine fortification, which they had in the ditch, fired from behind at the breach; our grenadiers withdrew, after having reconnoitered the difficulty of getting down into the lower of the place…The enemy, at the moment we were mounting the breach at the tower, made a strong sortie from their height; but two companies of grenadiers shot forward, cut them off, and drowned all those who could not get under the protection of the batteries of the place.—In the attacks of that day, the enemy had 500 killed or wounded. Bonaparte ordered a second breach to be made in the curtain of the fortifications to the cast of the place, and a sapping, in order to march against the ditch; he set the miners to work in it, and blew up the counterscarp. On the 15th ammunition began to fail, and the fire consequently slackened.

The sappings of the enemy were pushed on with great boldness on the 16th, especially on their right, where it was their endeavor to cut our sappings for the mine.—Bonaparte gave orders that at ten o’clock at night some companies of grenadiers should throw themselves into the outworks of the enemy. The order was executed; the enemy were surprised and put to the sword; their works were taken possession of; three of their cannon were spiked; but our troops were not able to maintain their possession of the works for a sufficient length of time to destroy them so far as effectually to prevent the enemy from re-occupying them. These works were in fact too much under the protection of the place. The enemy re-entered them on the 16th, and immediately set about repairing them: but their main object was to counterscarp; being sensible of the difficulty of counteracting it outwardly, they resolved upon cutting the counterscarp towards the mask of our mine, to forward which we could only work during the night, as we were but eight fathom from the counterscarp of a ditch, which was only twenty feet broad. On the 17th, at three o’clock, we perceived that the enemy were debouching by a covert sapping against the mask of the mine. We commenced a cannonade against them; but the mischief was done. During the night, we again moved against them, and we again drove them from their serpentine fortifications, but the mine was completely counter-worked, and the vent opened.—On the night between the 17th and 18th, Bonaparte gave it as his opinion, that the breach at the tower was the only passage which we should continue to open; consequently issued orders for attacking on the night the armed posts of the enemy, and for carrying his serpentine fortifications which flanked the breach, and more especially that completing the gracis near our first mine. He likewise gave orders to drive the enemy from the breach, and there also to effect a lodgment.—On the 18th we descried nearly thirty sail of ships, which proved to be a Turkish flotilla, coming from the port of Maeris, in the island of Rhodes bringing very considerable reinforcements of men, provisions, and ammunition. This convoy was escorted by a caravel, and several armed corvettes. Bonaparte, previous to the disembarkation of the succors sent to the enemy, ordered the division of Bon to make the same attack during the night between the 18th and 19th, which had been ordered for the preceding night. At ten o’clock at night, the two armed posts of the enemy, their fortification on the glacis, and the tower of the breach, were all carried. A lodgment was taken in the tower and the fortification on the glacis, and the tower of the breach, were all carried. A lodgment was taken in the tower, and the fortification on the glacis of the old mine. The 18th and 32d demi-brigades filled up the enemy’s fortifications with the dead bodies of their slain; they also carried off several stand of colors, and spiked the cannon—never was more intrepidity displayed. On the morning of the 19th, Bonaparte gave orders for battering in breach the curtain to the right of the tower. The curtain fell, and discovered a breach far from being impracticable. Bonaparte rushed towards it, and ordered an assault. The division of Lannes was on this duty, having before him his pioneers and grenadiers, under the command of the General of Brigade, Rambeaud.

French Operations Continue in Syria

2008-02-22T08:34:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 25-28.    

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War]. 

On the 24th, the General of Brigade, Murat, was ordered to set out from the camp of Acre, with a thousand infantry, and a regiment of horse, and to march with all possible speed to the bridge of Jacob, of which he was to take possession; he was then to attack the rear of the enemy, who were blockading Sasset, and afterwards to join General Kleber, who was threatened by a considerable force.

Bonaparte left before Acre the divisions of Regnier and Samuel. On the 26th, he went off with the rest of the cavalry, the division of Bon, and eight pieces of artillery. He took a position on the heights of Saffarie, where the troops were all night under arms. On the 27th, at day-break, he marched toward Fouli, being arrived at the last heights from which Fouli and Mount Tabor can be discerned, he saw near the latter the division of Kleber engaged with the enemy, consisting of 20,000 cavalry, in the midst of whom 2000 Frenchman were fighting. We saw the camp of the Mamelukes extending from the foot of the mountains of Naplouse, a distance of near two leagues from the scene of action. Bonaparte formed his troops into three squares, the one cavalry, in order to turn the enemy at a considerable distance, to separate them from their camp, and to cut off their retreat to Jenin, in which place were their magazines, and to drive them into the Jordan, where General Murat was to cut them off. The cavalry had orders to go with two pieces of light artillery to storm the enemy’s camp, whilst the infantry advanced to turn their flanks.

General Kleber had received a supply of ammunition, four pieces of cannon, and a reinforcement of cavalry had left his camp at Saffarie, on the 26th, and marched to Bizard, with a view of attacking the enemy on the 27th before day light, whatever might be their numbers. But, notwithstanding all his diligence, he was prevented by the difficulties of the way and the defiles from arriving before two hours after sunrise. The enemy, informed of his approach, had time to put themselves on horseback. General Kleber had formed his troops into two square columns, and occupied some ruins in his front. The enemy had placed the Naplousian infantry with two pieces of cannon, brought on camels, in the village of Fouli. All the cavalry, to the number of 20,000, surrounded the remainder of Kleber’s division, which, by the fire of its cannon and musquetry, repulsed their numerous assaults with equal valour and coolness. We were only half a league from General Kleber when Bonaparte ordered General Rampon to march with his brigade toward Kleber’s division: General Vial to advance to the Mountain of Nuoces, and the guides on foot to direct our course so as to cut off their retreat to Jenin. The enemy did not, until this momet, perceive that we were French. Disorder immediately took place in this immense mass of cavalry. We fired an eight-pounder, which announced our arrival to General Kleber, who immediately ordered the village to Fouli to be attacked, and it was carried by the bayonet. He then made a charge on the enemy’s cavalry, which the divisions of Rampon and Vial had by this time cut off from the Mountains of Naplouse, and the guides on foot shot the Arabs, who were escaping towards Jenin. The enemy hesitated, he saw himself cut off from his camp and his magazines, and was seized with terror. He fled, throwing himself behind Mount Tabor, which witnessed his defeat. He reached in the night, and in the greatest disorder, the brigade to Gizah;-Makanie; one body threw themselves into the Jordan, and mistaking the ford were drowned. At this moment General Murat had surprised the son of the Governor of Damas at the point Jacob, had carried his camp, and slain all who did not take to flight. He raised the blockade of Sasset, and pursued the enemy several leagues on the road to Damas. The column of cavalry, which was sent to attack the camp of the Mamelukes, led by adjutant General Leture, had completely surprised it, taken 500 camels, with all their ammunition; tens, and provisions, made 250 prisoners, and flew a great number of men.

On the 16th the army remained under arms on the field of battle. Bonaparte ordered every thing to be burned or killed which was found in the villages of Noures, Jenin, and Fouli. It was necessary to punish the Naplousians: but, after having reproached them with having taken up arms, he stayed his vengeance, and promised them protection, if they would only remain quite in their mountains. The General Murat took no repose. He left a detachment at the bridge of Jacob, provided Sasset with provisions, and then advanced on the 17th to Tabarie, of which, on the next day, he took possession. He then seized all the ammunition and provisions of the enemy; the stores there taken were sufficient to maintain our army for a year.—General Kleber, with his division, took post at the Bazar of Nazareth, occupied the bridge of Giz-el-Mekanie, and the forts of Sasset and Tabarie. He was also charged to take care of the Jordan: Bonaparte returned to the camp before Acre, with the division of Bon, and the corps of the cavalry under the orders of general Murat. The result of the battle of Mount Tabor, was the defeat of 20,000 men by 4000 French, nearly the capture of their camp, their magazines, and the retreat of the enemy to Damas. By the reports of the enemy from Damas, their loss amounted to more than 5000 men.—Bonaparte received advice that Rear-Admiral Peree, whom he had given orders to sail with the frigates, the Juno, the Courageous, and the Alceste, had landed at Jaffa three twenty-four pounders, and that six other pieces of ten pounds were arrived from Damietta.

On the 19th, some Arabs posted in the environs of Mount Carmel, interrupted our communication. Adjutant General Le Turc advanced with a corps of 300 men, surprised the Arabs, and bore away 800 head of cattle.

On the 5th Floreal, the mine intended to blow up the tower near the breach, was completed. The whole of our batteries commenced a cannonade upon the place: we set fire to the mine; but a subterraneous passage under the tower presented a line of less resistance. A part of the effort was spent and lost. The mine blew up but on one side of the tower. It remained, therefore, in such a situation, that the breach was as difficult to access as before.—Bonaparte ordered about thirty men to post themselves in the tower so as to be able to reconnoiter its means of communication with the rest of the place. Our grenadiers readied the ruins under the arch of the first story, and took post there: but the enemy who kept up a communication by means of the narrow passages, and who were in possession of the ruins of the upper arches, threw down burning materials upon our soldiers, and compelled them to abandon their post.—Our batteries continued to demolish the tower, on the 6th, and to widen the breach. In the evening we made an attempt to take possession of the first story. The enemy, whom we could not drive altogether from the upper stories, threw down more burning materials, which obliged us again to withdraw. General Veaux was dangerously wounded. In consequence of his wounds, General Castarelli died on the 8th Floreal: in him the sciences lost a man highly celebrated for his talents and knowledge, and in the army a soldier equally active and brave. On the 9th, the siege artillery arrived, and every necessary disposition was immediately made erect it into batteries. Almost the whole of the enemy’s pieces in the front of attack were dismounted. They endeavoured to defend this front by flanking themselves with a double fire of artillery and musquetry. They constructed from external works. They had already erected one opposite their right: they constructed another on their left, opposite Dgezzar’s palace. These two works advantageously flanked the tower that was attacked. The enemy advanced by stopping, in order to increase the musquetry fire, and held us closely in. they finally marched on in a counter-attack. The enemy were greatly facilitated in pressing forward their outworks, by being protected by the fire of the musquetry from their towers, and from their very high walls. Our brave soldiers always carried the out-works, whenever they attacked them; but they were obliged to abandon them immediately, and the enemy retook possession of them.

French Campaign in Syria Continues

2008-02-16T16:15:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 23-25.  

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War]. 

On the 9th, a Turkish frigate moored in the road of Caissa. The Turkish vessel being ignorant of our arrival, sent her boat ashore, with her Lieutenant and 20 men. On their landing the French surrounded, made them prisoners, and took possession of their boat. On the 10th, the enemy made a sally, but was repulsed with a considerable loss. Destroyes, the Chief of a brigade of artillery, was killed. Dgezzar had sent his emissaries to Aleppo, to Damas, to Said, and to the Naplousians, with a considerable sum of money, for the purpose of raising in a mass all the Mussulmen, who were capable of carrying arms. He said in his sermons, that they were to fight with the infidels; that we were only a handful of men, unprovided with artillery; and that as he was sustained by a powerful English force, they had only to appear in order to exterminate us. We learned through the Christians, that a body of troops was accordingly formed at Damas, and that a large supply of provisions was collected in the fortress of Sabarie, occupied by the Maugrebins. Dgezzar expected every moment to see this force from Damas make its appearance, and this it was which encouraged him to make such frequent sorties.

On the 12th, our besieging artillery was not arrived; we learned, on the contrary, that three vessels of our fleet, which sailed from Damietta, laden with ammunition and provisions had missed their way, and fallen in, during a fog, with the English, by whom they were captured. The rest arrived safely at Jaffa. As some of our besieging artillery was on board the captured vessels, Bonaparte sent orders to Rear-Admiral Perree, and to Damietta, to replace them. The same day we again battered in breach, and blew up a small part of the counterscarp. Bonaparte gave orders that we should try to make a lodgment in the tower of the breach but in this we were unsuccessful.

General Vial set out at break of day on the 14th Germinal at the head of 4000 men, in order to take possession of Sous, the ancient Tyre. He reached it after a march of eleven hours. The road was impracticable for artillery on the way to Cape Blanc; on the top of a mountain appear the remains of a castle, built by mutualis an hundred years ago, and since destroyed by Dgezzar. After having passed Capre Blanc, we discovered, on entering on a plain, the vestiges of an ancient fortress, and the ruins of two temples. General Vial tranquillized the alarms of the inhabitants of Sous, who fled at his approach. They returned to the town; Turks and Christians met with equal protection; he placed a Garrison in the town of Mutualis. The population of Sous amounts to 1500 souls. The town is enclosed with a wall without any entrenchments. The walls are in some measure raised upon the stocks of antique pillars. General Vial returned to the camp under Acre with his detachment on the 16th Germinal. The English Commodore observed the troops of the Dgezzar to have been repulsed in a variety of sorties. He concerted a fresh sortie, in concert with the French emigrant Phelippeaux. On the 18th, the enemy, at break of day, came on with any attack against our left and our centre; each column was headed by naval troops belonging to English ships, and their colours were seen waving in conjunction with those of Dgezzar, and the batteries were all manned by English troops. The enemy made an attempt to surprise our advanced posts, but their design was seen through: we received them with a brisk fire from our parallels, and all that attempted to appear against us were either killed or wounded. The enemy ultimately retired without gaining an inch towards destroying our works. The central column acted with more obstinacy—their object was to penetrate to the entrance of our mine; they were commanded by Captain Thomas Oldfield; he advanced boldly towards the entrance of the mine, at the head of some of his intrepid countrymen; they attacked like heroes, and were received by heroes; death only checked their bold career; the approaches of our parallels remained covered with the dead bodies of English and of Turks. The corpse of Captain Thomas Oldfield was carried off by our grenadiers; they brought him to our headquarters; he was at the point of death, and soon after his arrival was no more.

Some deserters who escaped from shore informed us, that English gunners were actually serving in the batteries, and that the English Commodore had with him a French officer of artillery, named Phelippeaux. The deserters told us, that the French who were either killed or wounded in the different assaults, had been, according to the atrocious and barbarous custom of the East, mutilated by the Turks, who cut off their heads, in order to convert them into trophies. Some days after the assault of the 8th, a quantity of bags were perceived on shore: our soldiers opened them, and oh, horror! They found the bodies of our unfortunate men, tied in pairs, enclosed in the stacks, and thrown into the sea by order of the Dgezzar, and the English Flag floated on the ramparts alongside of that of the Dgezzar, at the moment when 400 men had been thus cowardly assassinated.

The Commandant of the Castle of Sasset informed us that some troops had passed the Bridge of Jacob, on the Jordan. The advanced posts of Nazareth also intimated that another column had passed the Bridge of Gizel Micanie, and had advanced to Tabarie: that the Arabs had shewn themselves in the openings of the mountains of Naplouse, and that Tabaire and Genin of brigade, Junot, had been sent to Nazareth to observe the enemy: he learned that they had already thrown themselves in the village of Loubi.

On the 19th Germinal, General Junot having been informed that the enemy was assembling in considerable numbers on the heights of Loubl, for leagues from Nazareth, in the direction of Tabarie, he began his march at the head of the 2d light infantry, and three companies of grenadiers on the 19th, forming about 300 men, together with a detachment of 160 horse, belonging to different corps; with these he proceeded to reconnoiter the enemy. He descried them at a small distance from Kascana, on the top of the heights of Loubl; he pursued his march, turned the mountain, and found himself surrounded by 4,000 horsemen, the most intrepid of whom poured down upon his corps; he had only time to attend upon circumstances, and he fought with a courage and coolness that did equal honour to the Commander and the soldiers: the enemy left five stand of colours among the troops. While the battle raged, General Junot gradually gained the heights, as far as Nazareth; he was followed as far as Kastcana, about two leagues from the field of battle. The enemy lost together with their five standards, about 5 or 600 men; we had 60 men killed or wounded. The Chief of Brigade, Duvivier, distinguished himself as usual. General Kleber, in consequence of the news of the battle of Loubi, received orders to set out from the camp at Acre with the remainder of the advanced guard, in order to join General Junot at Nazareth. Scarcely had he reached the heights of Sed Jarra a quarter of a league from the heights of Loubi, when the enemy, pouring down form these heights debouched into the plain, surrounded General Kleber with nearly 4,000 horse, and 4 or 600 foot, and prepared to charge him. This the General anticipated, by attacking at the same time the cavalry and the village of Sed Jarra, which he carried. The enemy retreated. The troops then returned to the position of Nazareth. Sed Jarra is situated at the distance of a league and a half from Cana. After the affair of Sed Jarra, the enemy fell back, partly on Tabaire, partly on the bridge of Giz-el-Makanie, and partly upon Baizard. This latter place, on the borders of the Jordan, soon became their principal rallying point, form whence, on the 25th, the whole of the hostile army moved into the plain. There they formed a junction with the Samaritans, or Naplousians. General Kleber informed General Bonaparte that the enemy’s forces amounted to 15 or 18,000 men, and that they were expected to be from 40 to 50,000 strong by the inhabitants of the country. He likewise informed him that he was on his march to attack them. Bonaparte learned at the same time from the Commandant of Sasset, that on the 24th the enemy advanced, and laid waste its neighbourhood; that he himself retired into the fortress which the enemy afterwards attacked; that they attempted to scale the walls, but that they were repulsed with considerable loss; that he however found himself blocked up with little provisions and but little ammunition. Citizen Simon, Captain Commandant of the fortress, distinguished himself much. Citizen Tedesco, of the Administration, the only Frenchman who had a horse, offered to go to reconnoiter the enemy, and was killed. Bonaparte was of opinion, that a decisive battle should be fought with a multitude, who only came to action when they killed it, and by whom he was harassed with the advantage of superior numbers. He was sensible of the inconveniences of attempting an engagement near his position before Acre; he therefore gave orders for making every necessary disposition to attack the enemy on all points, and to force them to repass the Jordan, (we arrived from Damas by passing the Jordan to the right of the lake of Tabarie, by the bridge of Jacob, three leagues from which is situated the castle of Saffet, and on the left of the lake by the bridge of Giz-el-Makanie, a short distance from the short distance form the fort of Tabarie.) These two fortresses are to the right of the Jordan.

The French Army Besieges Acre

2008-02-08T05:07:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 20-23.

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

The army began its march against Acre on the 26th Ventose; the army arrived very late on the mouth of the little river of Acre, which is at the distance of about 1500 fathoms from the fortress. The night was employed in constructing a bridge; the 27th, at break of day, the whole army passed over. On the 28th the Commander in Chief ascended an eminence, that commands St. Jean d’Acre at the distance of 1000 fathom; he ordered to attack the enemy, who were drawn up in the garden that environed the town, and compelled them to retire within the fortress. The army was encamped upon an insulated eminence, that runs near to, and parallel with the sea, and which extends as far as Cape Blanc, about a league and a half to the northward, commanding to the east a plain, about a league and three quarters in length, terminated by the mountains that lie between Acre and the Jordan. On the 29th Generals Dommartin and Cassareli went out to reconnoiter the fortress. It was resolved to attack the front of the angle at the eastward of the town. The chief of Brigade, Samson, was wounded in the hand by a ball, which passed through it. No intelligence had yet arrived of the siege artillery that was sent by sea. The works of the breaching batteries, and of the counter batteries, were commenced. The commander of the English squadron was well informed that there was a great quantity of provisions at Caissa; he resolved upon seizing them, and also upon carrying off some small vessels that had arrived from Jaffa with provisions for us, Bonaparte had provisionally entrusted the command of Caissa to the Chief of Squadron, Lambert, a distinguished officer. We heard a heavy cannonade on the 2d Germinal from the camp at Acre, on the side of Caissa. We were soon informed that several English sloops of war, armed with cannonades of 32, had arrived, attacked Caissa, and had advanced against our ships, with a design to take possession of them; that the Chief of Squadron, Lambert, had given orders to permit the English to approach, without displaying any movement or measure of defense; that he had also concealed a howtizer; that he placed in ambuscade about sixty men, who composed his garrison; that at the moment the enemy were on the point of landing, he took occasion to fall upon them, attacked them with a sharp fire of musquetry; that he had boarded and taken one of the sloops, and an artillery piece of 32, and made prisoners seventeen English; that he had discharged his howitzer against the other sloops, which took to flight, having almost the whole of their crews killed or wounded, amongst whom were two officers.

The English Commodore relinquished his designs against Caissa. He came and cast anchor before Acre. On the 5th the works of the siege were pushed on with activity. The enemy made a fortie, on the 6th in which they were repulsed with loss. On the 8th, the breaching and the counter batteries were finished. About three in the evening a breach was made; a mine was branched out to blow up in the counterscarp. The mine exploded, and we imagined the effect complete. The impatience of the troops determined upon the assault. The grenadiers sprung forward; but they soon found themselves arrested in their progress by a trench of 15 feet, well provided with a counterscarp. This obstacle did not damp their ardor. They proceeded to place their ladders; the grenadiers descended, but the breach was still from eight to ten feet above the ruins: some ladders were placed to it. Mailly, the Assistant Adjutant-General, ascended the first; he climbed the breach, and was killed. The fire from the fortress was tremendous; the counterscarp checked the progress, and compelled the grenadiers to retreat, who advanced the first’ the Adjutants General Lescalles and Laugnier were killed. An emotion of fear had seized the enemy—they fled towards the harbour, but were soon fought back to the breach, where the bravest of Dgezzar’s troops were engaged. The height of the breach above the ruins prevented our grenadiers from ascending it, which afforded the enemy sufficient time to return to the top of the tower, form whence they threw down stones, discharged grenades, and poured down combustible materials. The division of grenadiers, nor being able to pass through it, were obliged to take shelter under our trenches. Six men were killed, and twenty wounded. The eagerness to begin the assault, made our men take for certain that the mine had blown up the counterscarp, while it only pierced a tunnel into the glacis.

French Armies Arrive in Palestine

2008-02-04T19:15:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 17-20.

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

On the 6th Ventose, the head quarters of the army marched to Kan Jounesse, the first village of Palestine, when you get out of the Desert. Gen. Regnier’s division had orders to remain at El-Arisch till dispositions were made for putting the fortress in a state of defense, and the park of artillery in motion. About a league and a half distance from Kan Jounesse, we discovered [opposite] a road a few columns of granite, and some fragments of marble dispersed here and there, which betokened the remains of an ancient monument, as well, bearing the name of which, is to be found in that neighborhood. Abdalla Pacha, and the Mamelukes who had encamped in the front of Kan Jounesse, informed of the approach of our army, raised their camp during the night of the 6th, and fell back upon Gaza.

On the 7th, the army marched against Gaza; at the distance of two leagues from the fortress, we perceived upon the heights a body of cavalry of the enemy. Bonaparte formed his three divisions each into a square body; that of Kleber was ordered to march against Gaza; General Bon’s division moved against the centre; that of General Lannes was to occupy the heights on our right, in order to turn those that were possessed by the enemy’s cavalry. The enemy made several movements, and seemed undecided. They at length put themselves in motion to advance toward us; they, however, made immediately a retrograde movement; we marched against them with fixed bayonets, upon which they withdrew. Kleber’s division cut off and killed several of their riflemen; our cavalry also maneuvered to entice an attack, but they could not succeed in engaging the hostile cavalry, who disappeared altogether in the evening. The head-Quarters were established at Gaza, and the army took its position upon the heights.

Gaza has a circular fort, in good condition, forming in the interior a pentagon of about [240 feet] in diameter. It contained 15,000 lbs of powder, several cannon, a quantity of carcasses, carriages, with a large store of warlike provisions. In the town were also found about 100,000 rations of biscuit, with rice, tobacco, tents, and a large quantity of barley. The inhabitants had sent Commissioners to meet Bonaparte, and were therefore treated as friends.

8, & 9—The Commander in Chief passed those days in organizing the place and the country, both in a civil and military point of view. A Divan was formed of the principal Turks inhabiting the town. The provisions and ammunition found here, were more acceptable, as the supplies which were to have been sent after us from Cathick were greatly delayed, from the difficulty of conveyance across the Desert.

10.—The main body of the army began to advance toward Jaffa, where the enemy were collecting their forces, for the purpose of making a stand. We encamped on the 11th at Esdodes, and on the 12th at Ramlay, a town inhabited for the greater part by Christians. We there found some magazines and biscuit, which the enemy had not time to remove. We also found some at the village of Ledda. On the 13th, the division under General Kleber, which formed the advanced guard, marched to Jaffa. The enemy, on his arrival, entered the body of the place, and cannonaded his division, whilst it took its position. Bonaparte, and the other bodies of the army, arriving in succession, Kleber’s division and the cavalry were ordered to advance to the banks of Lahoya, about two leagues on the way to Acre, for the purpose of covering the siege of Jaffa, which is enclosed by a wall, and flanked by towers provided with cannon. Towards the sea are two fort, which defended the harbor and the road. The place appeared well provided with means of defense.

15.—In the preceding night the trenches were opened, and exertions were used to open a battery in breach against the most commanding of the square towers, and two counter batteries. Another battery was also erected to the north of the place, to make a diversion by a false attack.

16.—This, as well as the preceding day, was employed in completing our works. The enemy attempted two sallies, but were driven back with considerable loss. The batteries then opened their fire, and at four o’clock in the evening, a breach was made, which appeared to be practicable. An assault was ordered; the light carabineers, and the 22d brigade were the first to advance. They had with them the workmen of the engineers, and of the artillery: the chief of the brigade was killed. Our brave fellows flew to the breach, and ascended it in spite of a flanking fire, which we could not by any means subdue. We made a lodgment in the square tower, and hoisted our flag. The enemy made every effort to attack the repulse our troops; but there being supported by the division of General Lanos, and by our artillery, which fired grape-shot into the town, following the progress made by our troops, advanced from roof to roof, and from street to street, until they took and hoisted our flag on the fort. They at length reached the harbour, and terror seized on the garrison, the greater part of which was put to the sword. About 300 Egyptians, who escaped from the assault, were sent to Egypt, and restored to their families. We lost about thirty men killed in the breach and in the town, and had also several wounded.

The garrison was composed of about 1,200 Turkish gunners, about 2,500 Maugrabins, or Arnauts, and some Egyptians. We found in the place ten pieces of cannon, and 16 lb howitzers for the field equipage, sent by the Grand Seignior to the Dgezzar Pacha, and twenty bad brass and iron pieces, which were placed on the ramparts. 17th.—Bonaparte being master of all the forts, ordered that the inhabitants should be spared, and General Robin took the command of the place. He succeeded in extinguishing the disorders which naturally follow an assault. The inhabitants were protected, and immediately returned to their own habitations. In the harbor we found fifteen small trading vessels. Bonaparte formed a Divan, consisting of the most distinguished Turks in the place; he took measures for reporting it to a state of defense, and also established a hospital. Jaffa was to the army a place of the highest importance, as it became the depot of every thing that was to be sent to us from Alexandria and Damietta.

25.—Kleber’s division was encamped at Miski, where it had covered the siege of Jaffa. On the 24th, the divisions of Bon and Lasne departed from Jaffa, and encamped at Miski. The army then marched onward to Zeta. At noon the advanced guard discovered a body of the enemy’s cavalry. Abdallah Pacha, with about 1000 horse, was on the heights of Korsum, on his left was a body of 50,000 Naplousians, who occupied the mountaints. The divisions of Kleber and Bon, with our horse, advanced against the enemy’s cavalry: but the latter, by several maneuvers, avoided an engagement. The division of Lasne was ordered to march forward to the right, in order to cut off Abdallah Pacha from the Naplousians, and to disconcert his plan, by forcing him to retreat either to Acre or to Damas. Borne away by its ardor, this division advanced amongst the mountains, and attacked the Naplousians, who took to flight, and were pursued too far by our light infantry. It fell back, after repeated orders; but the Naplousians, looking on this movement as a retreat, pursued our infantry, firing on them from the rocks, by which means they wounded about thirty men and killed Citizn Barthelemy, chief of the 69th demi-brigade. They were checked, however, at the opening into the mountain. This affair cost the Naplousians more than 200 men killed and wounded. Our army was under arms all night, near the tower of Zetta, about one league from Korsum—We encamped on the 26th at Saburieu, near the opening of the defiles of Mount Carmel, on the plan of Acre. General Kleber marched upon Caissa, which the enemy abandoned on our approach. We there found 20,000 rations of biscuit, and as many of rice.

A squadron, consisting of two English ships of the line, a frigate, and two advice boats, were moored in the road of Caissa. The port of Caissa would have been of great use to us, if the fort had been armed, but the enemy had removed with his troops, all the artillery, and ammunition. We took possession of the magazines, and left a garrison in the castle.

Caissa is enclosed by strong walls, flanked with towers. A castle defends the port and the road. A tower, with embrasures, commands the town, at the distance of 150 toises, but is itself commanded by the heights of Mount Carmel. The place is not tenable against artillery.

Berthier Describes Actions in the Syrian Campaign

2008-02-02T19:30:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 14-17

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

The 19th demi-brigade, the 3d battalion of the demi-brigade belonging to the Syrian Expedition, the Nautic legion, the depots of the cavalry corps, the Maltese legion, have again been sent to garrison Alexandria, Damietta, and Cairo; and, in order to form moveable columns, destined to keep in obedience the provinces of Lower Egypt, and to protect them against the Arabs, General Dessaix, as has been reported, occupied, with his division, Lower Egypt. The command of the province of Cairo was confined to General Dugua. The others are entrusted to the hands of Generals Beillard, Lanusse, Zayonschek, Fugieres, Leclerc, and to the Adjutant-General Almeyrus. Citizen Poussielgue, Chief Administrator of Finance, remains at Cairo. The paymaster-General of the Army, Esteve, a young man of distinction, is attached to the Expedition. The command of Alexandria was a very important trust, and was conferred upon Marmont, General of Brigade. Bonaparte gave orders to the Adjutant Almeyrus, to whom he confided the command of Damietta to carry on with all possible activity the fortifications that were to defend it. He ordered him to embark provisions and ammunition for the army of Syria, by taking advantage of the navigation of the Lake Menzale, and of the port of Tinch, from whence they should be conveyed to the magazines established at Cathich, at a distance of about five day’s march. He ordered artillery siege pieces to be embarked from Alexandria. Boldness and pertinacity often lead to victory. Bonaparte thought he should bid defiance to the English cruisers. The ships with the artillery failed. There were some frigates at Alexandria: Bonaparte ordered Read-Admiral Perree to set sail during the night with the Juno, Courageuse, and the Alceste, to cruise off Jaffa, and to keep up a communication with the army. He calculated that they should arrive at their destination within a given time. It was necessary to risk this expedient for conveying some siege pieces, in the supposition that the fortress of Acre should oppose an obstinate resistance. Besides, no accurate information had been obtained of the strength of that fortress. The obstacles to be encountered in the passage of the Desert did not admit of artillery being transported by land.—Prompt and extraordinary measures were taken at Cairo to collect together the necessary number of camels and mules for the carrying of every thing requisite for the passage of an army through the Desert; artillery, provisions, water, &c.

The gun-boats had been constructed at Bonlac, and brought to Damietta, to take possession of the navigation of the Lake Menzale. General Kleber received orders to embark with his division for the port of Tinch, by way of the Lake of Menzale, and from thence to Cathich, where he was to arrive on the [4th February]. General Regnier, who set out with the Staff from Belbeis, on the 4th Pluviose, on his way to Salehich, had again left that place on the 14th, in order to be at Cathich on the 16th of the same month, where he formed a junction with his advanced guard. He left Cathich on the 18th, and arrived before El-Arisch the 21st Pioviose. Near 2000 of the troops of the Pacha of Acre occupied El-Arisch and the fortress. On the 8th of February, General Lagrange; with two battalions of the 15th, one of the 75th, and two pieces of cannon, formed the advanced guard of General Regnier. On the 8th of February, when approaching the Fountains of Messondiat, he perceived a party of Mamelukes, who were dispersed by his rangers. He arrived in the evening at a grove of palm-trees, in the neighborhood of the sea, and before El-Arisch. On the 21st, he advanced with his column on the left of the village of El-Arisch, while general Regnier proceeded on the right. Pluviose 21st, General Legrange advanced with rapidity over the sand-hills, which command El-Arisch, where he took a position, and planted his artillery. He caused the charge to be beat, when the advanced guard threw themselves with rapidity from the right and left on the village, which he attacked in front. The enemy occupied the village, which stands in the form of an amphitheater; it consists of stone houses, with battlements on the top, and is protected by a front. Notwithstanding the most obstinate resistance, and a violent fire, the village was carried by the bayonet. The enemy retired into the fort, but with such precipitation, that in shutting the gates they excluded about 200 men, who were killed or taken prisoners. General Regnier the same evening blockaded the fort of El-Arisch, and this reinforcement continually increased till the 25th, when the enemy, emboldened by their superiority in cavalry, encamped within half a league of El-Arisch, on a plain covered by a very steep ravine, where they considered themselves as safe from an attack.

On the 25th Pluviose, General Regnier acquainted General Kleber with his project of surprising the enemy in their camp at El-Arisch, during the night, which was approved by General Kleber. During the night betwixt the 26th and 27th, a part of Regnier’s division turned the ravine which covered the camp of the Mamelukes, killed of made prisoners such as could not escape by flight, and took a great number of horses and camels, together with a large quantity of provisions, ammunition, &c. Two Beys, and some Califfs were killed on the field. The Commander in Chief had left Cairo on the 22d Pluviose, with his Staff, in order to pass that night at Balbeis, the 26th at Cathich. On the 28th he was to sleep at Messondiat, and the 29th at El-Arisch, where at the same time were to unite the park of artillery, the division of General Bon, and that of General Lannes. General Regnier had ordered a few cannon shot to be fired against the fortress, and had already begun to advance his line of attack; but not being furnished with a sufficient quantity of ammunition to batter it in breach, he summoned the commander of the fort, and closed in the blockade; he had also advanced a mine under one of the towers, which however was countermined by the enemy. On the 30th, Bonaparte ordered one of the towers of the castle to be cannonaded; the breach being opened, he summoned the place to surrender. The garrison was composed of Arnautes and Maugrabins, all rude barbarians, without leaders, unacquainted with any of the principles of war acknowledged by civilized nations. Their answer was, that they were willing to come out with their arms and baggage, as it was their wish to go to Acre. Bonaparte was anxious to spare the effusion of his soldier’s blood; he delayed the assault. At length on the 2d Ventose, the garrison, consisting of 1600 men, surrendered, on condition of being permitted to retire to Baydal, by the Desert. Some of the Maugrabins entered into the French service. We found in the fortress about 250 horses, two dismounted pieces of artillery, and several days provisions. On the 3d, the standards and the Mamelukes prisoners, were sent off to Cairo. General Kleber had set out with his division, and the cavalry, from El-Arisch. On the 4th he was to advance towards Kan Jounesse. The head-quarters removed from El-Arisch on the 5th, and arrived on the heights of Kan Jounesse without receiving any intelligence of General Kleber’s division. The Commander in Chief sent forward some of his escort to a village where the French had not as yet been. The Mamelukes who were in it took to flight, and withdrew to the camp of Abdalla Pacha, whom we decried about a league beyond Kan Jounesse, on the roads to Gaza. Bonaparte, having only a picket for his escort, and convinced that Kleber’s division must have gone astray, fell back upon Santon, three leagues behind Kan Jounesse, in the Desert. On our arrival at Santon, we there found the advanced guard of our cavalry. The guides had led General Kleber astray in the Desert: but he stopped some arabs, who put him into his road, for he had been a whole day out of it. He arrived on the 6th, at eight o’clock in the morning, after a most fatiguing march of 48 hours, during which he was without water. The division of Bon and Lannes, who had followed his steps, were also led astray for some time. The re-union of the three divisions, and the cavalry, which, according to orders, was to have moved on successively, being all arrived at Santon, soon exhausted the wells. We dug very laboriously to procure water, which we obtained, but in very small quantities, insufficient for our wants.

French Maneuver Forces Around the Suez

2008-01-30T00:46:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 11-14.

[ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War].

Head Quarters, Alexandria, 11th Thermidor [July 29].

October 1, 1798; he punished the guilty, he pardoned the rest and re-established order. He established a system of defence for the city of Cairo, in such a manner as to secure it against the Arabs, while at the same time he rendered himself master of that populous town so as to command it with a battalion. The French parties were disposed in such a manner, that they were proof against any seditious movement. He adopted a system of warfare against the hordes which have always depopulated Egypt. He established a new distribution of imposts. He introduced economy into the administrative part of the army. He established a new distribution of imports. He introduced economy into the administrative part of the army. He established a commercial company. He employed General Andreoffi, distinguished equally for his military and scientific knowledge, to reduce the Lake Muzalee, the Pelusiac Mouths, and to take an accurate survey of all these points, both in a scientific and military point of view. General Andreoffi having on the [23d October] returned from this survey, set out again with Citizen Berthollet, to survey the Lake of Nitron. Bonaparte had established an Institute at Cairo. He formed there a library, caused a chemical laboratory to be constructed, assigned proper funds for the support of these establishments and sent out men of science to examine those parts of the country where the position of the army assured them of safety. In short, he made every preparation for his expedition in Syria; before his departure he wished to make himself master of Suez and to explore that point, of so much consequence to the commerce of India, as well as to resolve the question concerning the canal which was said to have joined the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, respecting which, history has left only doubts.

While Bonaparte was making preparations for his Syrian expedition, he set out for Suez on the [22d September]. He was preceded by General Bon, who, with 1500 men, and two pieces of cannon, had traversed the Desert, and taken possession of Suez on [December 7]. Bonaparte being at Suez, learned that Dgezzar has been appointed Pacha of Damascus and Egypt—that he was assembling troops—and that a corps was already approaching the port of El-Arisch situated at the distance of a day’s journey from the entrance of the Desert. He sent orders to General Reignier, who was at Salchieh with the division, to dispatch General Lagrange with the 9th demi-brigade, and two pieces of artillery, to take possession of Cathich, and to construct there a fort.—The same day Bonaparte arrived at Cairo, where he employed himself with the utmost activity, in completing the preparations for his expeditions into Syria.

The army for this expedition consisted of the division of General Kleber, having under his command, Generals Verdier and Junot; the 2d demi brigade of light infantry; two battalions of the 25th of the line, and two of the 75th.—The division of General Reigner, having under his command General of Brigade Lagrange: the 9th demi-brigade of the line; and the 85th.—The division of General Bon, having under his command the Generals of Brigade Rampon and Vial: the 1st battalion of the 4th light infantry; and 1st and 2d of the 69th; 900 cavalry of different regiments, commanded by General Murat.—On the 5th the troops lay on their arms in the Desert. On the 6th they arrived at Suez. On the 8th they passed the Red Sea, at a ford near Suez, which is practicable at low water, and proceeded to the fountains of Moses, situated at the distance of two leagues and a half from Suez, in Asia.—These fountains are formed by five springs, which arise from the top of small mounts of sand. The water is fresh, but a little brackish. There are found here the vestiges of a small modern aqueduct, which conveyed water to cisterns on the sea-shore where it was preserved for the use of ships. These fountains are at the distance of three quarters of a league from the sea. In the evening they entered Suez, but it was high water; they then ascended to the point of the Red Sea; but the guide lost himself in the marshes, from which he extricated himself with difficulty, being up to the middle in water. This guide must have been a descendant of the one who conducted Pharaoh. Suez seems to have been a considerable staple of commerce. None but barks can enter the port; but a sand-bank, which projects a league into the sea, which is dry at low water, and near which frigates can anchor, renders it possible to construct a battery, which would protect the anchorage, and defend the road.—The Arabs of Tor came to solicit the friendship of the French. Bonaparte encouraged commerce, by establishing a custom-house, where the duties are inferior to those paid at the time of the arrival of the French, and he secured it against the usual oppression of the Mamelukes and the Pachas.—There is reason to believe that Suez will assume more splendor than ever it enjoyed before, considering the dispositions for its protection, and particularly for transporting goods from Suez to Cairo and Belbeis, by organized caravans. During our stay here, four vessels arrived from Djedda. On the 10th, Bonaparte set out from Suez, marching along the Red Sea to the north. At the distance of two leagues and a half from Suez, he found the remains of the entrance of the canal of Suez, which he followed four leagues. The same night he rested at the fort of Adgeroud; on the 11th, at the distance of ten leagues in the Desert; and on the 12th, at Belbeis. On the 14th he advanced into Honareb, where he found vestiges of the canal of Suez, at its entrance into the canal of Suez, and his entrance into the cultivated and watered land of Egypt. He followed it for the space of several leagues, and ordered Citizen Peyre, engineer, to report to Suez, and to set out with a sufficient escort, to take a geometrical level of the whole course of the canal—an operation which will resolve the problem of the existence of one of the greatest and most useful works in the world. General Dommartin, commandant of artillery. General Caffarelli, commandant of engineers. The park was composed of four 12-pounders, three 8-pounders, five howitzers, and three 5-inch mortars. There we attached besides, to each of the four divisions, two 8-pounders, two 6 inch howitzers, and two 3-pounders. To the guides on horseback, four 8-pounders, and two 6-inch howitzers. To the cavalry four 4-pounders.

Berthier Explains Preliminary Operations in Syrian Campaign

2008-01-28T15:37:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 9-11.

ALEXANDER BERTHIER, General of Division, Chief of the Staff of the Army, to the Minister at War.

Head Quarters, Alexandria, 11th Thermidor [July 29].

YOU will find annexed, Citizen Minister, a relation of the campaign in Syria, and an account of the memorable battle of aboukir. The courage and constancy of our brave troops multiply our forces. We confidently believe that the Government does not lose sight of this army.

ALEXANDER BERTHIER.

Head Quarters, Alexandria, 11th Thermidor [July 29].

THE object of the military and political conduct of Bonaparte, from the moment of the army landing in Egypt, was to strike a great blow against England, at the same time that he neglected nothing that could tend to convince the Porte of the desire the French Republic entertained of continuing the friendship which existed between the two powers. On the capture of Malta, a great number of Turkish slaves were delivered, and sent to Constantinople. Since our entering Egypt, the Turkish flag has waved along with that of France; the agents of the Porte were respected. A Turkish galley was in the port of Alexandria, as well as several merchant ships.—Bonaparte assured the Captain of the attachment of the French. An order arrived from the Grand Seignior for the galley to proceed to Constantinople. It was at that time when the Turkish vessels usually leave Egypt. Bonaparte made a present to the Captain of the galley, and desired him to take on board Citizen Beauchamps, with dispatches, assuring the Porte of the desire the French nation entertained of preserving the existing relations of friendship. He signified to the Grand Signior the causes of complaint which he had against Achmet, Dgezzar, Pacha of Acre, and stated that the punishment he intended to inflict upon that Pacha, if he continued to behave improperly, ought to give no uneasiness to the Ottoman Empire. These were the grounds of complaint against Dgezzar:--Ibrahim Bey, with about 1000 Mamelukes, had fled to Gaza after the affair of Salehich; Dgezzar had given him a cordial reception. Bonaparte had forseen every thing that could alarm the Porte. He had dispatched an officer to Dgezzar by sea. He carried a letter, assuring him that the French Republic was serious to preserve friendship with the Grand Seignior and to live at peace with him; but he insisted that Dgezzar should dismiss Ibrahim Bey and his Mamelukes, and refuse them aid. Achmet Dgezzar(1) returned no answer to this advance of Bonaparte. He arrogantly sent back the French officer, and the French at Acre were put in irons. Dgezzar not only continued to receive the Mamelukes with welcome, but threatened the frontiers of Egypt by hostile preparations. The army received no intelligence from Europe. The ports of Egypt were blocked up; but all the accounts received over land announced that the policy of England had availed itself of the affair of Aboukir to seduce the Porte, and prevail upon the Turkish Government to agree to an offensive alliance against us. Russia seemed equally desirous to draw the Grand Seignior into its views, under the pretext of connecting their interests, in the view of attacking us. What an inconsistent union of politics! But every thing may be expected from a Government no less barbarous than ignorant, and overwhelmed with anarchy. Bonaparte concluded, that if the Porte declared for our enemies, a combined operation would take place against Egypt; an attack on the side of Syria, and an attack by sea. He accordingly resolved to march into Syria, if it remained our friend: return into Egypt, be at the combined operation by sea, which, from the season, probably would not take place before about the end of June. Bonaparte, after having driven Ibrahim Bey into Syria, had returned to Cairo. He had sent General Dessaix with his division in pursuit of the remains of the army of Murad Bey, who continued in Upper Egypt. He organized the Government of Egypt by establishing a Diwan in every province. He has communicated to the people the happiness of being their own governors. He caused Salchieh, Balbeis, Alexandria, and Damietta, branches of the Nile, and the mouth of the Rosetta at Lasba, to be fortified, he suppressed the sedition at Cairo on the 30th Vendemiaire.
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[Footnotes]

(1)Achmet, surnamed Dgezzar (which signifies butcher) the disgrace of human nature, regarded as a monster, even amongst the most barbarous people of the East, who has filled his territories with moments of cruelty unheard of till his time. He has caused several of his wives to be slain on the most frivolous pretexts. He causes the men he wishes to chastise to be loaded with irons. He cuts off with his own hands the heads of his confidants. He cuts off nose, ears, hands, and feet from the most trivial suspicions. He makes those who displease him rot alive to the very head. He encourages the robbery and peculation of his officers, in order to seize and strangle them for wealth they have amassed.

Bonaparte Writes from Syria

2008-01-22T23:00:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 7-8.

Letter from General BONAPARTE to the EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Head Quarters at Jaffa, [May 27, 1799]

CITIZEN DIRECTORS.

I INFORMED you, by the courier whom I dispatched on the [23d April], of the events so glorious for the Republic, which have taken place during the last three months in Syria, and of the resolution which I have adopted of repassing the Desert immediately, that I may arrive in Egypt before the month of Thermidor [June].

The batteries of mortars, and of 24-pounders, were established, as I announced to you, on [May 12], in order to destroy the palace of Dgezzar, and the principal buildings of Acre. They were played continually for sixty-two hours, and fully completed the end which I proposed, the place being incessantly on fire.

The garrison, in a sort of despair, made a general sortie on the [16th May]. The General of Brigade Verdier, was in the trenches, and the action lasted for three hours. The remainder of the troops arrived a week before from Constantinople, and who were exercised after the European manner, advanced against our trenches in close columns. We withdrew our men from the posts, which we had occupied on the ramparts; and by that means the batteries, on which were our field-pieces, could fire with a grape shot on the enemy. More than half of them fell, in consequence, on the field of battle. Our troops then beat the charge in the trenches, and pursued the remainder, the bayonet in their reins. We took on this occasion, eighteen stand of colours.

The opportunity appeared to be favorable for carrying the place: but our spies, the deserters, and the prisoners, all agreed in stating, that the plague was then making most terrible ravages in the town of Acre; that more than sixty persons died of it every day; and that the symptoms of it were dreadful, those who were seized with it dying in thirty-six hours, and in convulsions similar to madness.

Had we entered the town, it would have been impossible to prevent the soldiers from pillage; and thus, in the evening, they would have brought into the camp the feeds of that dreadful disease, more formidable than all the armies of the world.

The army left Acre on the [21st May], and arrived in the evening. We encamped on the following night, on the ruins of Caesarea, surrounded by fragments of columns of marble and of granite, which announce the former grandeur of the place.

During the last two days, the army has been filing off with detachments to Egypt. I shall remain for some days at Jaffa, in order to blow up the fortifications. I shall next proceed to punish some districts where misconduct has prevailed; and in a few days I shall repass the Desert after leaving a strong garrison at El-Arisch. My next dispatches shall be dated from Cairo.

BONAPARTE.

Bonaparte Describes Military Campaigns to the Directors

2008-01-21T19:26:00.000-05:00

From: An Account of the French Expedition in Egypt; Written by Bonaparte and Berthier; with Sir William Sidney Smith’s Letters. With an English translation (London, Edward Baines, 1800.), pp. 2-6

BONAPARTE Commander in Chief to the DIRECTORY.

Camp before Acre, 21 Floreal, An. 7. (May 10, 1799.)

CITIZEN DIRECTORS,

I HAVE already transmitted to you the information, that Achmet Dgazzar, the Pacha of Acre, of Tripoli, and of Damas, had been appointed Pacha of Egypt; that he had raised a considerable army, and that his advanced guards had even marched to El-Arisch, threatening the rest of Egypt with a speedy invasion; that the Turkish transport vessels were collected in the port of Macri, for the purpose of transporting the army to Alexandria, when the season should admit; and that, for the movements which existed in Arabia, it was to be expected that the number of the people of Yambo, who had passed the Red Sea, would be greatly augmented in the course of the spring.

You have seen, by my last dispatch, the rapidity with which the army crossed the Desert. You have learned, also, the capture of El-Arisch, of Gaza, and of Jaffa, with the discomfiture of the army of the enemy, who lost all their magazines, a part of their camels, their stores, and camp-equipage.

There still remained two months, before the season of debarkation in Egypt. I therefore determined to pursue the remains of the hostile army, and to carry the war, during that interval, into the heart of Syria. We put ourselves, in consequence, on our march to Acre.

On the 25th Ventose (March 15), at ten o’clock in the morning, we perceived the enemy on the other side of the village of Kakoun. They had taken a position on our flank: their left, being composed of the people of Naplouse (the ancient Samaritans), was supported by a small hill, rather difficult of access; their cavalry was drawn up on the right.

General Kleber advanced against the enemy’s horse; General Lasne attacked the left wing; and General Murat led the cavalry in the centre. General Kleber, after a slight discharge of musketry, put to fight the enemy’s right wing, and pursued them with impetuosity; they took the road to Acre.

COMBAT OF KAISSA.

ON the 27th, at eight o’clock in the evening, we took possession of Kaissa. An English Squadron was moored in the road. Four pieces of battering artillery, which I had caused to be embarked at Alexandria on board four transport vessels, were taken off the cast of Kaissa by the English.

Several vessels, laden with bombs and provisions, escaped, and cast anchor at Kaissa. The English wished to carry them off; but Lambert, the Commodore of the squadron, repulsed them, having killed or wounded an hundred of their men, taken thirty prisoners, and got possession of the gun-vessel, with a 36 pound cannonade.

We had, as yet, nothing to place on our batteries before Acre but our field pieces. We battered in breach a tower which formed the most remote angle of the place. Our mine failing, the counterscarp was not blown up. The citizen Mailly, and adjoint to the staff, was killed in advancing to reconnoiter the effect of the mine.

You will see, by the Journal of the Seige, that on the 6th, 10th, and 18th, and 26th Germinal (March 26, 30, April 7, and 15), the enemy made several brisk forties, but were always repulsed with loss by General Vial.

On the 12th (April 1), our miners blew up the counterscarp; but the breach did not prove to be practicable.

On the 11th (March 31), General Murat took possession of Saffet, the ancient Bethulia. The inhabitants shew the place where Judith killed Holophemes. On the same day General Junot entered into and possessed Nazareth.

IN the mean time, a numerous army was advancing from Damas. It passed the Jordan on the 17th (April 6). The advanced guard was engaged, during the whole day, on the 19th, with General Junot, who, with 500 men of the 2d and 19th demi-brigades, put the enemy completely to the route, took from them five standards, and covered the field of battle with dead bodies. This was a distinguished action, which did honour to the valour and coolness of the French.

ACTION AT CANA.

On the 20th, General Kleber left the camp before Acre. He marched to meet the enemy, and found them at the village of Cana. He formed his troops into two square bodies. The armies, after exchanging a fire of Cannon and Musquetry, which sailed the greater part of the day, returning at night into their several camps.

On the 22d (April 11), the enemy moved from the right of General Kleber, and advanced to the plain of Aledecten, in order to form a junction with the Naplousians. General Kleber pushed forward between the river Jordan and the enemy, turned Mont-Tabor, and marched the whole of the night of the 26th (April 15), for the purpose of taking the enemy by surprise. He did not arrive in presence of the enemy until after day-break. He then formed his division into a square battalion. A cloud of enemies surrounded him on every side. He had to encounter, through the whole day, repeated charges of cavalry; but they were all repulsed with the greatest bravery.

The division of General Bon left the camp before Acre at noon on the 25th (April 14); and on the 27th, at nine o’clock in the morning, he found himself on the rear of the enemy, who occupied an immense plain. We never before saw such a number of cavalry, wheeling, charging and maneuvering in every direction. We did not make our appearance at all. Our cavalry carried the camp of the enemy, which was distant two leagues from the field of battle. We there took upwards of 400 camels and all the baggage, particularly that of the Mameloucs.

The Generals Vial and Rampon, at the head of their troops, formed into square battalions, marched in different directions, in such a manner as to form with the division of Kleber the three angles of an equilateral triangle, extending about [4000 yards] on each side, of which the enemy formed the centre. Being arrived within cannon shit, our troops all presented themselves at once, and terror seemed to pervade the ranks of the enemy. In a moment, this immense cloud of horsemen was scattered in disorder, and reached the banks of the Jordan. The infantry ascended the neighbouring heights and escaped under cover of the night.

On the following day I ordered the villages of Genine, Hourez, and Onalm, to be burned, for the purpose of the punishing the Naplousians. General Kleber was engaged in pursuing the enemy to the banks of the Jordan.

General Murut, during this time, had left the camp before Acre on the 23d (April 12), in order to raise the siege of Saffet, and to seize and bear off the magazines at Tabarich.

He defeated the enemy’s column, and got possession of all their baggage. Thus this army, the approach of which was announced with so much pomp, being, according to the reports of the natives, “As numerous as the stars of the heavens, or the sands of the sea,” a strange body of horse and foot soldiers, of every colour, and of every country, repassed the Jordan with the utmost precipitation, after having left an immense quantity of dead upon the field of battle. If we may judge of their fears from the rapidity of their flight, the terror with which they were seized was beyond all example!

You will observe, in the journal of the Siege of Acre, the efforts which were made, on the one side and on the other, to effect the passage of the moat, and to lodge ourselves in the tower, where mines were met by counter-mines. Several 24-pounders having at length arrived, we proceeded seriously to batter the place. On the 7th, 11th, and 13th Floreal, the enemy made several sallies, which were vigorously repulsed. On the 8th of May, the enemy received a reinforcement, which was brought by thirty Turkish ships of war. On that day they made four forties. They filled our trenches with their dead bodies, and we effected a lodgement, after a most bloody assault, within one of the most essential points of the place.

We were now masters of the principal points of the rampart, the Enemy had drawn a second line of entrenchments which had the castle of Dgezzar for their point of support. It remained for us to make our way through the town: it would have been necessary to open trenches before every house, and to sacrifice a great number of men, to which I was by no means inclined. The season, in addition to this, was too far advanced. The object which I had proposed to myself was accomplished; and now Egypt called me away.

I ordered a battery of 24-pounders to be erected, for the purpose of demolishing the palace of the Dgezzar, and the principal buildings of the town. I ordered also a thousand bombs to be thrown in which, in a place so confined, must have done considerable mischief. Having reduced Acre to a pile of rubbish, I shall repass the Desart, and be ready to receive the European or the Turkish army, which in Thermidor or Messidor (June or July) may be inclined to land in Egypt. I shall send to you, from Cairo, an account of the victories which General Desaix has obtained in Upper Egypt: he has several times routed the forces which came against him from Arabia, and has nearly scattered the whole of Mameloucs.

In all the actions, a great number of brave men fell, at the head of whom I must place the Generals Caffarelli and Rombaud. A greater number still has been wounded, amongst whom are the Generals Bon and Lasne.

I have lost, since my passage through the Desart, five hundred men killed, and twice that number wounded. The enemy has lost more than fifteen thousand men.

I demand of you the rank of General of Division for General Lasne, and that of General of Brigade for Citizen Songis, Chief of the Brigade of Artillery. I have given promotion to other officers, as you will find by the list annexed to this letter. I shall take occasion to inform you of the traits of courage by which a number of brave men have distinguished themselves.

I have been completely satisfied with the army. In a kind of new warfare so new to Europeans, it has made evident that true courage and warlike talents can surmount every obstacle, and are not to be disheartened by any privations. The result will be, we trust, an advantageous peace and an increase of glory and prosperity to the Republic.

BONAPARTE.

French Give Desperate Account of Egyptian Occupation

2008-01-13T23:53:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 122-151

TRANSLATION.

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Cairo, September 22, 1799.

E. POUSSIELGUE, Comptroller of the Expences of the Army, and Administrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to the EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Citizen Directors,

I HAVE been exclusively charged, since the arrival of the army in Egypt, with the administration of the finances, and of the other departments connected with the political economy of this country.

I conceive I owe you, after the departure of the General Bonaparte, and in the critical situation in which he left us, a concise but faithful representation of the observations which I have collected, and the political opinions which naturally flow from them.

Travelers, and even the agents of the French Government, who have been in Egypt, have so cordially agreed in the exaggerated ideas which they have disseminated respecting the natural riches, and the treasures which this country contains, that a residence of fifteen months, with multiplied researches, and experiments by a great number of enlightened men, have not yet totally effaced the false impressions they had given.

The ordinary revenues, including the customs, were estimated from 49 to 50,000,000; some have even carried them as far as 60,000,000.

They can only be reckoned, in time of peace, at 19,000,000; a system of commerce well managed, and well protected, might raise them to 20,000,000.

In time of war (such as that in which we have been incessantly engaged) the revenues do not, by any means, exceed 12 or 13,000,000.

Abundance in Egypt depends, first, on a good Nile, and secondly, on the distribution of the water: every year the canals must be cleaned out, the dikes repaired, and care taken that none of them be cut sooner or later than the common interest appears to require.

The distribution and the maintenance of the canals are very far from being carried here to that degree of utility which one would expect to find in a country, whose fertility entirely depends on the observation of these two circumstances.

Even when the Nile is good, a great quantity of land remains uncultivated, for want of order in cutting the dikes: but when the Nile is bad, or middling, the loss is ten times greater than it ought to be, because all the villages being equally afraid of wanting water, those who border on the river hasten, before the proper time, to cut the dikes: which is never done without a contest with the villages interested in opposing it: and by this inconsiderate method of proceeding, a great part of the water, already so scarce, is lost without procuring the least advantage.

But however productive the harvests may be, they cannot, under the present system, increase the revenues of the Government, although it be itself proprietor of two-thirds of the lands of Egypt; while, on the other hand, a bad Nile diminishes them considerably.

The Egyptian system of finance is entirely feudal.

The peasant ploughs and sows for his own advantage, in consideration of a fixed rent which he pays in money, or in kind, to the proprietor.

This rent may be divided into three distinct heads.

The Miri: this is a kind of ground-rent due to the Grand Seignor; the proprietor receives and pays in to the Effendi appointed to collect it.

This Miri, imposed on the lands, amounts to 3,000,000 livres, according to the rent-rolls which fell into my hands.

The second kind of rent is called Barani, or Moudaf; it is composed, first, of an over-charge of income, laid on by the proprietor by way of requisitions of every kind, made on the village, either of money or of produce. Thirdly, of expenses caused by the passage of the troops, or by the visits of the proprietor. Fourthly, of all the official charges of the village and the province, pious foundations, &c. &c. These united, produce from all the landed property of Egypt, 6,400,000.

Besides this, there is a sum of 1,300,000 arising from the duties which the Cachess used to collect for their own advantage in the provinces which they governed.

Thus it appears that the sum total of the revenues in specie which are raised from the cultivators of the lands of Egypt (exclusive of the immense peculations of the Copts who collect them) amount pretty nearly to 14,000,000.

From there must be deducted 3,200,000 livres for the fais and the baranis of the lands which do not appertain to the Government, and which are estimated at a third of Egypt: there will then remain to the Government 10,800,000.

It is not possible to obtain more than this, without making advances, or exactions.

To this revenue must be added the fais and barani which is paid in kind. This only takes place in the provinces of Upper Egypt.

This is estimated at 1,800,000 quintals of all kinds of grain, for that portion which belongs to the Government: taking the whole as equivalent to 1,000,000 quintals of good wheat, at 3 livres 10 fols each, it will amount to 3,500,000 livres.

From this must be deducted 850,000 for the expenses of collecting and carrying, which amount to 17 fols for every quintal delivered at Cairo: there remain then 2,650,000 livres.

In time of peace the produce of the customs and of the other indirect duties is usually stated at about 5,000,000.

The Mint produces 750,000.

From this it appears that the revenues of the government in time of peace will be 19,200,000 livres; but in the state of war in which we are, the customs and indirect revenues do not produce more than 1,500,000.

The grain of Upper Egypt which is not sold on the spot, and which we have no sufficient means to bring down the country, will not produce more than a million. The discharges that must be given to the villages for the lands not watered, will amount to more than 1,500,000.

There must still be deducted a number of charges and pensions granted to the country, and which we have been obliged to continue; the expenses of the caravan to Mecca, which were partly supplied by us last year, and which must be wholly so, this; the expenses of the Divans of the Provinces, and of the Janissaries of the country: all these will take off nearly 3,000,000.

It is not possible, then, to take the revenues appropriated to the army at more than 9 of the 10,000,000; of this sum there only remains about 2,000,000 to be obtained from this period to the 20th of December next.

General Bonaparte levied in the first months of our arrival on the different nations, and on the merchants, about 4,000,000 livres of extraordinary contributions. He also laid a duty of two-fifths of a year’s revenue on the landed property of individuals, which brought in about 1,2000,000.

These expedients are worn out. No more extraordinary contributions can be looked for in a country where all trade has been at an end for nineteen months. The money of the Christians is exhausted; we cannot ask the Turks for any without occasioning a revolt, and, besides, we should in no case obtain it. The money is hid; and the Turks, still more than the Christians, suffer themselves to be imprisoned, to be beaten in the most cruel manner; nay, SOME OF THEM HAVE EVEN SUFFERED THEIR HEADS TO BE CUT OFF RATHER THAN DISCOVER WHERE THEY HAD CONCEALED THEIR TREASURES!

The collection of the revenues begins in November for the rice-grounds; in January for the land appropriated to wheat, and other articles which pay in money; and in June for those which pay in kind.

The peasantry are still more tenacious of their money than the inhabitants of the towns; they never pay but when they are absolutely forced into it, and even then sous by sous: their money is hid, their produce and their other property buried in the ground; they know they must pay at last, and that by doing it voluntarily, and at the regular periods, they might save themselves from those violent measures which always cost them double, or ruin them. They prefer waiting for a column of troops; if they see them coming, they immediately flee with their wives, their children, and their cattle; and the soldiers find nothing at their arrival but a number of empty hovels. If they fancy themselves strong enough to resist, they give battle, and call in the neighboring villages, and even the Arabs, to their assistance. They have always scouts abroad to give them timely notice of the approach of the troops.

Sometimes it is possible to seize the chiefs of the village. They are thrown into prison, and kept there till the village has discharged what is due: this expedient is tedious, and does not always succeed. If we are fortunate enough to carry off their camels, buffaloes, and sheep, they suffer them to be sold, instead of attempting to recover them by paying their debt, and expose themselves to the hazard of dying with hunger, leaving their lands uncultivated for the succeeding year!

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to maintain perpetually in each of the sixteen provinces of Egypt a column of eighty or a hundred men, whose sole employment it is to force the villagers to pay their taxes: very frequently after a long and laborious round the soldiers return with a mere trifle.

It is easy to conjecture all the evils, the excavations, the havoc and waste, and the confusion, which commonly attend those rounds, and which the severest discipline can neither prevent nor remedy.

An inconvenience of a very serious nature arises to prevent the collecting of the taxes during the eight months in which the country is not inundated; it is the period when the Arabs undertake their predatory incursions, when landings are made on the coasts, and when we are threatened with attack from every quarter. It then becomes necessary for us to be continually fighting; and a column of troops has scarce begun to move forward, before it is compelled to fall back, in order to punish the revolted villages, or to expel the Mameloucs and the Arabs!

The collection of grain is still more difficult. Like the tax in specie, it is absolutely necessary to compel the villages, at the point of the bayonet, to pay what is due; it must then be taken to the magazines on the banks of the Nile, embarked in boats, and sent down the river to Cairo.

When the two first difficulties are overcome, the third, more difficult than their, still remains, on account of the small number of boats which can be found for these convoys, and the short time they can be used, which is only during the four months in which the Nile is navigable. Since our arrival a prodigious number of boats have been cut up and burnt for want of other fuel; these neither have, nor can by any possible means, be replaced; a part of what is left is constantly employed in following the movements of the troops who are in pursuit of Mourad Bey.

Last year we were obliged to purchase for ready money at Cairo, notwithstanding the scarcity of specie, corn for the subsistence of the army, to the amount of more than 300,000 livres, though we had at that very time several millions worth in Upper Egypt.

This year the boats have been exclusively employed in bringing down the Government stores: the Consequence of this has been an inconvenience of another kind; the city of Cairo is in want of bread, and the uneasiness of the people on the occasion has already produced some degree of fermentation!

In despite of all these disagreeable circumstances, there was last year some specie in the country; some had been brought in by the commerce of the preceding year; and yet, when Bonaparte left us, there were more than 10,000,000 still due to the army, of which the mere pay of the troops amounted to 4,000,000.

At present the specie has entirely disappeared; nothing is now to be seen but medins, which circulate from hand to hand with inconceivable rapidity!

This coin bears but little more than a third of the intrinsic value of the other coins. Before the war, Spanish dollars were brought here in abundance, and the medins carried away: at present the dollars are all taken off by the coffee-trade with Yemen, where they are sent to the mint, and melted down; so that, like the gold coin, they become more valuable as they become more scarce, and the medins more plentiful. The consequence of this is, a rise in the price of every article, and a number of obstacles in the circulation of cash.

The present superabundance of all the mercantile productions of Egypt, arising from the total cessation of foreign trade, is a circumstance still more disagreeable: it will complete the ruin of this country; for the villages being obliged to pay us always the same sums, and unable either to export, or to find a market for, their produce at home, will speedily see their inhabitants reduced to the last stage of misery; while the army, which had so much difficulty to procure money while there was yet some in the country, will shortly be deprived of it altogether.

The military chest is always empty; and for a considerable period to come, we have not the most distant prospect of receiving more than 2 or 300,000 livres a month, while the ordinary expenses amount to more than 1,300,000 for the same space of time.

The natives of this country, notwithstanding their frequent insurrections, may be considered as a mild and tractable people; but they cannot be trusted; they are besides very far from loving us, although they have been treated with more kindness than was ever yet known to any conquered people!!!

The difference of manners, that extremely important one of language, and, above all, their religion, form obstacles of the most insuperable nature to every thing like a sincere affection.

They have the government of the Mameloucs; they dread the yoke of Constantinople; but they will never be brought to endure ours but in the hope of ultimately shaking it off. The only favour they might be disposed to grant, is, to allow us the preference of all the nations which they call Christians.

We have here, on every side of us, ten thousand secret enemies to one open friend!

We had succeeded in maintaining a good intelligence with the Cherif of Mecca; and the letters which he wrote to Bonaparte and myself had quieted for an instant the consciences of the Mussulmen in this country: but we conjecture, from some spires which he has sent to Cairo since the arrival of the Grand Vizier at Damascus, that he has changed his opinion, and, in consequence of the insinuations of the English, who have a force in the Red Sea, gone over to our enemies.

We had 41,000 effective men at our arrival in Egypt. There were then only Mameloucs and Arabs to fight; and yet these constantly and exclusively occupied the whole attention of the army to the end of January.

At present the Mameloucs, though dispersed, are notwithstanding almost all in existence; and may, whenever the attention of the army shall be otherwise occupied, reunite with the utmost promptitude: they have only lost four or five interior chiefs; the principal ones who remain are still powerful, and have a considerable degree of interest.

The Arabs are not at all diminished; they hate us as much as they did at our arrival; and their wandering kind of life renders us no objects of apprehension to them.

When we first landed, the Egyptians believed, AS WE TOLD THEM, that it was with the consent of the Grand Signior, and they submitted with more docility: at present they are perfectly convinced of the contrary. Those who appear to be in our interest conceive themselves authorized, BY OUR LIE, to betray us; they will certainly do it on the first occasion; and their hearts were bounding with joy when the landing took place at Aboukir in August last.

But when to these numerous armies, in the midst of whom we live, are added those from without; when the Grand Vizier, with the principal officers of the Ottoman Court, is assembling all the forces of the Empire to attack us in different points at once, by land and sea, assisted too by England and Russia; when he calls upon all the people of this country to rise against us; and finally, when the few Arabs whom he had attached to us leave us to go over to him; it is not difficult to discovered that our situation is desperate!

The enemy loses an army; he raises another instantly. He was beaten at Mount Tabor, two months after he was beaten at Aboukir; the same period is elapsed, and he is again ready to be beaten at Salahieh! But every victory carries off some of our best troops, and their loss cannot be repaired. A DEFEAT WOULD ANNIHILATE US ALL TO THE LAST MAN; AND HOWEVER BRAVE THE ARMY MAY BE, IT CANNOT LONG AVERT THAT FATAL EVENT!

The war has deprived us of a number of excellent officers, such as General Caffarelli, General Dommartin, General Bon, General Rambault, and General Dupuis; it has also deprived us of almost the whole corps of Engineers, and of a very considerable part of the Chiefs of Brigade, both of infantry and cavalry. Several able General have left us, and Bonaparte has taken five with him.

The army, without clothes, and, above all, without arms, and without stores of any kind, reduced to less than two thirds of its original numbers, has now no more than eleven thousand men capable of taking the field, although about thirteen or fourteen thousand appear under arms; this is owing to the appearance of a great number of soldiers at the roll-call, who prefer, sick and wounded as they are, doing duty at their quarters to staying in the hospitals or in the depots. When they are wanted to march a little farther than usual, or to fight, the force they have put upon themselves instantly appears. Wounds, opthalmies, dysenteries, and other diseases not less common here, have absolutely disabled the rest of the army.

Even those who are in a condition to march are exhausted by fatigue, enfeebled by the climate, and the wounds and sickness which they have endured; and their courage is proportionally diminished.

With this handful of men, we have to cover five hundred leagues of country; overawe three millions of inhabitants, who may be reckoned as so many enemy; and garrison the holds and fortresses of Alexandria, Rosetta, Rahmanie, Gizeh, Benisuef, Medine, Miniet, Siout, Girge, Kene, Coffeir, Cairo, Suez, Mitt Kaniar, Slahieh, El Arisch, Billbeis, Catieh, Damietta, Mansora, Semenoud, and El Benouf. Should the Grand Vizier attack us, we cannot oppose more than five or six thousand men to all the Ottoman forces which will be at his disposal; and should he attack us in two places at once, he will penetrate into the country without a possibility on our side of preventing him: this would certainly have happened to General Bonaparte, if the Turks, while they were landing at Aboukir, had made the Syrian army advance upon Egypt!

In three months, we shall be obliged to encounter, a second time, that destructive malady the plague, which may make dreadful havoc amongst us: this horrible prospect dismays the stoutest hearts.

To put finishing hand to our misfortunes, the Nile of this year has been extremely bad, having flowed off suddenly, and before the lands could be inundated in due succession; we shall not be able to draw any contribution from the villages which have not received their water, and we are threatened with the most frightful misery!

There is not a soldier, not an officer, not a general, who does not most earnestly long to return to France; persuaded, as they all are, that they are sacrificing here, without any advantage to their country, their healths, and their lives!

However, from the present situation of things in France, and considering that for more than fifteen months it has not been possible to send us any assistance, it is clear that we must forego the hope of having it in any time to do us service, especially as the favourable season has now be suffered to pass by.

The army saw with pleasure General Kleber at their head after the departure of General Bonaparte; no one is more capable of inspiring them with confidence and esteem.

But he is full of honour, and of noble pride; and the more sensible he is of the difficulty of the task thus left him, the more fearful he will be of listening to sentiments imperiously dictated by circumstances, and the immediate interest of the army, but which might some time hence be attributed, perhaps, to timidity.

Not having the same responsibility on me, I am not afraid, Citizen Directors, to lay before you the naked truth; and be assured that, however strong the representation I have just made, you would find it but feeble and imperfect, if the limits of a letter would allow me to enter into greater details.

Egypt is a very fine country; our dreadful situation in it is merely the effect of circumstances. It proves only that we are arrived too soon, and that the time is not yet come for us to establish ourselves.

There is not a doubt but that if we were peaceable masters of Egypt, we might in a few years entirely remove a great part of the evils which infest and desolate it, such as the plague and the Arabs; and give to agriculture and commerce a new activity, which should restore this country to its ancient splendor. This would render it one of the finest colonies in the world, which would speedily become the centre of universal commerce.

But Egypt is bounded by two seas (the Red Sea and the Mediterranean) and by deserts.

It is necessary to have a powerful marine to be in a condition of approaching it at pleasure; and above all, to be enabled to protect its commerce, and ensure all the advantages which it holds out.

The French Republic is at present without a navy; it will be yet a long time before it can have created one capable of contending with that of our enemies.

To pretend to preserve Egypt without having any means of sending thither, and of assuring the safety of our convoys of every kind, is merely to expose ourselves to the hazards of being compelled to abandon it to Russia or England, who, under the pretext of driving us from It, will establish themselves there, and very soon take effectual measures to exclude us from it for ever.

We might, indeed, still maintain ourselves there if we had the permission of the porte; but if it was not thought possible to obtain it before our invasion, it must be still less so now, when the Porte lies at the mercy of the Russians and the English: and even were she, contrary to all appearances, disposed, from political considerations, to suffer us to occupy Egypt provisionally, the English would never be induced to permit it.

When the expedition to Egypt took place, we were at peace on the Continent; we had still a considerable fragment of our naval force in the Mediterranean; and we were in possession of the whole of Italy, Corfu, and Malta; a hope, too, might have been indulged that we should obtain the continent of the Porte, at least tacitly; and thus we should have gained the end we proposed, against the English; for it is my opinion, with that of all the world, that our proper view was, by alarming them for the safety of their Indian possessions, to force them into a peace, advantageous for the Republic, by making the evacuation of Egypt an object of compensation for the restitutions which we should in that case required.

BUT THE FATAL ENGAGEMENT OF ABOUKIR RUINED ALL OUR HOPES. It prevented us from receiving the remainder of the forces which were destined for us; it left the field free for the English to persuade the Porte to declare war against us; it rekindled that which was hardly extinguished with the Emperor of Germany; it opened the Mediterranean to the Russians, and planted them on our frontiers; it occasioned the loss of Italy, and the invaluable possessions in the Adriatic, which we owed to the successful campaigns of Bonaparte; and finally, it at once rendered abortive all our projects, since it was no longer possible for us to dream of giving the English any uneasiness in India: add to this, that the people of Egypt whom we wished to consider as friends and allies, instantaneously became our enemies, and, entirely surrounded as we were by the Turks, we found ourselves engaged in a most difficult defensive war, without a glimpse of the slightest future advantage to be derived from it.

At present we can no longer flatter ourselves that the English will be prevailed on to agree to an equivalent in the articles of peace, for the evacuation of Egpyt. For in the first place, they know perfectly well the degree of weakness and want of which we are reduced, and which renders it impossible to undertake any thing against them: and in the second, that even if we should receive succours (which they will use every means in their power to prevent), we should not, on that account, be a jot farther advanced while we have the Turks to contend with; and while they are assured that the Porte will not make peace without their consent, or without stipulating that the preliminary article for terminating the war, shall be the evacuation of Egypt.

Under this point of view, our plan has totally failed; in as much as it can no longer affect the English; and thus, neither as a conquest nor a colony, can there be any farther pretence for keeping possession of Egypt.

But there is yet another consideration; it is, that if we delay entering into a treaty (such is the state of weakness to which we are already reduced), there is reason to fear that we shall be too late; that the remainder of the army will perish, or that we shall be obliged to evacuate the country without any conditions at all: while, on the contrary, we have it at present in out power to make it the price of peace with the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary States, the strengthening our old connections with Constantinople, and resuming in the Levant the exclusive commerce which we once enjoyed.

This treaty, to which the ENGLISH MUST BE ADMITTED AS A PARTY, will be a preparatory step to that peace which it is, at length, more than time to conclude with them. It will infallibly induce Russia to declare war against the Porte, and cause a diversion of the most important kind in our affairs in Europe; we might even hope to regain by it what we have lost in the Mediterranean.

I have the greater confidence in this opinion, because I am persuaded that the English cannot see without some uneasiness, and without a secret kind of jealousy, the progress of the Russians—a progress much more dangerous for them than our continental power, now that our navy is destroyed, and that we have lost our maritime conquests.

The only event which could possibly enable us to preserve Egypt, would be an immediate war between Russia and the Porte. All the Ottoman forces which are marching against us would instantly fly to protect the centre of the empire. In such a case, the Grand Seignior would grant us peace on any terms we might think proper to ask.

But it is probable, that without a treaty of alliance between the French Republic and Russia, which might be useful to us at this moment, but which would certainly be impolitic, this last power will only wait till the Porte shall have made peace with us to declare war against her: for, by fighting against the Turks, we diminish his forces and his means. This is toiling for Russia, who, on her side, unable to make war against the Porte without forcing her to conclude a peace with us, attains her purpose, which is the destruction of that power, just as effectually by making war on the French, whom she knows to be her sole stay and support.

The Ottoman Empire is generally regarded as an old edifice, tottering to its fall. The European powers have long been preparing to divide its scattered fragments, and many politicians conceive that the catastrophe is close at hand. In this supposition, they might think it but right that France should have her share in the spoils; and the part allotted to her is Egypt.

If this fall of the Ottoman Empire (which is very far from being so certain, when we consider the discussions and the variety of oppositions it would produce amongst the great powers of Europe, even among those who might have combined for this very object; when we consider still further, that it will be eternally the interest of France, England, Prussia, and even the Empire, to oppose it); if this fall, I say, should after all take place, France will always be in time to have Egypt. Besides, the French will be invited there by the Turks themselves, whenever the latter find themselves menaced by the Russians, whom they mortally hate.

France is so fine a country; the French are so powerful by their numbers, their riches, and their situation with respect to the other continental powers, that they cannot possibly gain any thing by a total overthrow of the system of Europe; while, at the same time, this overthrow maay give birth to a new and preponderating power, which shall deprive them of all their advantages in the Mediterranean.

Weighing all these circumstances, Citizen Directors, I cannot but conclude that we are too distant, and that events operate too rapidly, to permit us to wait for your orders before we take our resolution; at least we cannot do so without compromising the interests of the Republic, the safety and the honour of the remains of the army.

That we must infallibly evacuate Egypt, establishing, as the price of this sacrifice, a peace, together with all our ancient connections, with the Ottomans and the States of Barbary.

That all which you have now to hope for, whatever may be your views on Egypt, depends upon the present intentions of General Kleber, which are to retard the evacuation as long as possible by the delays which he will endeavour to introduce into the negotiation; if, after all, we are happy enough to be permitted to negotiate:

That finally, if the evacuation should take place without waiting for your orders, it will only be, because it was inevitable; and because, in the state of ignorance in which we all are, respecting the real situation of France, and of Europe, this evacuation was imperiously called for by prudence, and was not inconsistent with our political interests.

Health and respect.

E. POUSSIELGUE.

Bonaparte Writes Ottoman Grand Vizier

2007-12-16T17:13:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 171-178

TRANSLATION

Of a Letter from BONAPARTE to the GRAND VIZIER, dated 4, 1213 (Mahometan Era).

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE SUPREME VIZIER, ABSOLUTE VICAR OF THE GREATEST OF THE GREAT, OF THE JUDICIOUS INTELLIGENT, AND OF THE GREATEST OF ALL THE MONARCHS OF THE EARTH, THE EMPEROR OF THE OTTOMANS(1).

THE object of the present letter, addressed to Your Excellency, and transmitted by the hands of the Effendi made prisoner at Aboukir, is to furnish you with a faithful view of the state of things in Arabia; and, by putting an end to the war which has taken place between the Sublime Porte and the French Republic, to give peace to those two powers.

Alas! Why, after having been friends for so many years, do they now find themselves at war? Is it because the boundaries of the two States are so distant from each other that they fight? Is it because the Courts of Germany and Russia border on the territories of the Sublime Porte that they have united themselves with it?

Your Excellency cannot be ignorant that the French Nation, without exception, is extremely attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as Your Excellency is with the most distinguished talents, and acquainted with the real interests of Courts, can it have escaped you that the Russians and Austrians have conspired, once for all, against the Sublime Porte, and that the French, on the contrary, are using every possible effort to counteract their wicked designs? Your Excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mussulman Faith, and that Paul the Third(2), Emperor of Russia, as Grand Master of Malta, that is to say, Chief Knight, has solemnly sworn enmity to the Mussulmen. The French have abolished the Order of Malta, given liberty to the Mahometan Prisoners detained there, and have the same belief as themselves, that “There is no God but the true God(3).” It is then very strange that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friends; and contract alliances with the Russians and the Germans, its declared enemies.

When the French were necessarily of the sect of the Messiah, they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; now, that they are, as it were, united by the same religion, that Power declares war against them(4)!! The Courts of England and Russia have led the Sublime Porte into an error. We had informed It by letters of our intended expedition into Arabia; but those Courts found means to intercept and conceal our papers(5); and, as if I had not proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of its domains, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it; His Most Glorious Majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and conceived an aversion for the French, his ancient friends. Is not the kind treatment which the ships of war and merchantmen belonging to the Sublime Porte, in the different ports of Arabia, experienced at my hands, a sufficient proof of the extreme desire, and love of the French Republic, for peace and amity? The Sublime Porte, without waiting for the arrival of the French Minister Descorches, who had already left France for Constantinople, and, without inquiring what were the motives for my conduct, declared war against the French, with the most unaccountable precipitation(6). Although I was informed of this war, I dispatched Beauchamp, Consul of the Republic in the Caravel, in full confidence of terminating it; and while I was expecting the answer of the Sublime Porte, by the same conveyance, I found that he had been thrown into prison, and Turkish troops dispatched to Gaza, with orders to take possession of Arabia.

Upon this I thought it more advisable to make war there than in the territory of Egypt; and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the Desert.

Although my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea(7), full of courage, inured to war in the highest degree, and victorious; although it is completely provided with every thing of which it can stand in need; though I have castles and fortresses of prodigious strength, and though the center, and the extremities of the Desert are fortified by batteries of cannon; although I have no fear nor apprehension of any kind, though I have no precautions to take, and that it is impossible for me to be overcome; nevertheless, out of commiseration for the human race, respect for those honourable ways of proceeding which are respected by all nations, and, above all, out of a desire to be re-united with the first and truest of our allies, His Most Glorious Majesty Sultan Selim, I now make manifest my disposition for peace. It is certain that the Sublime Porte can never realize its wishes by force of arms, and that its happiness can only be effectual by a pacific conduct. Whatever armies may march against Cairo, I can repulse them all.—And yet I will facilitate, as much as possible, every proposition which shall be made me tending to peace. The instant the Sublime Porte shall have detached itself from our enemies, the Russians and the English; there cannot be a doubt but that the French Republic will renew and re-establish, in the completest manner, the bases of peace and friendship with the Sublime Porte.

It will be better for you to cease your exertions in forming armies, and amazing provisions and warlike stores to no purpose. Your enemy is not in Arabia. He is in Bulgaria, at Corfou, and, by your mistaken policy, in the heart of the Mediterranean. Augment the number of your ships, put them in good order, and form a corps of able cannoniers. Let not the sacred banner of the Prophet be displayed against the French, but prepare yourselves to make use of it against the Germans and Russians, who, after smiling at the rupture, which has so inconsiderately and imprudently taken place between us, will suddenly raise their heads, and, with a loud and piercing cry, offer you the most burthensome propositions.

If you wish to have Egypt—tell me so. France has never entertained an idea of taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte, and swallowing it up. Give authority to your Minister, who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt, with full and unlimited powers, and all shall be arranged without animosity, and to your wish.

Enter upon the way that will enable you to take vengeance of your enemies. Labour to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of the Ottoman Empire. Employ all your influence to prevent the acceptance of the propositions which will be made to you by your enemies, as well as to turn aside the terrible and destructive projects which they may unhappily have set on foot at this moment. Having had, during the past, so many motives to abhor the Russians, is it wise to abandon the Black Sea to them, and not rather to exact vengeance? Say but a single word on this last head, and I will exert myself for your advantage. The French army is by no means desirous of convincing the Ottoman forces of its discipline and courage; it would rather unite with them to punish their common enemy.

If Your Excellency, to whom I have addressed my wishes in this letter, will send for M. Beauchamp, who is on the Black Sea, and question him on the subject, I am persuaded you will abandon the unfavourable opinion you now have of me. If it depended on my exertions, the day on which I should be able to extinguish the flames of a war so absurd and so unbecoming both parties would be reckoned by me as the most happy of my life.

BONAPARTE.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)There are two copies of this curious State Paper. The one, faithfully translated from the Arabic by the Turkish Government, and transmitted from Constantinople; the other, loosely, but elegantly rendered from the same original by the French; and found amongst the Intercepted Papers.

Both are here given: but the first only is translated, as being infinitely more to be relied on than that so elaborately framed at Cairo, and expressly calculated for the meridian of Paris. The general tenor, however, of both is the same: and incidental variation or two will be noticed.

To remark upon the particular points of this paper would be endless. Whoever sits down to peruse it must prepare himself for all that ignorance, blasphemy, meanness and hypocrisy—all that misrepresentations, defeating its own purpose, and falsehood, so gross as to be felt, can suggest to a contracted and restless mind, incapable of directing any scheme of policy. Yet presumptuously venturing upon all.

(2)This Paul the Third is an Emperor of Bonaparte’s own creation. Since the French laid aside the Red Book, they have fallen into strange errors! One of their profound Legislators lately exclaimed, amidst the shouts of the admiring Senate: “What! Francis the First dare to brave the anger of the Great Nation! Well, he shall be Francis the Last!!!”

But how must the Grand Vizier (acquainted, as Bonaparte says he is, with the interests of Courts, and who must be supposed to be so, in some degree, whether he had said it or not how must he have smiled, with mingled pity and contempt, at the sottish stupidity, the whining and hypocritical cant of the person to whom the interests of a powerful nation were entrusted!

(3)A sentence taken from the Coran. In the original it is properly marked as a quotation.

(4)This precious sentiment is thus expressed in the intercepted translation: “So then, the Sublime Porte, which was the friend of France while she was a Christian Nation, has declared war against her, the instant she adopted, as it were, the Mussulman Faith!”

(5)This assertion is positively contradicted by Kleber: who labours to excuse the French Government to the Porte, for the omission of this information, by alleging the necessity of secrecy as to the object of the armament.

Kleber had Bonaparte’s letter before him when he introduced this remarkable deviation from it. What must have been that general’s opinion—what must now be the opinion of the world, of its veracity.

(6)The drudgery of remarking on this effusion of folly and wickedness in inconceivable. In consequence of the just indignation of the Porte at the invasion of Egypt, Descorches was dispatched to inform it of the amicable intentions of France in this act of unprovoked hostility. Yet Bonaparte has the stupid insolence to make the crime of the Porte to be, the not waiting for Descorche’s arrival!!!

(7)It is but just to observe, that there is a considerable variation in the sense of the corresponding passages in this and the intercepted copy. That says—“My army is strong, perfectly disciplined, and amply provided with every thing that can render it victorious over your armies, though they be as innumerable as the sands of the sea.” Whether this qui-pro-quo arises from the imperfect wording of the Arabic, or from an idea in Bonaparte, that the original rhodomontade was too extravagant for France, cannot be told. The Turks could have no temptation to exaggerate the absurdity of this matchless production. Enough remained, though this boast had been withdrawn, to provoke the bitter smile of the Ottoman Court. But what must have been the sensations of the Grand-Vizier, when he heard Bonaparte vaunt of the ample manner in which his army was supplied, when (As it appears from Kleber) he well knew it to be perishing with want; or of his being invincible, when the whole of his (the Vizier’s) long march, from Damascus to Gaza, had been over the mangled carcasses of the French, whom the General had left to the hyeanas of Syria, in his hasty and disgraceful flight.

With this observation this letter is left to the scorn of the world.

The English reader, when he compares it with BONAPARTE’S parting instructions to KLEBER, will not fail to be struck with the sincerity of an overture, which is not followed up at all except 1500 Frenchmen shall have died of the plague, in which, in that case, is to be followed up only by a negociation SURELY TO GAIN TIME.

Officer Descibres Desperate Situation in Egypt

2007-12-12T23:28:00.000-05:00

General Describes Deteriorating Condition of the Army

2007-12-10T18:54:00.000-05:00

Commissary Urges Negotiations with the British

2007-12-09T19:41:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 88-91.

TRANSLATION

LIBERTY. EQUALITY.

E. POUSSIELGUE(1), Comptroller of the Expences of the Army, and Administrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to Citizen MERLIN, Memmber of the Executive Directory.

Citizen Director,

SINCE the delivery to Citizen Barras of the first dispatch which I had the honour to address to you, the particular conferences which have taken place with the Effendi, who is returned from Damascus, have afforded us, notwithstanding the letter of the Grand Vizier, some glimpses of a plan of accommodating matters, which may, in its consequences, become extremely important for the Republic; its final success, however, depends entirely on the part which the English may think proper to take in it.

General Kleber is now engaged in arranging for the Directory the notes which contain the substance of the conference. To me it is evident that the Grand Vizier would be disposed to do every thing we could wish; if he were not afraid that the instant his communications with us were discovered, Ruffia would suddenly fall upon the Ottoman Empire, which is at this time in no state of defence. But, if the Porte were sure of a powerful alliance, which would support her feeble efforts at the outset, and finally render her victorious, she would not hesitate an instant in forming her resolution. After all, these measures, as I have already said, cannot be put in execution unless the English become a party in them, and unite with the Porte and with us.

Now as the French Republic has nothing to apprehend from the English, which is not trifling when compared with the losses she must inevitably sustain from the establishment of the Ruffians in the Mediterranean; as there is not a chance of recovering from the English any part of what they have taken from us during the present war, but by an immediate treaty, which should hold out to them equivalent advantages elsewhere; and, on the supposition that they would agree to no restitution, there would be no present purpose answered by continuing the war, and no inconvenience sustained by adjourning our claims (reclamations) to a happier period; the Executive Directory, if it should relish the plan resulting from the notes which General Kleber is preparing to send home, may early remove every difficulty; and by an alliance with England and the Porte, deliver, at one stroke, the French Republic from these two powerful enemies, and from all the others, whose fall their defection from the alliance would necessarily ensure.

At all events, IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MOST EARNEST MANNER WITH THE ENGLISH AND THE PORTE; EVEN IF NO OTHER ADVANTAGE SHOULD RESULT FROM THEM THAN GAINING TIME, AND GIVING OFFENCE TO RUSSIA; such offence as should induce her to declare war against the Grand Seignior, to an opportunity of doing which she seems to look forward with impatience.

Health and respect.

POUSSIELGUE.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)The name of Poussielgue is familiar to the readers of the intercepted correspondence. They have seen and admired his accurate description of the victory of Aboukir: he appears here in a new light; and though his views for this country cannot be considered as evincing much knowledge of our character or connexions, yet his observations, as far as they respect France, must be allowed to be judicious. It would be superfluous to dwell on the importance of this letter, or to call the reader’s attention to the hopeless situation of the French affairs in the Mediterranean. The defultory whining of Le Roy showed that their commerce was annihilated there; the strong and conclusive representations of Poussielgue prove that their military influence will not long survive it.

Comptroller of Finances Confirms the Economic Disaster in Egypt

2007-12-07T17:55:00.000-05:00

Commissary Discusses British Blockade

2007-12-06T00:47:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 74-80.

TRANSLATION.

MARINE OFFICE.

Alexandria, October 1, 1799.

LE ROY, Commissary to the Marine in Egypt, to the Minister of Marine and of the Colonies.

Citizen Minister,

I MOST anxiously wish that the safe arrival of the four vessels under the command of Rear-admiral Ganteaume may have put you in possession of the short letter which I had just time to dispatch; duplicates of which were put on board them on the 22d of August, the day of their departure.

At all events, however, I send you a list of the names, &c. of those vessels:

Le Murion, of 28 guns, 18-pounders on the main-deck. Ganteaume, Rear-admiral; De la Rue, Captain.

Le Carrere, of 28 guns, 12-pounders. Dumanoir’le Pelley, General of Division.

(Both of these frigates are Venetian built; bolted with iron, and coppered here; the first on the 24th of October, and the second the 15th of November last.)

L’independent, Advice-boat, 4 six-pounders. Gaftaud, Ensign.

La Revanche, Advice-boat, 4 three-pounders. Picard, Ensign.

General Bonaparte took his passage on board Le Muiron. The Proclamations, which I enclose, first announced to the army his departure, and the appointment of General Kleber in his stead.

I should have been happy to send you a correct list of the passengers on board these four vessels; but the secrecy of their departure prevented the names from being entered on the registers of the proper office; and I have asked in vain for information from the officers of the present staff. You will find at the conclusion of my letter the only list which the first clerk of the Navy Office was able to procure me; and another made up on conjecture.

General Bonaparte and Rear-admiral Ganteaume will have given you better information than I can pretend to do on our internal situation. I shall merely confine myself to hazarding a few brief observations on the port of Alexandria.

Deprived of nearly all correspondence with France since our arrival in this country, we have the most undoubted proofs of the successful activity of the enemy in intercepting our communications. It strikes me therefore, that it would be exceedingly proper to dispatch, by a swift-sailing vessel, a cipher that would at once enable me to send you more detailed accounts.

From the time that General Bonaparte left us, the men on the look-out have discovered but three ships in the offing; and a boat which was suspected to have dispatches on board. We might easily have taken it, had we been provided with a few light, copper-bottomed vessels. It certainly does not fall within my department to say any thing respecting the naval forces. The sole means of giving effect to the successes of the land army; but I must, notwithstanding, do myself the honour to hint to you, that during those periods when the blockade is accidentally raised, a few corvettes, carrying from 12 to 16 guns, and coppered, might be successfully employed on expeditions of the utmost utility to the colony.

Here is the copy of a report made to the Directory by the Commander in Chief: “We have a confused account of an army collecting in Syria, under the immediate command of the Grand Vizier, composed first, of the troops which followed him from Constantinople; secondly, of those of Djezzar, Pashaw of Acre, and, thirdly, of the remainder of the Mameloucs, under Ibrahim, ancient Cheik-el-beled, or chief of the Beys.”

Whatever, Citizen Minister, may be the issue of our military operations, I cannot but think it of the utmost moment that the Executive Directory should appoint a commissary, with the requisite powers, to supply the void of the inspection, formerly confided to the ambassador at the Ottoman Porte. They should also consult on the means, either of diminishing the losses of the Levant trade; or rather of reproducing and invigorating it, at the period of peace: the employment and the subsistence of the fourteen provinces imperiously call for something of this kind.

These useful functions, Citizen Minister, should be confided in some former manager of these establishments; one habituated to repair the evils which a war of invasion, and its attendant consequences, inevitably bring on foreign trade. It will be also essentially necessary to define with rigorous exactness the limits of authority in each department. Military ardour enters little into the system of a counterpoising power: it sacrifices every thing to the calls of the moment; it lays its hands on the civil officers of every description. Soldiers forget what influence a respect for the laws and a love of order has on the event of things; they listen only to an interested ambition, and occasion, without intending it, disorders of the most irreparable kind. I have seen myself, an officer, in other respects a valuable character, insist upon commanding the harbour, the troops, and the workmen! Did a Rear admiral chance to drop in; their authorities instantly clashed: confusion succeeded to confusion; and private interest, which alone pursues its object with steadiness, took advantage of these multiplied pretensions of the different orders in the Mediterranean, and the re-establishment of trade in that sea, cal for the most prompt, decisive, and judicious measures.

Health and respect.

LE ROY.

P.S. Since my letter was finished, I have had an opportunity of procuring some information form the captain of a ship, who has frequented the ports of the Levant. The merchants have constantly rejected my application.

Our merchandise was usually exchanged in Egypt for the merchandise of the country, which consisted of the productions of Yemen, and those of the interior of Africa.

The Beys took from the traders the articles of which they stood in need; but always on credit. They paid for them at their leisure; so that there are considerable debts still out-standing in most of the commercial towns of the country; some arising from exchanges which have not been completed, and others from former demands.

In the present situation of things, it would seem to be no less an act of prudence than of justice to empower an agent of Government to lay before them the account-books of the different houses in advance, that an estimate may be formed of what is due to the whole body, and proper measures taken to recover it.

With respect to the other ports of the Levant, nothing but peace can enable the merchants to get in what is due to them. The object of Government should be to furnish them with the degree of protection necessary to support and enforce their claims.

LE ROY.

Report Outlines Debt Bonaparte Accumulated in Egypt

2007-12-03T23:10:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 57-60.

TRANSLATION.

Army of the East.

French Republic.

ESTIMATE of the different sums due on the 23d of August 1799, the Period at which General KLEBER took upon himself the Command of the Army.

PAY of the army -- -- 4,015,000

Extraordinaries -- -- 576,000

Difference of pay, between the law of the 2d Thermidor, in the year 2, and that of the 23d Floreal, in the year 5, due to part of the army -- -- 802,332

Artillery -- -- 91,214

Marine, military, and merchant service, by a rough calculation -- -- 3,962,124

Military subsistence -- -- 1,198,973

Clothing -- -- 144,381

Military Hospitals -- -- 311,277

Military Convoys -- -- 177,098

Military Posts -- -- 5,432

To the Interceptor of the saddle manufactory -- -- 12,601

To the Interceptor of the boot manufactory -- -- 6,000

To the Commissaries at Suez – 7,014

To certain French, Turks, and Greeks, who have furnished provisions at Alexandria and elsewhere -- -- 41,980

To Citizen Rosetty for provisions for the army, when on its march to Rhamanie -- -- 3,222

Total -- -- 11,315,252

OBSERVATIONS.

Since the army quitted France, the expenditure has exceeded the receipts by 11,315,252 livres—this debt, then, must inevitably continue increasing. At our first arrival here, requisitions were made in all the towns for the immediate subsistence of the troops. They have never been paid for.

Extraordinary contributions were levied upon the merchants, tradesmen, &c.

The assets of the Mameloucs were also seized on our arrival; their wives been made to pay an extraordinary imposition.

The receipts of the last year were greater than those of the present can possibly be. The inundation has failed, and many villages have been deprived of water.

The debt above stated, does not include what is due to the provinces for the supplies in kind, with which the troops were furnished during their march.

It is evident from these observations, that, as long as the army of Egypt is engaged in hostilities, there can be no foreign trade; nor can the receipts be possibly made to answer the expenses. It is peace alone which can place the receipts on a satisfactory footing.

Certified by me,

E. POUSSIELGUE, Commissary-general, &c. to be conformable to the respective lifts delivered to me at Cairo, Oct. 7, 1799.

Examined by the Commander in Chief,

KLEBER.

Kleber Addresses French Soldiers after Bonaparte Leaves

2007-12-01T15:24:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 55-56.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Cairo, August 31, 1799.

KLEBER, Commander in Chief, to the ARMY SOLDIERS!

MOTIVES of the most imperious nature have determined the Commander in Chief, Bonaparte, to return to France.

The dangers incident to a voyage undertaken in no very favourable part of the year(1), on a narrow sea, covered with the enemies’ fleets, were too feeble to arrest him. Your happiness was at stake!

Soldiers! A powerful reinforcement, or a glorious peace, is at hand: a peace worthy of you and your achievements, is on the point of restoring you to your country.

In taking upon myself the charge with which Bonaparte was intrusted, I was neither unaware of its importance, nor of the toil and danger attending it; but on the other hand, when I considered your gallantry, so often crowned with the most brilliant success; your unwearied patience in braving every calamity, and supporting every privation; when I considered, in short, all that might be done or attempted with such soldiers, I lost sight of every thing but the advantage of being at your head, and the honour of commanding you; and I felt myself inspired with a new vigour.

Soldiers! Rely upon what I say; your urgent wants shall be the never-ceasing object of my most earnest solicitude.

KLEBER.

By order of the Commander in Chief, the General of Division, and Chief of the Staff,

DAMAS.

A true copy.

DUMAS, Adjutant General.

A true copy.

LE ROY.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)The 22d of August may seem to those acquainted with the Mediterranean, no very unfavourable season for putting to sea; but the north west winds, which almost constantly prevail there about this period, make the voyage to France extremely tedious, and fully justify Kleber’s observation. For the rest, this ADDRESS, delivered while that General was yet smarting from the recent perfidy of Bonaparte, may be recommended to the reader as a model of generosity, manliness, and true military honour.

Kleber Condemns Bonaparte in Letter to the Directory

2007-11-30T00:04:00.000-05:00

Bonaparte Dispatches Kleber Before Fleeing Egypt

2007-11-28T22:04:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 14-27.

TRANSLATION.

Alexandria, August 22d, 1799.

BONAPARTE, Commander in Chief, to General KLEBER.

ANNEXED to this, Citizen General, you will find an order for you to take command of the army. My constant apprehensions lest the English fleet should again appear on the coast, compel me to hasten my voyage by two to three days.

I take with me Generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andreoffi, and Marmont; Citizen Monge, and Citizen Bertholet.

Enclosed you will find the English and Francfort papers (1) up to the 10th of June. You will see by them, that we have lost Italy! That Mantua, Turin, and Tortona are in a state of blockade. I have some grounds to flatter myself that the first of these places will hold out to the end of November(2); and I trust, if fortune smiles upon me, to be in Europe before the beginning of October.

You will also find enclosed, a cipher for your correspondence with the Government; and another, for your communications with me.

I entreat you to dispatch Gimot some time in the month of October(3), together with the baggage which I have left at Cairo, and my domestics. I should, however, have no particular objection to your taking as many of them as may suit you, into your own service.

It is the present intention of Government, that General Desaix(4) should set out for Europe in November next, unless something of consequence should arise here to detain him.

THE COMMISSION OF THE ARTS shall return to France on board a flag of truce, which you will demand for this purpose, comfortably to the late cartel, some time in the month of November, immediately after they have completed the object of their mission. They are at present engaged in putting up a finishing hand to it, by an examination of Upper Egypt. Nevertheless, if you think that any of them will be of service to you, you may put them in requisition without scruple(5)!!!

The Effendi who was made prisoner at Aboukir, is set out for Damietta. I have already written to you to send him to Cyprus: he takes with him a letter for the Grand Vizier, of which I enclose you a copy(6).

The arrival of the Brest fleet at Toulon, and of the Cadiz fleet at Carthagena, leaves no kind of doubt of the possibility of transmitting to Egypt the muskets, sabers, and pistols, balls, &c. of which you stand in need, and of which I am provided with a very exact enumeration; together with a sufficient number of recruits to supply the losses of our two campaigns. Government itself, I presume, will, by that conveyance, acquaint you with its intentions: as for myself, both in my public and my private capacity, I promise to take every measure for enabling you to hear frequently from France(7).

If, by a series of the most extraordinary events, none of these attempts should succeed, and you should neither receive reinforcements, nor intelligence from France by May next; and if this year, in spite of all your precautions, the plague should break out in Egypt and carry off more than fifteen hundred of the troops(8)—a considerable loss in addition to that which the events of the war will daily occasion—I think that you ought not then to venture upon another campaign, and that you are sufficiently justified in concluding a peace with the Ottoman Porte; even though the evacuation of Egypt should be the leading article. It will merely be necessary for you to postpone the execution of it (if such a thing is possible) till the period of a general peace.

No one, Citizen General, has better means of judging of the importance of Egypt to France, than yourself. The Turkish empire, menaced with ruin on every side, is crumbling to pieces at this moment; and the evacuation of Egypt on our part, should be so much the more unfortunate, as we should be sure to see, ere long, this fine province fall into the hands of some other European powers.

The intelligence of the good or ill fortune which may attend the Republic in Europe, will, of course, have its due influence in determining your future measures.

If the Porte should reply to the overtures I have made for peace, before my letters from France can reach you, it will be, in that case, necessary for you to declare, that you have all the powers with which I was entrusted. Even then upon the negotiation; adhere strenuously and constantly to the assertion which I have advanced, that France never had the least idea Of TAKING EGYPT FROM THE GRAND SEIGNIOR!!! Require the Ottoman Porte to separate itself from the Coalition, to grant us the free commerce of the Black Sea, to set at liberty all the French in confinement, and lastly, to agree to a suspension of hostilities for six months, that there may be a sufficient time for the mutual exchange of ratifications.

Supposing, however, that you should find yourself in such circumstances as you conceive make it necessary to conclude the treaty with the Porte; you must then make that power understand that you cannot execute your part of it, before it be ratified (at home); and that, according to the usual practice of all nations, the interval between the signing and ratifying of a treaty, is always considered as a suspension of hostilities.

You are acquainted, Citizen General, with my way of thinking respecting the interior policy of Egypt. Act in whatever manner you please, the Christians will still be our friends; it will be necessary, however, to prevent them from growing too insolent, lest the Turks should conceive the same fanatic prejudice against us as against them, which would destroy every possibility of a reconciliation: this fanaticism must at all events be laid asleep, until we have an opportunity of extirpating it entirely(9). By gaining the good opinion of the powerful Cheiks at Cairo, we shall secure that of all Egypt; and of all the chiefs which its inhabitants may rally under, there are none less to be apprehended by us than the Cheiks, who are all timorous, unacquainted with arms, and, like all other priests, know how to inspire the people with fanaticism, without being fanatics themselves(10).

With respect to the fortifications, I consider Alexandria and El Arisch as the two keys of Egypt. I had once an idea of forming, during the approaching winter, several redoubts of palm-tree(11); two from Salich to Caslies, two from Caslies to El Arifch: of these last, one was to be placed on the spot where General Menou discovered a spring of tolerable water.

Brigadier-general Sanson, commander of the corps of engineers, and Brigadier-general Sougis, commander of the Artillery, will furnish you with the necessary details of their respective departments.

Citizen Poussielgue has had the sole management of the finances; I have found him extremely active, and in every respect a person of merit; he begins to have some insight into the chaos of the administration of this country. It was my intention, if nothing occurred to prevent me, to attempt this winter a new system of taxation, which would, by degrees, relieve us from our present dependence on the Copts: before you undertake it, however, I advise you to make it the subject of long and deliberate meditation; it is safer to begin an operation of this nature a little too late, than a little too soon.

Our ships of war will certainly make their appearance this winter, either at Alexandria, Brulos, or Damietta. You must have a battery and a signal-tower at Brulos. Endeavour to get together five or six hundred Mameloucs, in such a manner that, when the French fleet arrives, you may be able to lay your hands upon them at the same instant of time, either at Cairo or in the other provinces, and fend them off immediately for France(12). If you cannot procure Mameloucs, such Arab hostages, Cheiks al Beled as may then be in custody, no matter on what account, will answer the end as well. These people, landed in France, and detained there for a year or two, will contemplate the grandeur of the nation; they will acquire, in some degree, our manners and our language, and when they return to Egypt, will prove to us so many partisans.

I have already repeatedly written for the company of comedians; I will take particular care that they shall be sent(13). This appears to me an article of the utmost consequence, not only for the army, but for the purposes of effecting something like a change in the moral habits of the country.

The important situation of Commander in Chief, which is now devolved upon you, will afford you ample opportunities of displaying those talents with which nature has endowed you. The interest taken in every thing which passes here, is active and lively; and the consequences resulting from it will be immense, whether considered with respect to commerce or to civilization. This is assuredly the epoch from whence revolutions of the most extraordinary nature will take their date.

Accustomed to look for the recompence of the toils and difficulties of life in the opinion of posterity, I abandon Egypt with the deepest regret(14)! The honour and interests of my country, duty(14), and the extraordinary events which have recently taken place there; there, and there alone, have determined me to hazard a passage to Europe, through the midst of the enemy’s squadrons. In heart and in spirit I shall still be in the midst of you! Your victories will be as dear to me as any in which I may be personally engaged; and I shall look upon that day of my life as ill employed, in which I shall not do something for the army of which I leave you the command; and for the consolidation of the magnificent establishment, the foundation of which is so recently laid.

The army I entrust to your care, is entirely composed of MY OWN CHILDREN. I have never ceased, even in the midst of their most trying and difficult dangers, to receive proofs of their attachment(15); endeavour to preserve them still in those sentiments for me. This is due to the particular esteem and friendship I entertain for you, and to the unfeigned affection I feel for them!

BONAPARTE.

A true Copy,

KLEBER.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)It would seem from this (and indeed the whole tenour of this correspondence proves it) that the Directory gave themselves as little trouble about Bonaparte, as if he had not obliged them by sacrificing his gallant army to their common views. But for these papers (which were most probably given to him by some unsuspecting British tar, who had better have kept them himself), he would have been ignorant of what was doing in Europe. He refers Kleber no information from the Directory; HE MENTIONS NO ORDERS FOR HIS RECALL—which would have been a sufficient plea, and which would not have failed to urge, if he had received any—but bottoms the whole, upon the accidental acquisition of a few newspapers! Even in his farewell address to the army, he gives no other reason for his return, but the news; though such a circumstance must have been to them a most cruel insult; as their preference in Europe must have been full as necessary as his own.

(2)Bonaparte may be pardoned for this conjecture, formed from an estimate of the time which it took him to reduce it, in his boasted campaigns. Mantua was invested by him for the first time on the 4th of June 1796; it did no surrender till the 2d of February in the following year, a space of eight months; nor then to the fire of the besiegers, but to that with which no courage, nor obstinacy, can contend—an absolute want of food! Compare this with the recovery of the same town, in the present campaign. It fell, with a garrison of thirteen thousand men, after a close and vigorous siege of only eleven days! Indeed, if the Austro-Russian campaign in Italy be compared with those of Bonaparte, the latter dwindle into insignificance. With an immense army, powerfully reinforced by the discontented and vicious of all nations, whom he attached to his standard by the lure of novelty and indiscriminate plunder, Bonaparte over-ran Italy in two years: let it be remembered, however, that all its fortresses (with the exception of Mantua) were pusillanimously or insidiously delivered to him, before he had even captured the paltry town of Ceva, the first garrison in Piedmont; while the Austro-Russians have reconquered the same country in the short space of nine months, with the addition of Alexandria, Tortona, &c. and the almost impregnable fortresses of Coni and Turin; the last of which had been treacherously seized by the execrable Joubert.

This, though pretty generally known, is mentioned here, for the exclusive benefit of Bonaparte’s Jacobin admirers; who, reduced to despise, with the rest of the world, his legislative talents, pretend to found his claims to empire on his rapid and unrivaled victories!

(3)The General had forgotten that he promised the soldiers (whom he took leave of with such heart-felt regret) that he would return to them forthwith.

(4)This is a person who, according to the joint reports of Bonaparte and himself, has annihilated Mourad Bey, and his handful of Mameloucs, several times over. It will be seen presently, however, that they are still alive and merry; preparing to do as much for him in their turn. Desaix was looked upon in France as one of the best officers in the service.

(5)Would not one imagine this humane savant-driver was talking of camels or buffaloes, instead of the men whose immortal labours in Egypt were to astonish the world, and illustrate France with a full display of the recondite lore of Hermes Trifmegiftus? Put them in requisition without scruple! Unfortunate beings! This s the very thing that he had before done to them in France!

This paragraph is highly worthy of serious consideration of the Jacobins: since of all the brilliant qualities of Bonaparte, none (with the exception of his humanity) has been so long and so loudly dwelt upon by them, as his singular love of learning, and learned men!

(6)See No. XIV.

(7)After noticing the various wants of the French army, the reader may be curious to know what Bonaparte has done in either of his capacities to relieve them. It may be told in three words. He has raked the kennels of Paris for a number of prostitutes more pestilential than the plague, to send them; and he has put in requisition a few miserable companies of strolling players, who may probably arrive time enough to see the curtain drop for ever on the tragic-comedy of his expedition.

(8)The cool calculation of 1500 men, which this “hope and consolation” of the rancorous “school of humanity” thinks a reasonable quantity to die of the plague, is chiefly noticed here, as furnishing a tolerable criterion for estimating the numbers that fell in the former season. As an useless sacrifice of so many hundred human beings, it is scarce worth mention in the history of a man, who has spilled more blood wantonly than any commander of ancient or modern times.

(9)Our General “has a meeting, and, no doubt, you all have sense enough to find it out; though, it must be confessed, it is not very obvious. The truth seems to be, that with an abundant degree of cunning (and this, and a fierce and savage courage, will, upon examination, be found to make up the whole of his character), he was bewildered himself in the variety of his objects. The Christians, by whom probably Bonaparte means the Copts, are to be trampled upon to gratify the Turks, whose fanaticism is to be indulged, that it may be the more easily destroyed some time hence by the French, who are at present treating for the entire evacuation of the country! Such are the contradictory reveries with which Bonaparte labours to confound Kleber, and to conceal his own want of rational and enlarged ideas on a subject so infinitely interesting and important.

(10)Bonaparte’s ignorance is inconceivable. He has been amusing himself for fifteen months with hunting out and destroying Arabs, Turks, and Copts; and yet he seems to know as little of their distinct polity as if he had never left home. Who ever heard before of Cheik priests? A Cheik is an Arabian chief, neither timorous nor acquainted with arms, as he had frequently found to his cost. It is not improbably that Bonaparte means by his Cheiks the Coptic clergy! Mean what he will, however, the sneer at priests comes with an admirable grace from one who has just paid them such extraordinary compliments in his proclamation to the royalists of La Vendee. An Atheist at Paris, a Catholic at Rome, a Mussulman at Grand Cairo, and a hypocrite every where, it is to be hoped his insidious language will be treated as it deserves; and that what is here laid of priests will be duly weighed by as many of those brave and faithful people as have at some unsuspicious moment been gratified by an encomium on their church, as deceitful, they will now see, as it was impious.

It is pleasant to reflect that the communication with the Vendeans, &c. is now so easy and so frequent, that this publication will probably reach them before it is heard of at Paris.

(11)This was an idea truly worthy of Bonaparte. To destroy the palm-trees would as effectually depopulate many parts of Egypt, as if he had turned the course of the Nile; thousands of the natives who inhabit the borders of the deserts have no other subsistence but dates for a great part of the year. But what is this to Bonaparte? To destroy and to reign are all he asks; it matters not over what or whom.

(12)It is impossible to conceive a scheme of blacker or more diabolical perfidy than Bonaparte here plans for Kleber.

Five or six hundred innocent people, living without suspicion or fear under the protection of the French, are to be torn from their country, their families, and friends, and hurried off to France under a pretence equally absurd and iniquitous.

Fortunately, Bonaparte left a man behind him but little inclined to be the agent of his villany. How must this gallant and discerning soldier have felt the insult here offered him? How must he have smiled with contempt at this mixture of indiotism and frenzy? This order for him to exasperate the country by an act of wanton barbarity, at the time he was instructed to treat about leaving it in peace! Bonaparte allows that those Mamelouc missionaries could not finish their Parisian educations in less than a year or two, and yet he has just before granted a delay of only six months to conclude the agreement which is to shut the French out of Egypt for ever.

With respect to the Arab hostages, Cheiks, or any thing else instead of Mameloucs; if such a motley crew were not designed to gratify his own vanity, they could only serve to remind the Parisians of the ever-memorable procession of the “Orator of the human race,” Anacharfis Clootz. At any rate, the idea of bringing about a great change in the country by their means, is completely ridiculous, and truly worthy of the man who conceived it.

(13)That is the only one of all his numerous promises that Bonaparte has condescended to recollect. He thought of it, we see, in Egypt; and, not to disparage his talents for invention, might be indebted for the idea to Voltaire, who advised us (not seriously, it must be confessed) to send a few opera-dancers to St. Vincents, to soften and subdue the Caraibs.

(14)What have we here? A mortified Carthusian? Meek and lowly servant of an unambitious republic, he makes no boastful claims to the admiration of the present age; he fights battles, he overturns states, he wades through human blood, from shores of Genoa to the Adriatic; he flies from one ravaged quarter of the globe to lay waste another, without motive or end;--and he tells all this in a jargon that Captain Bodadil would have laughed at. What then? His toil, like virtue, is its own reward, and he aspires only to the grateful notice of prosperity! All this is as perfectly true, as that he abandoned Egypt with regret, or that Keleber believed him when he said so.

(15)Of what materials must this man’s heart be made? Even Satan is represented by Milton as bursting into such tears as angels fled, at the recollection of what he had brought on his followers, yet—faithful how they stood. But Bonaparte seems absolutely incapable of any impressions of pity or remorse; he is an anomalous being, such as neither history nor fiction has yet dared to exhibit.

Bonaparte Flees Egypt and Promotes Kleber

2007-11-27T22:58:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 3, pp. 5-6.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Alexandria, August 23, 1799.

BONAPARTE, Commander in Chief, to the ARMY.

IN consequence of the news from Europe, I have determined to return immediately to France. I leave the command of the army to General Kleber: they shall hear from me speedily: this is all I can say to them at present. It grieves me to the heart to part from the brave men whom I am so tenderly attached; but it will be only for an instant; and the General I leave at their head is in full possession of the confidence of the Government and of mine.

BONAPARTE.

By order of the Commander in Chief, and of the General of Division, Chief of the Staff,

ALEX BERTHIER.

A true copy,

SONNET, Adjutant General.

A true copy,

LE ROY.

Note.

This address to the army was not delivered by Bonaparte. It was enclosed in the letter to Kleber, to be read to them after he was gone!

Kleber Briefs the Directory on Intercepted Letters

2007-11-26T13:01:00.000-05:00

British Editors Include a Diatribe on Bonaparte's "Wickedness and Fraud"

2007-11-20T13:49:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. I-XX.

INTRODUCTION
--------------------------

THE Correspondence, of which the following Letters make a part, was intercepted at different periods, by the Turkish and English ships of war. It consists of Official and Private Letters, whose contents, perhaps, like those of a thousand others, which have at various times, fallen into the hands of our cruisers, would have remained a secret to all but Government, had not the French, by holding out, first, a false account of the motive of this famous Expedition, and then, by spreading the most absurd and exaggerated accounts of its success; rendered it necessary to undeceive Europe, (still trembling at the tale), by proving from their own statements, that what began in wickedness and fraud, was likely to terminate in wretchedness and despair.

The Publication being thus determined upon, the next step was to make such a selection from the voluminous Correspondence in the hands of Government, as, without gratifying an idle curiosity, or indulging a prurient inclination for scandal and intrigue, should yet leave nothing to be desired with respect to the real situation of the Army in Egypt; its views and successes, its miseries and disappointments. For this purpose, every thing that was not illustrative of one or other of those objects was suppressed: all private Letters, unless intimately connected with the end in view, were passed over; and even those of Bonaparte (which have been so shamefully misrepresented, and commented upon by those fervid champions of decency, the Opposition Writers(1)), though not strictly and absolutely private, yet containing nothing that could materially interest or inform the public, were laid aside with the rest. We trust that we have not admitted any thing that can raise a blush on the cheek of our readers, either for themselves or for us.

We might here close our Introduction, but as the Egyptian Expedition has awakened curiosity, and been the theme of much wonder, and applause, and error, and misrepresentation; we do not think we shall render an unacceptable service to the reader, by enlarging a little on the subject.

The French have long turned their eyes towards Egypt. The sanguine disposition of their Consuls in the Levant, had ministered with admirable effect, to the credulity, and avarice, and ambition, of this restless nation, by assuring them that Egypt was the Paradise of the East, the key of the treasures of the Indies; easy to be seized, and still more easy to be kept! There was not a Frenchman under the old regimen, who was not fully persuaded of the truth of all this; and certainly they have lost nothing of their ambition, their avarice, and their credulity, under the new.

What plans the Monarchy might have devised for gaining possession of this “Paradise,” we know not. It could not hope to effect it by force.—But the present rulers of France, who have trampled on the powers of the Continent too long, and with too much impunity, to think it necessary to manage them now, could have no apprehensions of resistance to their measures, and were not likely to be scrupulous in the choice of means, to effect whatever purpose they had in view.

Egypt, however, though said and believed to be a rich country, promised no immediate supplies of plunder; and the project for seizing it would still have remained in the port-folio of Citizen Talleyrand, had not a circumstance happened that made its speedy adoption a measure of necessity.

Every one knows that the Directory long since engaged to make a free gift to the army, of a thousand livres, at the conclusion of a general peace. This engagement, like many others, it seemed to have forgotten; till the necessity of attaching the troops to their interests, and thus enabling them to perfect the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor, made it necessary for the Triumvirate to renew their promise, and to revive the languid expectations of the army.

None contributed more to the success of this fatal day than the army of Italy, which, to the eternal disgrace of Bonaparte, was permitted to overawe the councils, and to assume to itself the whole power of the state.

Such a service could not be overlooked: their claim to a portion of the milliary became doubly valid, and as the war in Italy was now supposed to be at an end, thousands of them returned to France to claim it.

Here began the difficulties of the Directory. They had no money to give; but it was not expedient to confess it: and the expedition to Egypt was, therefore, brought forward, as an excellent expedient for quieting the present clamour, and providing for forty thousand veteran troops, inured to plunder, and impatient of controul; who were too sensible of their merits, to be quietly laid aside; and too urgent in their demands, to be cajoled with empty promises.

Hence arose the expedition to Egypt. The plunder of the Venitian docks and arsenals, had fortunately furnished them with a vast quantity of naval stores, and with several ships of the line, frigates, &c. With the former, they fitted out the vessels in the port of Toulon; and they collected transports from every quarter. While these preparations were going on, the cupidity and ardour of the troops were artfully inflamed by ambiguous hints if an expedition that was to eclipse, in immediate advantages, the boasted conquests of Cortes and Pizarro.

To promote the farce (for such we are persuaded it was), artists of all kinds, chymists, botanists, members of the pyro-technical school in prodigious numbers, and we know not what quantities of people calling themselves Savans, were collected from every part of France, and driven to Toulon in shoals.—When all these were safely embarked, Bonaparte assembled the Italian army, (amounting to 22,0000 men), and after gravely promising them on his honour, which he observed had ever been sacred, that they should each receive on their return money enough to purchase six acres and a half of good land, took them on board, and tranquilly proceeded to bury them all in Egypt.

On his route he collected near twenty thousand more of the army of Italy—sturdy beggars, who might have disquieted the Directory if they had been suffered to remain in Europe, and who will now contribute with their fortunate comrades, to fatten the vultures of Grand Cairo.

We shall not stop to notice the capture, as it is called, of Malta(2), nor the various gambols that were played by this unwieldy armament in the Mediterranean, but having conducted it in safety to Alexandria, return to make a few miscellaneous observations on its outset, supposed destination, &c.

The first circumstance that strikes us, is the extreme ignorance of the French, with regard to the country they were going to desolate and destroy. They had no connections with its ports for ages, and yet they appear to have known no more of its interior, than the inhabitants of the moon. This want of knowledge was universal—from the Commander in Chief(3) to the meanest soldier in the army, all was darkness, and blind confidence in the blindest of guides!

The “Savans” were not a whit better informed than the rest—like Phaeton,

“They hop’d, perhaps, to meet with pleasing woods, And stately fanes, and cities fill’d with gods:--“

and like him too, we imagine, they have found a general conflagration, and a river!

Now we have mentioned these men, it may not be amiss to inquire into the services the general literature of Europe is likely to derive from their exertions: services, be it remembered, for which the Directory, who forced them on board, have already received the felicitation of all the “friends of liberty.”

The inquiry will be short. All the mention we find of them, from the hour of their embarkation to the present, is contained in Berthier’s letter to the Consuls of the Roman Republic. “The Savans Monge, Benolet, Boursienne, &c.” says he, “fought with the greatest courage; they did not quit the General’s side during any part of the action, and they proved by their exertions, that in combating the ENEMIES OF THEIR COUNTRY(4), every Frenchman is a soldier,” &c.

Thus we find that the “enlightened geniuses of the eighteenth century,” who were to explore the construction of the Pyramids, to dive into the Catacombs, to wind through the mazes of the sacred labyrinth, to dig up the mystic volumes of Hermes, and, in a word, to roam “with free foot” from the Cataracts to the seven mouths of the Nile; are become men of blood, obliged to cling to the troops for protection, and unable to advance a single step to the right or left, beyond the reach of the musquetry or cannon of the army!

But the imbecility displayed in the outset of this strange expedition, is not more extraordinary than the obstinacy with which it had been held up to the admiration of Europe. Either ignorance, or fear, or Jacobism, has been always at hand—to suggest the greatness of plan, where there was little, in fact, but blind hazard—to whisper a combination of means amidst the want of every thing, and to promise infallible success to men whose every step was attended with destruction and despair! While the army was yet on its way to the place of its destination, the old plans of the French Government were in every mouth; and the wisdom was loudly applauded which was to attach the Beys to the invader, crush the dominion of the Porte, and secure the country for ever to the “Great Nation.”

Bonaparte arrives, and reverses the whole scheme. The Beys are now to be crushed, because they alone have the power to resist: and the sovereignty of Constantinople is to be upheld, because it is inefficient. The applause was louder than before! “Better and better still,” cried the sagacious discoverers of deep design in all the bedlam tricks of France; “that country will gain more this way than l’other—“Vive la Republique!”

Again, when it was found that no impressions but those of hatred and hostility, were made on the natives of Egypt, and that the conqueror barely held the ground on which his army halted, we were suddenly made acquainted with another and a greater scheme; which we were seriously assured was the only genuine one, and which could not fail of success! What was not done in Egypt, might be done in Persia. The inhabitants of the southern coasts of that country were opportunely discovered to have the primitive religion of the Arabs, before it was infected with Mahometanism; and with them, “through the means of their venerable Patriarch,” Bonaparte, it was known, had long since been in correspondence. The clue of the mighty maze which had so much puzzled mankind, was at length discovered! Arabia was to be restored to liberty and happiness, by the arms of France, acting on one side of it, and by these innumerable and faithful auxiliaries, on the other. The rest was plain enough. Arabia being once organized, and in possession of a Directory and two Councils, a free passage to India was afforded, of course, through Mekran, the region of friends and philosophers, and the “tyrant of the sea,” driven with disgrace from Calcutta!

It would be superfluous to send our readers to any author of credit, for a refutation of all this absurdity; which yet has been dwelt on, by the friends of France, with complacency and delight—but if they should happen to look into Niehbur, they will find, that there really are some wild Arabs, a poor, and miserable, and half naked people, who wander up and down the coasts of Arabia Proper, and live on putrid fish! These Icthyophagi are the enlightened savages, who, in conjunction with Bonaparte, are to diffuse the knowledge of liberty and virtue through the Eastern world!

But it is not only the profoundity of the General’s plans of conquest, that is so highly and so justly celebrated: his capacity of legislating for the countries he subdues, receives an equal share of applause; and his admirers would think they insulted his reputation, if they forbore to mention, that he added the political sagacity of Solon, to the military science of Alexander.

The reader will find (No. X.) a Letter from Bonaparte, containing, what he calls, his “Provisional Organization of Egypt;” if he will look carefully into this, and into another curious Paper (Appendix, No. VIII.) he will be inclined, we think, to abate something of his admiration for this new Solon.

The tenaciousness of the Eastern people for their customs is proverbially great; yet they are to change them at a word! The simplicity and invariable uniformity of their dress is no less striking; ages pass away, and find it still the same; yet they are now, in obedience to they know not what orders, to trick themselves suddenly out in tri-coloured shawls and scarfs, and ribands, like the tawdry Jack Puddings of the Executive Directory.

All the complicated relations which bind the society among which the General is thrown, are either unknown or unheeded by him; one or two general and barren provisions are made to represent all those moral habits and local regulations which, with an infinite variety, distinguished the formed government of this people.

But a remedy is at hand: if his laws will not do of themselves, force will speedily make them effectual. The military, under the command of a French officer, are directed to be called in on every occasion (p. 71.); this is the grand specific for all! After a disgraceful and futile attempt at civil wisdom, the whole is resolved into violence, and the code of the legislator is thrust down the throat of the people by the bayonet of the Conqueror!

But what could be expected from a man who had already betrayed his incapacity in similar attempts in Europe? Let his stupid admirers (for we must now be serious), let his stupid admirers call to mind his Italian “organizations” (the worthy prototypes of his Egyptian ones), repeatedly changed by himself, and the instant he was out of sight disdainfully changed by others. There too was the same poverty of conception. From his traveling cloke-bag, he privately drew out the MODEL OF ALL LEGISLATION—THE CONSTITUTION OF 1795. This was copied for great and small, and applied in all situations, and to every people! Antiquity knew nothing of this sweeping mode of legislation; they shewed a condescension to the different customs and prejudices of those who fell under their management; and a cluster of small and contiguous powers were judiciously and humanely indulged with the possession of those laws which had long been dear to them, and which removed them from each other in principles and manners, as far from “the center to the pole.”

But Italy, which, in the judgment of our philosophists, had once exhibited this weakness, was now to be taught a better lesson. All moral consideration were to be superseded by the supreme wisdom of the cloke-bag; and Republics, Monarchies, and whatever else might be the distinctions of Aristocratic government, were to be swept away with the besom of 1795. What shall be the Constitution of Genoa? A Directory and two Councils. What of Mantua? A Directory and two Councils. What again of Bolognia? You are very tiresome: look into page—of the Constitution of 1795; what does it say? Once more, a Directory and two Councils. Thus it is. Ventum est ad summum fortuna; and we make laws quicker and better than the ancients—Achivis doctius unctis! One undistinguished rule domineers over all the varied application of political wisdom, and Minos, and Solon, and Lycurgues, are vanquished by a single roll of paper triumphantly carried through Europe, and speaking alike (whether intelligibly or not) “to all people, and nations, and languages and tongues.”

From the legislative pretensions of Bonaparte, we might now descend to the consideration of the fraud, and hypocrisy, and blasphemy, and impiety, and cruelty, and injustice, which he has never ceased to display since the commencement of this famous Expedition; but we are better pleased to leave them to the faithful page of the historian, which we are satisfied will one day hold them to the just contempt and execration of all mankind.

We shall indulge ourselves, however, with an observation or tow on his cruelty. We select this vice, because Bonaparte has been celebrated by the ignorant and malevolent of this country, for nothing so much as for this humanity! One man, of whom we should say, if we could for a moment believe in the metempsychosis, that the spirit of Bishop Bonner had taken full possession, has had the consummate folly to affirm, that Bonaparte, “his consolation and his triumph,” preferred the preservation of one citizen, to the melancholy glory of a thousand victories.

Where did this scribbler, who form his study insults the feelings of his countrymen, and boasts of his satisfactions in the success of their enemies, collects his proofs of the tender concern of Bonaparte for the life of a Citizen? Was it at the bridge of Lodi, where he sacrificed six thousand of them to the vanity of forcing a pass which he might have turned without the loss of a man? Was it--? But why multiply questions, when there is not, perhaps, a reader of a common newspaper in Europe (this pestilent foe to the honour of his country excepted), who does not know that Bonaparte has wantonly spilt more blood than any Attila of ancient or modern times, who, with the same means, has had merely the same ends to effect.

We may, perhaps, at some future time, take up this topic at great length; meanwhile we shall content ourselves with referring to Boyer’s Letter (No. XXII.), and return to the subject of the Expedition.

We have called it a farce—we might, with more justice, have called it a tragedy—It is, we are persuaded (but here we beg to be understood as speaking only our private and individual opinion) a deep-laid plan, of which the only actors in the secret are the Directory and Bonaparte, and, perhaps, Berthier. The main plot was to get rid of the Italian army: the subordinate one to conquer and plunder what they could: if Egypt fell—so much the better; if it did not—so much the better still. The denouement was skillfully effected either way, and the Government equally relieved!

But why then all this expence, this hazard of their sole remaining fleet, this exposure of their best and most skilful officers, of their profoundest philosophers, of their most scientific men of every kind?—These we confess are weighty and rational objections, and if we could not answer them to our own satisfaction, we would without hesitation, renounce the opinion we have given, and adopt that of our opponents in its stead.

We begin, then, with premising that the Directory do not set much store by their Savans; they have exported several head of them to Cayenne, a spot still worse than Egypt; and made a great consumption of them at home, in noyades, fusillades, &c. &c.—these, therefore, may be safely put out of the question.

With respect to the expence—to say nothing of the hopes of repaying themselves by the plunder of Malta, and Grand Cairo(5); it was surely worth something to effect the important ends they had in view. The “hazard of their fleet,” indeed, seems a more serious matter; but let it be remembered, that the Directory had no idea that we could possibly send a squadron into the Mediterranean (a sea which we had then abandoned for near two years), strong enough to attack it: and here let us pay the tribute of applause so justly due to the secrecy, and skill, and promptitude, with which this most important measure was effected.

With regard to the “exposure of their best officers”—and here we make our chief stand—we say, that the Government had no such design. They were sent, it is true, because the army would not move without them; but we have proof, little short of mathematical certainty, that they were speedily meant to be recalled to France. It appears from some of Bonaparte’s letters, that he had not the slightest idea of wintering in Egypt. “I shall pass,” says he, “the cold months in Burgundy, where I wish you would look out some little place for me”—Here, then, is the solution of the whole enigma. Bonaparte was to leave his devoted followers to moulder away in the undisturbed possession of Egypt, and under some plausible pretence to return to Europe with his ablest officers, and with, perhaps, a handful of the most ductile and tractable of his troops.

This plan, and no other, accounts for his keeping the fleet on the coast, in spite of the remonstrances of Brueys, and the evident danger to which it was exposed—it was to carry back the “Conqueror of Egypt” in triumph to France: and the Admiral, who was wholly unacquainted with his design, fell a sacrifice at last, to a perfidy which he could not comprehend.

THE FIRST OF AUGUST ruined all these fine spun schemes; and Bonaparte fell into the toils he was spreading for others! All return is now impossible, except as a fugitive, or a prisoner. He may enter into the chambers of the Pyramids, and hold conversations on the tomb of the Cheops, with Imans, and with Muftis; he may organize, and conquer, and plant botanic gardens, and establish menageries; he may pass from the Delta to the Thebaid, and from the Thebaid to the Delta, with his train of tri-coloured Cheiks, and be hailed as the ALI BONAPARTE of the country—all is still but folly: his final destruction can neither be averted nor delayed; and his unseasonable mummeries will but serve to take away all dignity form the catastrophe of the drama; and render his fall at once terrible and ridiculous.

Before our readers accuse us of being too sanguine in our expectations, or too precipitate in our judgment, let them carefully peruse the following Correspondence. They will find every officer in the army dissatisfied with his situation, and impatient to return to France: execrating the climate and the country, and lamenting the folly that left him to embark in so wild, and absurd, and hopeless an expedition. They will find the whole army without tents, baggage, or ammunition, without medicines, or wine, or brandy; with few of the necessaries, and none of the comforts of life.

This WAS a faithful picture of their situation before the destruction of their fleet—what IT IS since, they may easily conjecture. If, then, they will add to this accumulation of misery and despair, the inveterate hostility of the Arabs, the treachery of the Egyptians, and the destructive warfare of the Mameloucs, together with the nauseous and peculiar diseases of the country, the intolerable heats, and pestilential winds, the devouring myriads of venomous insects, and the stench and putrefication of ten thousand stagnant pools, they will not, we imagine, be much inclined to dispute the justice of our conclusions.

With respect to the Letters we have given, they were selected, as far as was consistent with our plan, with an eye to variety. They are, with few exceptions, extremely well written, and do credit to the epistolary talents of the authors: nor is this their highest merit; they are friendly and affectionate; and we see with pleasure that the cold-blooded rant of a detestable and impious philosophy, has not yet succeeded in extinguishing the social feelings!

One word more. We had very different motives from those of raising a laugh, when we admitted into the collection, the Letters of Guillot, Le Turcq, &c. We had it in contemplation to shew, that from the highest to the lowest, from the best informed to the most illiterate, the sentiment of discontent and disgust is universal; that, far from harbouring a thought of sitting down in Egypt, not an individual in the army (so far, at least, as had come to our knowledge) but turns with fond anxiety towards home, and thinks, with horror and despair, of a residence in this “Terrestrial Paradise,” even for a few weeks!

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)The following paragraphs are taken from the Morning Chronicle. We might have produced a hundred more of the same kind, but these we think will be sufficient to convince the reader, of the “superior delicacy” of that paper. When he has considered them well, he will not be disinclined, perhaps, to felicitate the French ladies, on the letters of their lovers and friends having luckily escaped such “delicate,” and honourable hands!

“It is not very creditable to the generosity of Office, that the private letters from Bonaparte and his Army to their friends in France, which were intercepted, should be published. It derogates from the character of a nation to descend to such gossiping. One of these letters is from Bonaparte to his Brother, complaining of the profligacy of his wife; another from young Beauharnois, expressing his hopes that his dear Mamma is not so wicked as she is represented! Such are the precious secrets which, to breed mischief in private families, is to be published in French and English!” [Nov. 24]

“After the public have been so long agitated with anxiety and speculation respecting Bonaparte and his Expedition, they are at length to be gratified with the scandal and intrigue of which the private Letters from the General and his Officers are full.” [Nov. 25]

“The private correspondence of Bonaparte’s Officers, is a curious specimen of public intelligence. It reminds us of the weak and impolitic Ministry who persecuted WILKES. When their fund of malice was nearly exhausted, they gave out that he had written an indecent poem, which certainly has as much to do with the question of general warrants, as Madame Bonaparte’s chastity has to do with her husband’s Expedition through Egypt!” [Nov. 26]

(2)That event had been secured before Bonaparte left Toulon, by the intrigues and largesses of Poussielgue: these have been since laid upon by the Bailli Teignie, and others; and made the subject of a formal accusation against the Grand Master Hompsech, by the Knights who have taken refuge in Germany, Russia &c.

(3)In a letter of Bonaparte’s to the Directory; dated July 6th, he says “this country is any thing but what travelers, and story tellers represent it to be.”

(4)The cant of the French is even more shocking than their enormities. They invade a friendly country, which they wantonly devote to pillage and devastation; and the leaders of this lerocious horde of savages have the detestable insolence to call the unoffending people whom they are exterminating for the crime of endeavouring to protect their lives and properties, and who are utterly and alike ignorant of them their sanguinary employers—“THE ENEMIES OF FRANCE.”

Bonaparte Issues Proclamation in Arabic

2007-11-18T14:53:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 235-237.

No. I.

Translation of the Proclamation issued by BONAPARTE, in the Arabic Language, on his landing in Egypt.

IN the name of God, gracious and merciful.—There is no God but God; he has no son or associate in his kingdom.

The present moment, which is destined for the punishment of the Beys, has been long anxiously expected. The Beys, coming from the mountains of Georgia and Bajars, have desolated this beautiful country, long insulted and treated with contempt the French Nation, and oppressed her merchants in various ways. Bonaparte, the General of the French Republic, according to the principles of Liberty, is now arrived; and the Almighty, the Lord of both Worlds, have sealed the destruction of the Beys.

Inhabitants of Egypt! When the Beys tell you the French are come to destroy your religion, believe them not: it is an absolute falsehood. Answer those deceivers, that they are only come to rescue the rights of the poor from the hands of their tyrants, and that the French adore the Supreme Being, and honour the Prophet and his holy Koran.

All men are equal in the eyes of God: understanding, ingenuity, and science, alone make a difference between them: as the Beys, therefore, do not possess any of these qualities, they cannot be worthy to govern the country.

Yet are they the only possessors of extensive tracts of land, beautiful female slaves, excellent horses, magnificent palaces! Have they then received an exclusive privilege from the Almighty? If so, let them produce it. But the Supreme Being, who is just and merciful towards all mankind, wills that in future none of the inhabitants of Egypt shall be prevented from attaining to the first employments and the highest honours.—The Administration, which shall be conducted by persons of intelligence, talents, and foresight, will be productive of the happiness and security. The tyranny and avarice of the Beys have laid waste Egypt, which was formerly so populous and well cultivated.

The French are true Mussulmen. Not long since they marched to Rome, and overthrew the Throne of the Pope, who excited the Christians against the professors of Islamism (The Mahometan religion). Afterwards they directed their course to Malta, and drove out the unbelievers, who imagined they were appointed by God to make war on the Mussulmen. The French have at all times been the true and sincere friends of the Ottoman Emperors, and the enemies of their enemies. May the Empire of the Sultan therefore be eternal; but may the Beys of Egypt, our opposers whose insatiable avarice has continually excited disobedience and insubordination, be trodden in the dust, and annihilated!

Our friendship shall be extended to those of the inhabitants of Egypt who shall join us, as also those who shall remain in their dwellings, and observe a strict neutrality; and when they have seen our conduct with their own eyes, hasten to submit to us; but the dreadful punishment of death awaits those who shall take up arms for the Beys, and against us. For then there shall be no deliverance, nor shall any trace of them remain.

Art. 1. All places which shall be three leagues distant from the route of the French army, shall send one of their principal inhabitants to the French General, to declare that they submit, and will hoist the French flag, which is blue, white, and red.

Art. 2. Every village which shall oppose the French army shall be burned to the ground.

Art. 3. Every village which shall submit to the French, shall hoist the French flag, and that of the Sublime Porte, their Ally, whose duration be eternal.

Art. 4. The Cheiks and principal persons of each town and village shall seal up the houses and effects of the Beys, and take care that not the smallest article shall be lost.

Art. 5. The Cheiks, Cadis, and Imans, shall continue to exercise their respective functions; and put up their prayers, and perform the exercise of religious worship in the mosques and houses of prayer. All the inhabitants of Egypt shall offer up thanks to the Supreme Being, and put up public prayers for the destruction of the Beys.

May the Supreme God make the glory of the Sultan of the Ottomans eternal, pour forth his wrath on the Mameloucs, and render glorious the destiny of the Egyptian Nation.

Admiral Ganteaume Provides Official Abstract of Encounter with the British

2007-11-17T15:59:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 230-234

TRANSLATION.

Alexandria, August 5th.

Abstract of the Engagement which took place on the night of the first of August, between the French Fleet, and that of Great Britain, under the command of Rear Admiral NELSON.

AT two in the afternoon, the Heureux threw out a signal of 12 sail in the W.N.W. Our men on the look out, discovered them at the same time, and counted successively as many as 16. We were not long in recognizing these vessels to be an English squadron, composed of 14 sail of the line and two brigs.

The enemy steered for our anchoring ground, with a press of sail: having a brig sounding a head. The wind was N. and rather fresh.

The two brigs, the Alceste and the Raileur, were immediately ordered to make a sail to windward, to prevent the enemy’s light vessel from continuing her soundings.

The signals for stowing the hammocks, and making ready for fight; for announcing the resolution of engaging at anchor; and for recalling the men on board their respective ships, were all made at three.

The long boats employed in watering were also recalled: a boat was hastily dispatched from the Artemise to the shoals of Rosetta, to acquaint the transports there with the appearance of the enemy; and finally, the frigates and corvettes were ordered to send as many of their men as possible on board the ships of the line.

The enemy’s squadron continued to advance with a press of sail; after standing off to a considerable distance, to avoid the breakers on the island(1), it hauled its wind, shortened sail, and clearly manifested a design to attack us.

At three quarters after five, the battery on the little island threw some bombs, which fell into the van of the enemy’s line. At 6, the Admiral threw out the signal for commencing the engagement, and shortly after, the two headmost ships began firing.

Several of the enemy’s vessels having suddenly shortened sail, had turned the head of our line, and letting go their anchors, with a cable astern, had ranged along side, between us and the land; while others had moored themselves within pistol-shot of us, on the other side! By this maneuver, all our vessels, as far down as the Tonnant, found themselves completely enveloped, and placed between two fires.

It appeared to us that in executing this maneuver, two of their vessels had run aground: one of them, however, was immediately got off.

The attack and the defense were extremely brisk. The whole of our van was attacked on both sides, and sometimes raked. In this disorder, and involved as we were in continual clouds of smoke, it was extremely difficult to distinguish the different movements of the line.

At the beginning of the action, the admiral, all the superior officers, the first commissary, and about twenty pilots, and masters of transports, were on the poop of the ship(2), employed in serving the musquetry. All the soldiers, and sailors, were ordered to the guns of the main and lower decks: the twelve pounders were not half-manned.

After the action had lasted about an hour, the Admiral was wounded in the body, and in the hand; he then came down from the poop, and a short time after, was killed on the quarter-deck.

Obliged to defend ourselves on both sides, we gave up the twelve pounders, but the twenty-fours, and thirty-six’s kept up their fire with all possible ardour. The Franklin and the Tonnant appeared to be in as critical a situation as ourselves.

The English having utterly destroyed our van(3), suffered their ships to drift forward, still ranging along our line, and taking their different stations around us: while we [illegible] van cut off, were frequently obliged to [illegible] away our cable, or our hawser, to enable us to present our broadside to the enemy.

One of their ships, however, which lay close to us on the starboard side totally dismasted, ceased her fire, and cut her cable, to get out of the reach of our guns: but obliged to defend ourselves against two others who were furiously thundering upon us, on the larboard quarter, and on the starboard bow, we were again compelled to heave in some of our cable.

The 36 and 24 pounders were still firing briskly, when an explosion took place on the aft of the quarter-deck. We had already had a boat on fire; but we had cut it away, and so avoided the danger. We had also thrown a hammock, and some other things, which were in flames, over board, but this third time, the fire spread so rapidly and instantaneously amongst the fragments of every kind, with which the poop was incumbered, that all was soon in flames. The fire pumps had been dashed to pieces by the enemy’s balls, and the tubs and buckets rendered useless.

An order was given to cease firing, that all hands might be at liberty to bring water; but such was the ardour of the moment, that in the tumult, the guns of the main-deck still continued their fire. Although the officers had called all the people between decks, aloft, the flames had in a very short time, made a most alarming progress, and we had but few means in our power of checking them.

Our main and mizzen masts were both carried away; and we soon saw that there was no saving the ship; the fire having already gained the poop, and even the battery on the quarter-deck.

The captain and second captain had been wounded some time before. General Gnateaume therefore took upon himself the command, and ordered the scuttles to be opened, and every body to quit the ship.

The fire broke out about a quarter before ten, and at half after ten the ship blew up, although we had taken the precaution to open all the water-courses. Some of the crew saved themselves on the wreck; the rest perished.

The action continued all the night with the ships in the rear, and at break of day, we discovered that the Guerrier, the Conquerant, the Spartiate, the Aquillon, the Peuple Souverain, and the Franklin had hauled down their colours, and were in the possession of the enemy. The Timoleon, with all her masts gone, was dropt astern of the fleet, her colours still flying. The Heureux and the Mercure which had run aground were attacked, and obliged to strike in the morning. The artemise was set on fire at 8 o’clock, and the Serieuse sunk.

The Guillaume Tell, the Genereux, the Timoleon, the Diana, and the Justice, with their colours still flying, were engaged with some English vessels during a part of the morning, but this division, with the exception of the Timoleon, set their sails, about 11 o’clock, and stood off to sea.

The Timoleon ran ashore; and we have since heard, that the Captain, after landing all his men, set her on fire the next morning, to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy.

Such are the results of this horrible affair; and we have detailed them as they presented themselves to our memory; not having been able to preserve a paper or note of any kind.

Read Admiral GANTEAUME.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)See the Charts.

(2)The l’Orient.

(3)We take the opportunity of this passage to make a few observations.

It has been said in the French papers, and repeated in our ears usque ad nauseam, that the fate of the day was undecided when the l’Orient took fire; and questions have been gravely put by the opposition writers, and still more gravely debated, as to the probable consequences of the engagement, if that accident had not taken place.

These patriotic gentlemen, however, may now close their well meant discussions: we have it, happily, in our power to decide the question for ever, by such authority, as they neither can nor will, we believe, be inclined to dispute. We have the authentic and irrefragable testimony of the Admiral Ganteaume, that the van of the French fleet was in our hands before that event took place: and we have, secondly, THE EXPRESS AUTHORITY OF THE CAPT. BERRY for saying that Six of their ships had struck before the l’Orient was perceived to be on fire; and that not only HE, BUT EVERY OTHER OFFICER, WHO WAS IN A SITUATION OF JUDGING, IS PERSUADED THAT THE L’ORIENT HERSELF HAD PREVIOUSLY STRUCK TO THE BRITISH FLAG!

Admiral Ganteaume Gives Account of "Most Fatal of Disasters"

2007-11-16T18:39:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 219-225

TRANSLATION.

Alexandria, August 23d.

Rear Admiral GANTEAUME(1), to General BRUIX, Minister of the Marine, and of the Colonies.

Citizen Minister,

OBLIGED to give you an account of the most fatal of disasters, it is with piercing and heart-felt sorrow, that I acquit myself of this melancholy part of my duty.

Eleven sail of the line taken, burnt, and lost for France, our best officers killed or wounded, the coasts of our new colony laid open to invasion of the enemy; such are the dreadful results of an engagement which took place on the night of the 1st instant, between our fleet and that of the English under the command of Admiral Nelson.

From the experience which you have had, Citizen Minister, in our ports during the course of this war, it will doubtless be easy for you to judge, whether the crews of a fleet so hastily fitted out as ours, could be reasonably expected to be well composed; and whether we could hope to find amongst men collected at random as it were, almost at the very instant of our departure, able mariners, and skilful and experienced cannoneers. The favourable season, however, the care and attention of the officers, and, perhaps, a certain portion of good luck, seconded the progress of the fleet effectually, that, together with its convoy, it reached the coast of Egypt without any accident whatever.

The Admiral has most assuredly informed you that on our arrival at Alexandria, we learned that an English squadron of 14 sail had been there three days before us. It would have been the most prudent step perhaps, to have quitted the coast the moment the descent had been effected; but the Admiral, who waited for the orders(2) of the Commander in Chief (whose army naturally derived a great degree of confidence from the presence of the squadron) did not think himself justified in quitting the coast, but took, on the contrary, a strong position in the anchoring ground of Bequiers.

This road by its proximity to Rosetta, enabled him to receive on board the necessary supplies for the fleet; and to replace, though with infinite risks and pains, some part of the water that was daily consumed on board. It was therefore, unfortunately determined to moor the fleet in one line, in an open situation, and which could not be protected from the shore.

Fatal intelligence received from time to time by neutral vessels, announced the return of the enemy’s squadron. It had been seen off the Isle of Candia, steering to the westward. The conduct of this fleet, which, though superior to ours, had not waited for us before Alexandria, but made sail to the west, while we were effecting our disembarkation, which it might easily have thwarted or prevented, unhappily confirmed us in the opinion that it had no orders to attack us, and produced a boundless and fatal security.

On the 21st of July, however, two of the enemy’s frigates(3) reconnoitred us, and on the 31st, about two in the afternoon, their whole fleet hove in sight. It was composed of 14 sail of the line, and two brigs. The wind was northerly and rather fresh. They bore down with a press of sail on our fleet, and clearly announced a design to attack us.

The measures which the Admiral took on this occasion, the resolution to engage at anchor, and the results of this horrible affair, are detailed in the abstract(4), which I have subjoined to the present letter; in that, I have delineated every circumstance as it appeared to me on this too grievous, and too dreadful night.

The L’Orient took fire. It was by an accident which I cannot yet comprehend, that I escaped from the midst of the flames, and was taken into a yawl that was lying under the ship’s counter. Not being able to reach the vessel of General Villeneuve, I made for this place, from whence I have now the mortification of transmitting you these melancholy details.

The Franklin, the Spartiate, the Tonnant, the Peuple Souverain, and the Conquerant are taken. They got their top-masts up, and sailed with the enemy’s squadron, which quitted the coast on the 18th of August; leaving here a small division of four ships of the line and two frigates.

The Mercure, the Heureux, and the Guerrier have been burnt by the enemy. The two first ran aground during the action, and were buiged when they took possession of them.

The Timoleon, incapable of making her escape, was run on shore by Captain Trulet, who set her on fire, after putting all the crew either into his own boats, or into those which were sent him from the rest of the fleet.

The two frigates, the Artemise and the Serieuse were destroyed, in spite of the enemy’s endeavours to preserve them; the first was burnt, and the other sunk.

The sole relicks then of this unfortunate armament are comprised in the division of frigates, corvets, and fluets, which are now at Alexandria, and in that of General Villeneuve, who, by a bold maneuver(5), made his escape from the enemy. You will see by my Abstract, that this latter division is composed of two ships of the line and two frigates,--the Guillaume Tell, the Genereux, the Diane, and the Justice.

Placed by my rank at the head of the part of our unfortunate armament which remains here, Admiral Nelson proposed to me to receive the wounded, and other prisoners. In concert with General Kleber, commandant of the town, I have acquiesced in his proposition; and three thousand one hundred prisoners, of whom about 800 are wounded, have been put on shore since the 6th of August.

By means of this correspondence we have collected some information respecting our personal losses. My pen trembles in my hand while, in conformity to my duty, I attempt to particularize our misfortunes.

The Admiral, the Chiefs of Division, Casa-Bianca, Thevenard, Du Petit Thouars, are killed, and six other superior officers, whose names are subjoined(6), dangerously wounded. I have not yet been able to procure an exact list of the privates killed and wounded, on account of Admiral Nelson’s refused to send me the Commissaries of the captured vessels, with their roles d’equipage.

Since the action the enemy’s cruisers are masters of the whole coast, and interrupt all our communications. The other day they captured the Fortune, a corvet which the Admiral had sent to cruize off Damietta. The English squadron, as I had the honour of mentioning to you above, sailed (it is said) for Sicily on the 18th instant. The division which is stationed here, consists of four seventy-fours and two frigates.

On account of the extraordinary care which the English always take to conceal their loss of men, we have been able to procure no information on the subject that can be relied on. We are assured, however, that Admiral Nelson is dangerously wounded in the head, and that two captains are killed. We are also told, that two of their ships, the Majestic and the Bellerophon, had each 150 men killed and wounded.

In the situation in which we are, blocked up by a very superior force, I am still ignorant, Citizen Minister, what measures we shall pursue with the feeble maritime resources that yet remain to us in this port; but if I must needs speak the truth, such as it really appears to me, I then say that, after so dreadful a disaster, I CONCEIVE NOTHING BUT A PEACE CAN CONSOLIDATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR NEW COLONY. MAY OUR GOVERNORS PROCURE US A SOLID AND HONOURABLE ONE!

I am, with respect,

GANTEAUME.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)Our last was from a spectator on shore. We now present our readers (and we do it with great satisfaction) with a narrative of the engagement, from one who was an actor in it; from one who might have said with Aeneas,

--quaeque ipse miserrima vidi, Et quorum pars magna fui!

From Ganteaume, in short, Rear Admiral of the fleet, who was on board the l’Orient durng the action—which he describes with the precision of a seamen, and the feelings of a patriot.

These dispatches are addressed to Bruix. They are confidential, and such as would certainly have never transpired, but for the event which threw them into our hands. If this correspondence reach the minister of marine (which we have no doubt but it will) he may still profit by it. We have given it with fidelity.

We think these two papers give the fullest account of the glorious event of the first of August, that has yet appeared. It should be observed, however, that the letters from our fleet were all on board the Leander; and, as we have already observed, were destroyed by her gallant commander, previous to striking.—We are not, indeed, without a portion of information on the subject; but still it is flattering to see a brave and able officer, (for such Ganteaume is,) bearing testimony in his official documents, to the superior courage and skill of our intrepid countrymen.

(2)If we wanted any additional proofs of the falsehood of Bonaparte, this paper would furnish it. To injure the reputation of Brueys, and to insult his ashes, he asserts, as we have already seen (No. III.), that this unfortunate Admiral detained the fleet on the coast of Egypt contrary to his wishes; and here we have Ganteaume, Commander in Chief of all the French Naval forces in Egypt, expressly declaring, in direct contradiction to the assertion, that Brueys only remained on the coast because Bonaparte would not permit him to depart!

We have given our opinion on this subject (No. III.), and probably said more than enough there to convince the blindest of Bonaparte’s admirers, that he is deficient in one quality at least, of a great man; but we could not resist the temptation of making “assurance doubly sure,” and establishing his character beyond all possibility of future doubt, by the unsuspected evidence of his warmest friend.

(3)Sir John Sinclair, who has taken his ideas of ships in the Mediterranean from flies in a milk-pot, ducks in a pond, or gilt boats and streamers in a garden canal, very properly reprehends Mr. Pitt for not having made the victory more complete, by causing all the ships which were in quest of Lord Nelson, to find him! And true it is, that if these two frigates, and two or three more that were on the look out for the Admiral, had joined him previous to the engagement, they might have rendered him some service. But the worst is yet to come: for we can seriously assure Sir John, that if these vessels had not perversely found the French fleet (for which their captains shall be broke when he is first Lord of the Admiralty) while they were searching for ours, the victory would have been as complete as heart could wish, not a vessel, not a man would have escaped! It was these and other frigates which afterwards appeared that alarmed the enemy, and occasioned all those measures of precaution and security which we find they took; and for which, if Sir John will be pleased to compare the various dates of this and the following dispatch, he will see they had sufficient time.

Notwithstanding all this, however, we are not inclined to be very angry with the ships in question. It is thought by many that their captains possess full as much nautical skill as Sir John Sinclair, and nearly as much promptitude and zeal for the service of their country; this we confess, is also our opinion, and when we see SUCH MEN anxiously and ardently engaged on an element which no human power can controul, and in a service which no human abilities can effect at will, we are ready to conclude that something more than a knowledge of agriculture is required to enable us to judge of their merits, and something better than an itch of finding fault, to justify an attack on the plans of the minister who employs them!

(4)It follows this letter.

(5)Genteaume does Villeneuve too much credit: the merit of the escape (such as it is) is due to another person.

(6)These names do not appear; they were, probably, omitted in the hurry of making up the dispatches.

Accurate Assessment of Results of Battle with the British

2007-11-15T23:48:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 206-213.

TRANSLATION.

Rosetta, August 4th.

E POUSSIELGUE(1), Controller of the Expences of the Army of the East, and Administrator General of the Finances.

WE have just been witness, my dear girl, of the most bloody and unfortunate naval action that has been fought for many ages. We do not yet know all the circumstances of it, but those that we do know, are horrible.

The French fleet, composed of thirteen sail of the line, of which one was a three decker of 120 guns, and three of 80, was moored in the incommodious bay of Aboukir; the only station to be found on the coast of Egypt. For the last week several English frigates had frequently reconnoitred the position of our fleet; so that it was in constant expectation of being attacked. From Aboukir to Rosetta, in a straight line, is about ten miles; so that from the heights of this latter place our ships were plainly discernible.

The 1st of this month, at half after five in the evening, we heard the report of several guns: this was the commencement of the action. We immediately got upon the roofs of the highest houses, and on the little eminences, and clearly distinguished ten English vessels; the others were not yet in sight. The firing was exceedingly brisk till a quarter after nine, when we perceived, by favour of the night, a prodigious light, which sufficiently announced to us, that some vessel was in flames—at this moment the fire was brisker than ever. At ten o’clock, the vessel which was burning, blew up with a most tremendous noise, which was heard as plainly at Rosetta, as the explosion of Grenelle at Paris. This accident was succeeded by a pitchy darkness, and a most profound silence, which continued for about ten minutes. The time elapsed between our seeing and hearing the explosion was two minutes. The firing now began again, and continued, without intermission, till three in the morning: it then grew very faint till five, when it commenced with more fury than ever.

I now took my stand on a tower called Aboul-Mandour, about a mile from Rosetta, from whence I had a clear and distinct view of the whole engagement. At eight in the morning, I perceived a vessel on fire; about half an hour after, another, which did not appear to me to have been on fire before, suddenly blew up; its explosion was as dreadful as that of the preceding evening. The vessel which was burning removed further from the shore, the flames insensibly diminished, and it appeared to us, that the crew had succeeded in extinguishing them altogether.

During this time, the contest raged with redoubled fury: a large vessel, with all her masts carried away, got on shore. Several others appeared totally dismasted; but the two fleets were so intermixed, that we could not distinguish whether they were French or English; nor possibly make out which side had the advantage. The firing continued as warm as ever, till two in the afternoon of the 2d; at which period, two sail of the line, and two frigates, cut their cables, and make sail to the eastward with all the canvas they could carry. These vessels we clearly distinguished by their colours to be French. No other vessel stirred, and the firing ceased.

About six in the evening I returned to the tower of Aboul-Mandour, to reconnoiter the position of the two squadrons: it was the same as when I left it. The four vessels under weigh were off the mouth of the Nile. We knew not what to think of it. Twenty-four hours were past, and not a soul arrived to give us any information. To procure any ourselves was impossible; by land, on account of the Arabs, who were assembled between Rosetta and Aboukir; and by sea, on account of the difficulty of passing the bar, and the swell at the mouth of the Nile.

Thou may’st judge of our impatience and perplexity. We drew a very unfavourable augury from this silence: we were compelled, however, to remain in this state of uncertainty, all the night of the 2d. At length, on the morning of the 3d, a boat(2), which had slipped out in the night from Alexandria, brought us some details; but out of a most melancholy nature. They told us that some officers of the French fleet, who had escaped in a shallop to Alexandria, had reported that soon after the commencement of the action, Admiral Brueys had received three dangerous wounds; one on the head, and two in the body; that he still persisted in remaining on the quarter-deck; and that a fourth shot had cut him in two; that his first Captain Casa-Bianca, had been killed at the same instant, by a cannon ball; that the ship was just then perceived to be on fire; that they could not succeed in putting it out; and that she had finally blown up about ten in the evening. They added, that our squadron was defeated and destroyed; that four vessels only had escaped; and that the rest were in the enemy’s hands.

I returned to the tower, and found every thing precisely as it was the evening before. It was the same yesterday, and is still so this morning.

I now present you with an exact view of the whole scene, as it appeared to us: keeping the tower of Aboukir to the left, and directing our eyes along the horizon, to the right.

The 1st vessel dismasted, carries English colours.

The 2d and 3d in a good condition, colours not to be distinguished. The 4th has lost a mast.

The 5th in good condition; has English colours.

The 6th has lost a top-mast; this morning she hoisted a gib and a square sail.

The 7th has lost all her top-gallant masts.

The 8th has all her mast by the board.

The 9th ditto; except her bowsprit, which is standing.

The 10th dismasted; this morning a sail was bent to her bowsprit.

The 11th, 12th, and 13th, form a kind of groupe, we can only see that the three vessels have but seven masts between them.

The 14th has only her mizzen mast.

The 15th has lost her mizzen-top, and top-gallant masts.

The 16th has all her masts by the board.

The 17th has lost her mizzen top-gallant.

The 18th has lost her fore and main-masts.

The 19th, 20th, and 21st, form a groupe, with only four masts standing—all the top-masts gone.

The 22d entirely dismasted, and on shore—has English colours; they are endeavouring to get her off, and rig her out with jury masts.

The 23d in good condition; has English colours.

The 24th ditto. This is all that I could distinguish.

The result is, that though the English are victorious, they have been very roughly handled: this is clear, from their not being able to follow the four vessels that made off on the 2d.

For two days, all these vessels have remained inactive; they lie like logs in the water.

This morning intelligence is arrived from Alexandria, which confirms our losses. Rear Admiral Decres is killed, as well as Ducheyla. The Tonnant was the last ship that struck. Du Petit Thouars who commanded her, had both his legs carried away by a cannon ball. The vessels that escaped are the Guillaume Tell and the ----; the frigates are the Diana and the Justice. They say that it was the Artemise which blew up the morning before yesterday.

There is much still to be learned respecting this engagement. The English Admiral, they tell us, has sent a flag of truce to Alexandria, with a request that they would receive and take care of the wounded, which amount to 1500. He also proposes to send the prisoners on shore. I have not heard what answer was returned.

You will have in France the official relation of this event from both parties. I know not what they may say; but thou mayest rely with the utmost confidence on what I have written, because it is what I saw.

Communicate my letter to the female Citizen Corancez—this will save her son the trouble of writing; besides, I have set him about something else. He has already written six letters, and has not received an answer to any of them. I have heard nothing of Citizen Mony, whom I have appointed Agent at Demanhour. Derances, who has been ill, is quite recovered; he is with me. Martain is well, he has not received a single line from his family. I am the only fortunate person, since I have received three letters from thee since I have been in Egypt; many others have undoubtedly miscarried, as the English have taken several of our couriers.

I have had my portrait painted in profile since I have been here, by Citizen Denou, a skilful artist. They tell me that it is extremely like—but we have so many English about us, that I dare not send it, for fear it should find its way to England, or to the bottom of the sea. How happy should I be to bring it to thee myself! Be assured that the moment I can obtain my discharge, which I solicit night and day, I will quit this country. No fortune in the world shall keep me here. I would consent with pleasure to return to thee, as naked as I was born.

For the rest, my health is extremely good. I set out for Cairo to-morrow morning, in a handsome passageboat, with the military chest, the Paymaster-general, two advice-boats, an escort of 250 men, and more than 40 passengers. I take with me a fine Arabian horse, which a Cheik here made me a present of. We go by the Nile.

Adieu, my dear little girl, love me always well, and remember me to all our friends. I embrace thee tenderly, as well as my children.

POUSSIELGUE.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)This man was originally a merchant of Marseilles; but having a talent for intrigue, he was selected by the Directory, who had frequently profited by his ingenuity, to corrupt and revolutionize the knights of Malta. How well he succeeded, the recent surrender of that island declares but too plainly. He had, however, made himself too obnoxious to the Maltese to think of remaining there, and Bonaparte who, as the Cardinal Antici somewhere observes, “knows how to distinguish,” advanced him, in return for his eminent services, to the lucrative post in which we now find him.

He is evidently a very able man; and his letter which we now lay before the reader, is one of the most surprising instances of accuracy of observation, and fidelity of description, that we ever remember to have met with. It has been shewn to many of our officers who were in the engagement; and they unanimously concur in regarding it as a very extraordinary production.

It should be mentioned to the farther credit of Poussielgue that he could at no time have been nearer than seven miles to the scenes which he so correctly and minutely describes.

(2) That which brought General Loyer. See his letter, No. XXVIII.

General Menou Reflects on the Aftermath of Defeat by the British

2007-11-14T17:31:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 198-200.

TRANSLATION.

Rosetta, August 4th.

J. MENOU(1), General of Division, to General KLEBER.

WHAT a calamity, my dear General, has befallen our fleet! It is dreadful in the extreme: but we must take heart, and rise superior to our misfortunes!

I shall dispatch your Aid-de-Camp(2) to-morrow morning, together with the Commissary, in an advice boat to Cairo. I have had no details from Aboukir(3),

Not having any cavalry with me, I cannot dispatch a messenger over land; and the surf at the mouth of the river is so violent, that it is with the utmost difficulty and danger we can pass it(4).

I have still some faint hopes that all is not lost. If you have any intelligence of the tartanes, and other vessels, which had on board the artillery, cartridges, and other necessaries of the army, I beg you to communicate it to me; for we are in extreme want of them all here, and at Cairo.

If you could also, without risk, send round the baggage of the army, it would be of the greatest consequence, as it might then be forwarded to head quarters.

Finally, my dear General, let me hear from you—I am [anxious] to know every circumstance relative, as well to you, as to the ruins of our fleet. I am about to send you a courier, which is just arrived from the Commander in Chief; he has dispatches for you. Every thing is tolerably tranquil here; but we are obliged to keep a good look out!

I have again arrested Coraim(5), who had been released on board the L’Orient, and sent on shore. I shall send him to Cairo to-morrow under a strong escort. Is it true that you are thinking of sending me Demui? His troop will be extremely serviceable to me, if you have no occasion for it at Alexandria. Health and friendship, my dear General. Let me hear from you; for God’s sake, let me hear from you.

J. MENOU.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)Menou was wounded at the attack on Alexandria, and left in consequence of it, with the command of Rosetta. The French reckon him one of their best officers.

(2)Loyer. See the preceding letter.

(3)They must have arrived soon after this letter was finished: for Loyer’s, which is dated the same day, says, they had then reached him, and that he was to take them with him to Bonaparte.

(4)Menou had a considerable number of horse at Rosetta, and yet he did not think them sufficient to escort a courier to the fort of Aboukir, garrisoned by Frenchmen, and not more than eight or ten miles from town! Can our readers which for a more convincing proof of the state of security in which the French live in Egypt, or of the complete possession which they so truly declare in their official papers, they now have of the country.

(5)The Cheriff mentioned in Loyer’s letter.

Officer Discusses "Conversions" of Local Tribes

2007-11-13T20:40:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 192-196.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Rosetta, Aug. 4.

Aid-de-Camp LOYER, to Citizen KLEBER, General of Division.

My General,

I ARRIVED here yesterday morning at 7 o’clock, without any accident: instead of following the rest of the flotilla, we took a good offing—which answered extremely well. About two in the morning we were in sight of an English frigate(1), who certainly did not perceive us, or, at least, did not condescend to take any notice of us.

General Menou had not yet been informed of our unhappy disasters. He expressed a great deal of uneasiness to me for the fate of a convoy of light artillery, consisting of 11 pieces, with carriages, sponges, &c. and a prodigious quantity of musquet cartridges.

Many days have already elapsed since this convoy was dispatched from Alexandria. Not being able to get over the bar of the Nile, it had come to anchor at Aboukir, where every thing was to be put on board the light vessels of the country. Nothing, however, has yet been disembarked of all this cannon, ammunition, &c. except two eight-pounders. The rest is exposed to the seizure of the enemy, if it is not already in their possession. Citizen Dumanoir can give you some information on the subject: a detachment of troops may not yet be too late, perhaps, to preserve a convoy so necessary to the service.

I cannot conceive what motive could induce Admiral Brueys to set the Cheriff(2) at liberty, the night of the engagement. I took it for granted that he had been some how or other released by that event—but no such thing: he was sent here, I find, and had been walking about the town for several hours, during the absence of General Menou: on his return, however, the General sent him on board an advice boat, where he remains in custody. I am very sorry that you did not furnish me with the whole of your correspondence, that I might have laid before the Commander in Chief, the more than suspicious conduct of this Cheriff. As I am acquainted, however, with the principal reasons which induced you to remove him from Alexandria, I will mention them to General Bonaparte.

Our communications by the Nile are not yet quite safe. General Menou is arming an advice boat to take me to Cairo. I should have set out to day, but for the news from the army which has just reached him. An Adjutant General is this moment arrived from Cairo: he brings an official detail of the march of our army, and of the combats it has sustained; orders to some of the troops here to join without delay, and systems of organization for the country. For the rest, all is tranquil. Your division is at Boulac. The chief of battalion, Goyne of the 25th, tells me that it is far from being pleased with your(3) r----, and that it regrets exceedingly that you are not at its head.

The divisions of Desaix and Bon are the only ones that seem to have been in action. You see from the dispatches that our loss is trifling.

General Menou is about a treaty of pacification, and even of alliance with some of the Chiefs of the tribes. He has hopes of bringing over the tribe from which General Damas suffered so much. One of the subordinate chiefs has already made peace, and had a place of encampment assigned him. He has just been here to know the General’s pleasure—would to Heaven these conversions may increase(4)!

To-morrow morning I shall set out with the Cheriff, and a great number of our people, who are quartered here. It will take us four days to reach Cairo, and perhaps as many to return, on account of the winds. Do not, therefore, look for me, my dear General, in less than ten or twelve days(5). I will use all possible diligence to rejoin you speedily. I hope to be the bearer of good news—news which will remove you from Alexandria and its deserts, to the banks of the Nile—the Elysium of Egypt.

Your devoted Aid-de-Camp,

LOYER.

The official dispatches of the marine on the calamitous event of the 2d, have just been remitted to General Menou. I shall take them with me.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)this is incorrect. Lord Nelson had no frigate with him at this time; nor, indeed, till two or three days afterwards.

(2)Of this Cheriff we find the following account in a letter from Alexandria. “Bonaparte endeavoured to gain the confidence and friendship of the Cheriff; he decorated him with the tri-coloured scarf, and in every instance paid him the most distinguished attention. The Cheriff, laying his hand on his breast, took Allah to witness that he would be grateful. But General Kleber soon found that the traitor maintained a secret correspondence with the Mameloucs. He therefore ordered him into confinement on board the L’Orient; from whence he was put on shore a little before the catastrophe.”

The meaning of all this is—that Brueys, who was not in the secret, thought the innocence of this man a sufficient reason for setting him at liberty. We sincerely wish that the rest—(the children of the most respectable families, who were barbarously torn from their parents, as hostages, by the unfeeling Bonaparte—“Bonaparte exigea pour otages, les enfans les plus apparens du pays”—is the expression of the letter)—may have been dismissed at the same time: but we fear they all perished in the explosion of the L’Orient.

For the rest; this letter confirms the account of the horrid massacre mentioned by Boyer (No. XXII.) “Tout ce qui resistoit a mordu la poussiere, et nos soldats brulant de venger la mort de leurs compagnons d’armes, ONT IMPITOYABLEMENT PASSE AU FIL DE L’EPEE, LES RESTES DES TURCS QUI S’ETOIENT REFUGIES DANS UNE MOSQUEE.”

(3)Representative. He means Dugua.—See Damas’s letter to Kleber, p. 78.

(4)Drowning men will catch at straws. We do not, therefore, wonder to see the sensible Loyer flattering himself with the hopes of advantages to be derived from the “conversions” of the Arabs, notwithstanding he must have seen their fallaciousness. Bonaparte had some time before, not only converted, but even associated thousands of them to his army; so, at least, he says, and so all France repeats after him. And what were the important advantages derived from it? Hatred, and immediate desertion.—In short, (for we are unwilling to dwell on a subject so obvious to every man of common information) every hope of maintaining an alliance with such a people, is more absurd than the day-dreams of a madman.

(5)Loyer did not come back quite so soon as he expected. It took him eleven days, only to reach Bonaparte, whom he met returning from an unsuccessful attempt to rob the caravan: for this we can confidently assure our readers, was the true purport of the General’s boasted expedition towards Syria.

He had with him, as he says himself, most of the staff officers with the divisions of Regnier, Lannes, and Dugua.—All these, however, were completely baffled, by the gallantry and skill of Ibrahim Bey, and finally compelled to retreat with great loss towards Cairo, without accomplishing any part of their object! One regiment of grenadiers was nearly cut to pieces.—So much for the conquest of Syria, so triumphantly announced, and so gravely commented upon in the opposition papers!

French Navy Defeated After "Flattering" Themselves with Victory

2007-11-12T18:19:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 187-188.

TRANSLATION.

Rosetta, August 4th.

To Citizen BARRAS, Member of the Executive Directory of France, at Paris.

IN my last, dated from Alexandria, I had only, dear Director, to speak to thee of the success of the Republican arms. At present, I have a much more painful task. The Directory is, doubtless, informed ere this of the unfortunate issue of our naval engagement with the English.

During several hours we flattered ourselves with the hopes of being victors, but the blowing up of the L’Orient, threw the whole squadron into confusion. The English themselves allow that all our ships fought well;--many of their vessels are dismasted, but our squadron is almost totally destroyed. Thou art sufficiently acquainted with my disposition to be assured that I shall never become the echo of that calumny which is already anxiously busied in giving welcome to the most absurd rumors. I hear every thing, and say nothing—the affair is yet too recent to pronounce on it.

Consternation has overwhelmed us all. I set out tomorrow for Cairo, to carry the news to Bonaparte. It will shock him so much the more, as he had not the least idea of its happening. He will doubtless find resources in himself—if not to repair a loss of such magnitude, yet at least to prevent the disaster from becoming fatal to the army, which he commands.

With respect to myself, this dreadful event has restored all my courage. I feel that the moment is now come when it is indispensably necessary to unite all our efforts to enable us to triumph over the numerous obstacles which destiny, or malevolence, will not fail to fling in our way.

Pray Heaven this disastrous news produce no bad effect at Paris! I am, I confess, exceedingly uneasy about it—though I have still some confidence in the Genius of the Republic, who has hitherto so constantly befriended us.

Adieu, my dear Barras. I shall write to thee from Cairo, where I expect to be in four days.

TALLIEN.

I have seen thy cousin here—he is not well; the climate does not agree with him. There are not many sick in the army, however; although the heat is excessive, and the men are exposed to privations of every kind.

Letters from Alexandria assure us that two sail of the line, and two frigates, made their escape. The English are still off Abouquir: they appear to have suffered very much. A glimmering of hope still remains: may it not vanish like the rest!

Frenchman Comments on Political Turmoil in France

2007-11-11T16:58:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 181-184.

TRANSLATION.

Rosetta, August 4th.

I KNOW not, my dear girl, if thou hast received any of my letters. Since I left France, I have written to thee, once from Bastia, twice from Malta, and once from Alexandria. We have been here near a week, waiting for an opportunity to proceed to Cairo; for it is dangerous to ascend the Nile without an escort. In our passage we had the good fortune to escape the English, who are still in these parts.

Before thou canst receive this letter, the defeat of our fleet by the English, will be known in France. We are all here in the most dreadful consternation: I can give thee not details, because we are not yet fully acquainted with them ourselves; what is, unhappily, too well known is, that the superb vessel in L’Orient blew up during this engagement. Placed on an eminence which overlooked the sea, we were witness of this horrible spectacle. The combat lasted more than twenty-four hours; the English must have suffered greatly. We are still ignorant how many vessels we have lost; and I venture to hope that the disastrous reports in circulation will not be confirmed. Admiral Brueys was killed, as was Ducheyla, and a number of other brave officers.

It is not in the first moments that we should form a judgment on the causes of a calamity so distressing to every good Frenchman. On the contrary, we should anxiously endeavour to check that calumny(1) which neither respects misfortune, nor the ashes of the dead.

With respect to myself, I hear and observe, but do not think it either safe or prudent, to pronounce amidst the tumult of the passions. We depart to-morrow for Cairo, and shall be the first to announce this afflicting news to Bonaparte; who I hope will know how to appreciate this situation, and bear this first reverse of fortune with firmness. I frankly declare that I am not quite so tranquil with regard to the effect this news may have in France; I see already the enemies of Bonaparte and of the Director(2) his friend, sallying forth from their retreats and agitating the public opinion against them!

Past services will be forgotten, and every one will assume the merit of having forseen what has happened. The parties, the half-extinguished factions, will re-invigorate their mutual age, and our unhappy country will again be torn to pieces by new dissensions!

As for me, my love, I am here, as thou knowest, much against my will,--my situation every day becomes more and more irksome; since, separated from my country, from every thing that is dear to me, I cannot foresee the period when I may hope to rejoin them: nothing, however, shall induce me to betray my friendship and my duty. Bonaparte has experienced a reverse; this is an additional reason with me, for attaching myself more firmly to him, and for uniting his fate with my own.

Do not suppose from this, that I can ever become the partizan of any faction; the past has sufficiently enlightened me on the score of prudence; and if it should happen (which I am very far from supposing) that an ambitious chief should arise, aiming to enchain his country, or to turn the arms of its defenders against its liberty, you should then see me in the ranks of those who would stand forward to oppose him.

Thou seest, my girl, that I know how to choose my party; but I declare to thee, with the most perfect openness of heart, that I had rather a thousand times be with thee and thy daughter, in some retired corner of the world, far from all the passions and all the intrigues which agitate mankind;--and I assure thee, that if I ever have the happiness of placing my foot once more on the soil of my native land, nothing shall induce me to quit it again. Of the forty thousand Frenchmen who are here, there are not four whose determination on this head is not the same as my own.

Nothing can be more melancholy than the life we lead here; we are in want of every thing. It is now five days since I closed my eyes. I lie on the bare floor; flies, bugs, ants, gnats, mosquitoes, insects of every kind devour us alive; and twenty times a day I regret our charming Chaumiere(3). Do not, my love, dispose of it on any account.

Adieu, my best Theresia(4), my paper is drenched with my tears. The delightful remembrance of thy goodness, and thy love, the hope of meeting thee again, still amiable, still faithful, and of embracing my dear daughter, are the sole support and stay of the unfortunate.

TALLIEN.

Let my mother know that I am well.

I experienced a loss on our passage. The day we left Malta, Bellavoine fell asleep in some tavern, and never appeared afterwards. I desired Regnault to forward him to me, if he should happen to light on him. Minerva is still with me, and is very well.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)We see by this that the unfortunate Brueys was already become the object of malevolence. It reflects some credit on Talien, that he did not join in the cry so unjustly raised against him; and, indeed, though we have no great respect for Talien, who has ever been a man of turbulence and blood, we cannot but confess, that this and the following letter, set not only his talents, but his social feelings, in a very amiable and respectable light.

The cant of patriotism, however, we may be allowed to discredit. We have heard the same language from every one of the numerous demagogues who have desolated France. The instant their power is established, their regard for their country knows no bounds: all farther change is deprecated, and, if “an ambitious chief should arise,” they are as determined as Tallien himself, to protect her, that is, themselves, against him. They fail, however, and make way for others, who, with the same professions of patriotism, are destroyed in their turn,--“and thus the wheel of fortune goes around!”

Talien’s party is now at the head of affairs; this is an excellent reason for him to wish to be quiet: the “holy work of insurrection” loses all its sanctity when employed against the successful tyrants of the day; and they hate to be “plagued by the bloody instructions which they have taught.”

(2)Barras.

(3)This is the name which Tallien has given to a house he possesses in the neighbourhood of Paris; and which, like the Thatched House in St. James’s Street, is any thing but what it professes to be. Chaumiere means a thatched hut or cottage.

(4)His wife, Theresia Cabarrus.

Commissary Chides Bureaucrat for Neglecting Egyptian Hospital

2007-11-10T15:50:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 176-177.

TRANSLATION(1).

Rosetta, August 1st.

DUVAL, Commissary of War, to the Citizen TRIPIER, Agent for the Hospitals, &c.

IS it not a wonderful thing, Citizen, that for near a month, during which the hospital has now been established at Rosetta, you should have neglected it to a degree which is absolutely unpardonable. No straw beds, no chamber utensils, no medicines, no linen for dressings; in a word, a total want of every thing and the sick in a state of the utmost distress.

You will hardly allege, I fancy, that you are without means--for in the first place, you have so much a decade to supply all the wants of the service; and, in the second, you have the transport No. 47, which has on board necessaries of every kind for a hospital of more than a thousand sick; add to these, the general magazine which is established at Alexandria.

I summon you then, Citizen, on your responsibility, to send me, without the smallest delay, every thing necessary, linen, &c. as well as medicines, for a hospital of four hundred sick.

I will take care to give an account of your negligence to the First Commissary; as well as to the Commander in Chief; and especially if you shew the least remissness in sending me what I write for.

Health.

DUVAL.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)This letter was written on the morning of the first August, previous to the engagement; it furnishes, as the reader sees, another instance of the regard to truth which Bonaparte displays in his public dispatches. "We have not a man sick," says this veracious Chief, in which he is followed as usual by Berthier: and yet we find 400 perishing for want of necessaries at Rosetta! a place reached with little fatigue, entered without striking a blow, kept with no other precautions than strict police, and supposed to be the healthiest spot in Egypt!

Commissary Requests Provisions for Alexandria

2007-11-09T20:10:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 171-174.
TRANSLATION.

Alexandria, July 29.

LE ROY, Commissary of the Marine, to Admiral BRUEYS.

Citizen Admiral,

IN obedience to the orders of General Kleber, an agent for military supplies is about to set out for Rosetta. I shall furnish him with a letter for Citizen Jaubert, who will take measures for preventing the purchases made for the fleet, and those for the army, either here or at Rosetta, from occasioning a competition in the markets, which will be injurious to both.

The Board of Health has appointed Citizen Ferriere to the hospital at Aboukir. He will wait on you for orders.

Captain De la Rue writers to me in the most pressing manner, from Rosetta, for scherms (lighters). It is with the utmost difficulty that I have been able to collect five to send you—we are now engaged in looking out for a sixth.

I presume that the capture of Cairo will facilitate our communications;--but, at all events, the supplying the fleet with provisions of water, the forwarding the baggage of the army, the correspondence with Rosetta, the necessity of going to procure water for Alexandria, which in a short time will be in want of it(1)—All these urgent calls induce me to propose to you to dispatch one of the ships of war to Damietta, to collect as many scherms as possible, and bring them round to Rosetta, where they may be put under the command of Citizen De la Rue, and distributed according to your orders.

The situation of the sick, and the means of taking care of them, are not yet precisely such as to enable me to dispense with requesting you to order all the sick of your squadron to be put on shore in future at Rosetta. The difficulty of refitting at this port has, hitherto, retarded the sailing of the Madonna della N----; but you shall have her one of these days.

Health and respect.

LE ROY.

P.S. What an infinity of pains, Citizen Admiral, for the most trifling thing! The success of the Commander in Chief will soon, I hope, alleviate or remove our difficulties.

General Kleber repeats his request to you, to let him know if you cannot contrive to send his packets by the first vessel which you dispatch to France. The General also desires you to send an officer to Rosetta, to overlook the taking on board the water for Alexandria, and the embarkation of the baggage of the cavalry on the Nile.

Here is the outline of a plan which I have drawn up for the purpose, by the assistance of the worthy Guien; a man whose friendship I owe to your recommendation—for which I can never be sufficiently thankful.

1. To convey all the scherms of Damietta to Rosetta, where, in conjunction with those at Alexandria, they shall be appropriated to the exclusive service of the squadron, and of this port.

2. The macks shall serve as transports to convey the passengers to Cairo, as well as the baggage of the army.

3. The Caisses shall supply the place of sloops, when ever a sufficient number of tartanes cannot be found.

4. To employ between this place and Bequier, and between Bequier and Rosetta, as many tartanes as possible, with latin sails, and drawing little water.

Health and respect.

LE ROY.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)’Proofs rise on proofs!” We mentioned in our observations of Savary’s letter, (No. XII.) that the troops and transport vessels at Alexandria, would shortly experience a scarcity of provisions. We now find that a worse evil awaited them; for so long since as the beginning of August, they were obliged to draw their supplies of water from Rosetta! It is true that the rise of the Nile towards the end of that month, would probably furnish them with a precarious supply—but, on the other hand, as the canal was entirely in the possession of the Arabs, and as it never brought water enough to fill half the cisterns of the city, we may reasonably doubt whether they derived much advantage from it.

Add to this, that the usual population of the city, which was always (that is in modern times) scantily supplied with this indispensable article, is about eight thousand, the French say then: now the garrison, the transports, and the ships of war there, must make an addition to it of twelve thousand at least: so that placing every thing in the most favourable light, it is impossible but that the want of water must by this time be most seriously felt; and evil the more alarming, as not a drop can now be procured from Rosetta.

We may be accused of being too sanguine, but as we reason from facts; and not from a vague reliance on we know not what resources, to be found in the good genius of Bonaparte, we shall be little affected by the charge—while we give it as our fixed opinion, that the shipping at Alexandria (putting all the attacks upon it out of the question,) will soon be driven, by its wants, to attempt an escape which must be fatal to a great part of it, or to an unconditional surrender.

General Writes on the Battle of the Pyramids

2007-11-08T20:34:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 165-168.

TRANSLATION.

Grand Cairo, July 29.

DUPUIS, General of Brigade, &c. to his friend Carlo.

ON land as on sea, in Europe as in Africa, I am doomed to be on thorns(1);--Yes, my friend, on our arrival at Malta I went to take possession of it, and to abolish the Order: on our arrival at Alexandria, and storming it, I was made Governor of the place. At present, after a most painful march of twenty days, we are arrived at Grand Cairo, not, indeed, without beating the Mameloucs, en passant; that is to say, putting them to flight, for they are not worth our anger.

Here I am, then, my friend, graced with a new dignity; which I could not refuse, since it was no less than the government of Cairo; a dignity much too fine for me to refuse, when offered by Bonaparte.

The conduct of the Brigade at the affair of the Pyramids is unique. It cut to pieces, itself, 4000 of the Mamelouc cavalry, took a battery of forty pieces of cannon, all their intrenchments, their colours, their magnificent horses, and their rich baggage—since there is not a single soldier who has not 100 louis d’ors, without exaggeration; and many of them 500(2).

In fine, my dear friend, I occupy at present the finest seraglio in Cairo; that of the favourite Sultana of Ibrahim Bey, Sultan of Egypt. I occupy his charming palace, and I respect, in the midst of his nymphs, the promise which I made to my dear girl in Europe—No; I have not yet been guilty of one act of infidelity towards her, and I hope, yes, I still hope to hold out.

This is a most horrid place. The streets are filthy and pestilential; and the inhabitants hideous and brutified. I toil like a horse, and yet I cannot find my way through this immense chaos, far more extensive than Paris; but Heavens! How different!—O how I long to get back to Liguria.

Yes, my dear fellow, though I enjoy myself tolerably well, and want for nothing—yet where are my friends? Where is the worthy Marina? I weep like a child at our separation: but I hope that I shall soon be with her—yes, soon, for I am d----nably sick of every body here.

Our march across the Desert, and our battles, cost us very few men. The army is in good health, and about to be new clothed. I do not know where I shall go to Syria or not; we are all ready. I had the misfortune to lose my [illegible word] at the storming of Alexandria.

Let me hear from you, I beg. Finally, the judge of the paltroony of this great people of whom we have heard so much. I took possession of this immense city on the 23d of this month, with only two companies of grenadiers. It has more than 600,000 inhabitants.

Adieu, my dear friend, I embrace Marcellin a thousand times, his mother, his father, his papa Carlo, and all friends, and believe me till death the most devoted of your friends.

C. DUPUIS.

I write by this courier to Pijon and Spinola—tell Pijon that he was in high luck to be banished(3); would to God that I had been so too! I embrace him and his family. My regard to poor Pietro.

I embrace Honorio, your brother, and your uncle.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)This is the strangest letter we ever met with. It is an incoherent rhapsody, which, if the author was sober when he wrote it, proves to him to be a singular compound of madness and folly. Such as he is, however, we see Bonaparte selecting him for the Governor of Grand Cairo! Yet on farther consideration, we do not think the General much less happy than usual in his choice; for a wise man would not have accepted the post; and a sane man could not have held it “to the purpose.”

(2)Dupuis has repeated this contemptible falsehood, in a letter which has found its way to Paris. “Our troops,” says he, “roll in gold, and are all mounted on huge asses, which gallop ventre a terre!!!’ This looks as if the Mameloucs had reserved, as usual, the horses for themselves; which will be found, we imagine, to be pretty nearly the case. The rest of the letter is too absurd for notice.

(3)We know nothing of General Dupuis. From his connections he appears to be a Genoese; but from his name and his mode of thinking, a Frenchman. He is in extacy at his good fortune, and longing to be rid of it! Proud of the government of Cairo, and wishing he had been hanged, or banished, before he went on the expedition which conferred it to him! He seems to reason some what in the manner of Sancho—“To be sure, a Governor is a great man; but if this is to be a Governor of Barataria, I would rather have staid at home, and kept goats.”

"In the Hands of a Civilized Nation" Egypt "Would Become a Mine of Wealth"

2007-11-07T20:53:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 147-162.

TRANSLATION.

Grand Cairo, July 28th.

My dear Parents,

OUR entrance into this city furnishes me with an opportunity of writing to you(1); and as my design is to make you fully acquainted with an expedition no less singular than astonishing, I shall take the liberty of recapitulating our achievements since the day we left Toulon.

The land army, composed of 30,000 men, embarked at Marseilles, Toulon, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia, set sail on the 19th of May, under the convoy of 15 sail of the line (two of which were armed en flute[2]) 14 frigates, and several smaller ships of war. The convoy altogether formed a total of more than 400 sail; and never perhaps, since the Crusades, has so large an armament appeared in the Mediterranean.

Without calculating the dangers of the element on which we were embarked, or those which we had to apprehend from an enemy formidable at sea, we steered with a favourable wind for Malta, where we arrived on the 10th of June. The conquest of this important place cost us but a few men. It capitulated on the 12th—the Order was abolished, and the Grand Master packed off to Germany with a budget of fine promises; in a word, every thing succeeded to our wish. Time, however, was precious—we had no leisure to amuse ourselves with calculating the advantages to be derived from the possession of Malta; for an English squadron of 13 sail of the line, commanded by Nelson, was at anchor in the Bay of Naples(3), and watched all our motions. Bonaparte, informed of this, scarce gave us time to take in water: he ordered the fleet to weight immediately, and, on the 18th of June, we were already in full sail for the second object of our expedition. We fell in with Candia on the 25th, and on the 30th our light vessels made Alexandria.

Admiral Nelson had been off the city on the noon of this very day; and proposed to the Turks to anchor in the port, by way of securing it against us; but as his proposal was not accepted, he stood on for Cyprus; while we, profiting by his errors, and turning even his stupidity to our own advantage, made good our landing on the 2d of July, at Marabou. The whole army was on shore by break of day, and Bonaparte putting himself at their head, marched straight to Alexandria, across a desert of three leagues, which did not even afford a drop of water, in a climate where the heat is insupportable.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, we reached the town, which was defended by a garrison of near 500 Janizaries. Of the rest of the inhabitants, some had thrown themselves into the forts, and others got on the tops of their houses. In this situation they waited our attack. The charge is sounded—our soldiers fly to the ramparts, which they scale, in spite of the obstinate defence of the besieged: many Generals are wounded, amongst the rest Kleber—we lose near 150 men, but courage, at length, subdues the obstinacy of the Turks! Repulsed on every side, they betake themselves to God and their Prophet, and fill their mosques—men, women, old, young, children at the breast, ALL are massacred(4). At the end of four hours, the fury of our troops ceases—tranquility revives in the city—several forts capitulate—I myself reduce one into which 700 Turks had fled—confidence springs up—and, by the next day, all is quiet.

It will not be amiss, I think, to make a short digression just here—for the sake of informing you of the object of this expedition, and of the causes which have induced Bonaparte to take possession of Egypt.

France, by the different events of the war and the Revolution, having lost her colonies and her factories, must inevitably see her commerce decline, and her industrious inhabitants compelled to procure at second hand the most essential articles of their trade. Many weighty reasons must compel her to look upon the recovery of those colonies, if not impossible, yet altogether unlikely to produce any of the advantages which were derived from them before they became a scene of devastation and horror; especially, if we may add to this, the decree for abolishing the slave trade.

To indemnify itself, therefore, for this loss, which may be considered as realized, the Government turned its views towards Egypt and Syria; countries which, by their climate and their fertility, are capable of being made the storehouses of France, and, in process of time, the mart of her commerce with India. It is certain, that by seizing and organizing these countries, we shall be enabled to extend our views still further; to annihilate, by degrees, the English East India trade, enter into it with advantage ourselves; and, finally, get into our hands the whole commerce of Africa and of Asia.

These, I think, are the considerations which have induced the Government to undertake the present expedition against Egypt.

This part of the Ottoman dominion has been for many ages governed by a species of men called Mameloucs, who, having a number of Beys at their head, disavow the authority of the Grand Seignior, and rule despotically and tyrannically, a people and a country, which, in the hands of a civilized nation, would become a mine of wealth.

To gain possession of Egypt, then, it is necessary to subdue these Mameloucs(5); they are in number about 8000—al cavalry—under the command of 24 Beys. It is of consequence to give you some idea of these people, their manner of making war, their arms, defensive and offensive, and their origin.

Every Mamelouc is purchased—they are all from Georgia and Mount Caucasus—there are a great number of Germans and Russians amongst them, and even some French. Their religion is Mahometanism: exercised from their infancy in the military art, they acquire an extraordinary degree of dexterity in the management of their horses, in shooting with the carabine and pistol, in throwing the lance, and in wielding the sabre; there have been instances of their severing, at one blow, a head of wet cotton.

Every Mamelouc has two, three, and sometimes four servants, who follow him on foot wherever he goes; nay, even to the field. The arms of a Mamelouc on horseback, are two carabines, carried by his servants—these are never fired but once—two pair of pistols stuck in his girdle; eight light lances in a kind of quiver, which he flings with admirable dexterity; and an iron headed mace. When all these are discharged, he comes to his last resource—his two sabers: putting, then, the bridle of his horse between his teeth, he takes one of them in each hand, and rushes full speed upon the foe, cutting and slashing to right and left. Woe be to those who cannot parry his blows! For some of them have been known to cleave a man down the middle. Such are the people with whom we are at war! I shall now proceed with my narrative.

Having organized a government at Alexandria, and secured a communication(6) with the read of our army, Bonaparte ordered every man to furnish himself with five day’s provisions, and made preparations for passing a desert of twenty leagues in extent, in order to arrive at the mouth of the Nile, and ascend that celebrated stream to Grand Cairo—the prime object of his expedition. We began our march on the 5th of July, and reached the river by easy stages, falling in, on our route, with some detached parties of the Mameloucs, who retired as we advanced. It was not till the 12th, that General Bonaparte learned that the Beys were marching to meet him, with their united forces, and that he might expect to be attacked the next day: he marched therefore in order of battle, and took the necessary precautions.

Bonaparte sent me forward to gain intelligence, with three armed sloops; with this little flotilla I advanced about three leagues in front of the army. I landed at every village on both sides of the Nile, to gain what information I could respecting the Mameloucs; in some I was fired at, in others received with kindness, and offered provisions. In one of them I met with an adventure as laughable(7) as it is singular: the Cheik of the place having collected all his people to meet me, came forward from the rest, and demanded to know by what right the Christians were come to seize a country which belonged to the Grand Seignior. I answered him, that it was the will of God and his Prophet to bring us there. But, rejoined he, the King of France ought at least to have informed the Sultan of this step. I assured him that this had been done; and he then asked me how our King did? I replied, very well; upon which he swore by his turban and his beard, that he would always look on me as his friend. I took advantage of the kindness of these good people, collected all the information I could, and continuing my route up the Nile, came to anchor for the night opposite a village called Chebriki, where the Mameloucs were collected in force, and where the first action took place.

I sent off my dispatches to the Commander in Chief that night; in these I gave him all the information I had been able to obtain respecting the Mameloucs.

As soon as the day broke, I clambered up the mast of my vessel, and discovered six Turkish shalops bearing down upon me; at the same time I was reinforced by a demi-galley. I drew out my little fleet to meet them, and at half after four a cannonade began between us, which lasted five hours; in spite of the enemy’s superiority, I made head against them, they continued nevertheless to advance upon me, and I lost for a moment the demi-galley, and one of the gun-boats. Yielding, however, was out of the question, it was absolutely necessary to conquer;--in this dreadful moment our army came up, and I was disengaged. One of the enemy’s vessels blew up. Such was the termination of our naval combat.

While this was passing, the Mameloucs advanced upon our army; they rode round and round it, without finding any point where an impression might be made, and, indeed, without any attempt at it. I presume, that, astonished at the manner in which our columns were drawn up, they were induced to put off to a future day the decision of their fortune and their empire. This affair was trifling enough in itself, the Mameloucs only lost about 20 men, but we reaped a considerable advantage from it, that of having given an extraordinary idea of our tactics to an enemy acquainted with any; who knows of no other superiority in arms than that of sleight and agility; without order to firmness, unable even to march in platoons, advancing in confused groups, and falling upon the enemy in sudden starts of wild and savage fury.

After the retreat of the Mameloucs, we advanced upon Cairo, where the decisive action took place. It was, in fine, on the 22d of July, that the army found itself at daybreak about three leagues from Cairo, and give from the so much celebrated Pyramids. Here the Mameloucs, commanded by the famous Mourad, the most powerful of the Beys, awaited us: till three in the afternoon the day was wasted in skirmishes; at length the hour arrived! Our army, flanked on the right by the Pyramids, and on the left by the Nile, perceived the enemy was making a movement. Two thousand Mameloucs advanced against our right, commanded by General Desaix and Regnier. Never did I see so furious a charge! Giving their horse the rein, they rushed on the divisions like a torrent, and pushed in between them. Our soldiers, firm and immoveable, let them come within ten paces, and then began a running fire, accompanied with some discharges of artillery; in the twinkling of an eye more than 150 of them fell, the rest sought their safety in flight. They returned, however, to the charge, and were received in the same manner. Wearied out at length by our resistance, they turned, and attacked out left wing, to see if fortune would there be more favorable to them.

The success of our right encouraged Bonaparte. The Mameloucs had thrown up a hasty entrenchment in the village of Embabet, on the left bank of the Nile, in which they had placed thirty pieces of cannon, with their valets, and a small number of Janizaries to defend their approaches—this entrenchment the General gave orders to force; two divisions undertook it, in spite of a terrible cannonade. At the instant our soldiers were rapidly advancing towards it, six hundred Mameloucs sallied from the works, surrounded our platoons, and endeavoured to cut them down;--but, instead of succeeding, met their own deaths. Three hundred of them dropt on the spot; and the rest, in their attempt to escape, threw themselves into the Nile, where they all perished. Despairing now of any success, the Mameloucs fled on all sides; set fire to their fleet, which soon after blew up, and abandoned their camp to us, with more than four hundred camels loaded with baggage.

Thus ended the day, to the confusion of an enemy who were possessed with the belief that they should cut us in pieces; and who had boasted that it was as easy to cut off the heads of a thousand Frenchmen, as to divide a gourd or a melon(8).

The army marched on that night to Gizeh; the residence of Murat, the Chief of the Mameloucs. The next day we crossed the Nile in flat-bottomed boats, and entered Cairo without resistance.

Here ends the narrative of our military operations. I propose now to give you some account of the miseries we underwent in our march, together with a brief description of the country we have traversed, and of the inhabitants.

Let us return to Alexandria.—This city has nothing of its antiquity but the name—if there be any other relicks(9) of it, they remain utterly unregarded and unknown, among a people, who appear to be scarce conscious of their own existence. Figure to yourself being incapable of feeling, taking events just as they occur, and surprised at nothing; who with a pipe in his mouth, has no other occupation than that of squatting on his breech before his own door, or that of some great man, and dreaming away the day, without a thought of his wife or family. Figure to yourself too, a number of mothers strolling about, wrapped up in a dirty black rage, and offering to sell their children to every one they meet;--Men half naked, of the colour of copper, and of a most disgusting appearance, raking in the puddles and kennels like hogs, and devouring every thing they find there;--houses of twenty feet in height at the most, of which the roof is flat, the interior a stable, and the exterior four mud walls.—Figure to yourself all this, I day,and you will have a pretty correct idea of the city of Alexandria. Add, that around this mass of misery and horror, lie the ruins of the most celebrated city of the ancient world, the most precious monuments of the arts.

Leaving this city to ascend the Nile, you cross a desert, bare as my hand, where every three or four leagues you find a paltry well of brackish water. Imagine yourself the situation of an army obliged to pass these arid plains, which do not afford the slightest shelter against the intolerable heat which prevails there! The soldier, loaded with provisions, finds himself, before he has marched an hour, overcome by the heat, and the weight of what he carries, and throws away every thing that adds to his fatigue, without thinking of tomorrow. Thirst attacks him! He has not a drop of water; hunger!—he has not a bit of bread. It was thus that amidst the horrors which this faithful picture presents, we beheld several of the soldiers die of thirst, of hunger, and of heat; others, seeing the sufferings of their comrades, blew out their own brains; others threw themselves, loaded as they were, into the Nile, and perished in the water.

Every day of our march renewed these dreadful scenes; and, what was never heard of before—what will stagger all belief; the army, during a march of seventeen days, never tasted bread—the soldiers lived during the whole of this time on gourds, melons, poultry, and such vegetables as they found on their route. Such as the food of all, from the General to the common soldier,--nay, the General was often obliged to fast for eighteen to twenty hours, because the privates generally arriving first, plundered the villages of every article of subsistence, and frequently reduced him to the necessity of satisfying himself with the refuse of their hunger, or of their imtemperance!

It is useless to speak of our drink. We all live here under the law of Mahomet, which forbids the use of wine; but, by way of indemnity, allows us as much Nile water as we can drink.

Shall I give you some account of the country between the two branches of the Nile? To do this properly, I must lay before you a topographical chart of the course and direction of the river.

Two leagues below Cairo it divides itself into two branches; one of which falls into sea at Rosetta; the other at Damietta: the intermediate country is called the Delta, and is extremely fertile. Along the outer sides of the two branches, runs a slip of cultivated land, broader in some places than in others, but no where more than a league: beyond this are the Deserts, extending on the left to Lybia, and on the right to the Red Sea. From Rosetta to Cairo, the country is well peopled, and produces a good deal of wheat, rice, lentils &c. The villages are crowded together-their construction is execrable, being little more than heaps of mud trodden into some consistency, hollowed out within; and resembling, in every feature, the snow heaps of our children. If you recollect the shape of those oven-like piles, you have a perfect idea of the palaces of the Egyptians!

The husbandmen, commonly called Fellas, are extremely laborious; they live on little, and in a state of filth and degradation that excites horror. I have seen them swallow the residue of the water which my camels and horses happened to leave in their troughs.

Such is this Egypt, so celebrated by travelers and historians! In despite, however, of all these horrors, of the hardships we endure, and of the miseries the army is condemned to suffer, I am still inclined to think that it is a country calculated above all others to give us a colony which may be productive of the highest advantages(10); but for this, time and hands are necessary. I have seen enough to be convinced, that it is not with soldiers as ours! They are terrible in the field, terrible after victory(11), and, without contradiction, the most intrepid troops in the world: but they are not formed for distant expeditions. A word dropt at random, will dishearten them—they are lazy, capricious, and exceedingly turbulent and licentious in their conversation—they have been heard to say, as their officers passed by, “there go the Jack Ketches of the French!” and a thousand other things of the same kind.

The cup of bitterness is poured out, and I will drain it to the dregs. I have on my side firmness, health, and a spirit which I trust will never flag: with these I will persevere to the end.

I have yet said nothing of Grand Cairo. This city, the capital of a kingdom, which, to borrow the language of the Savans of the country, has no bounds, contains about 400,000 souls. Its form is that of a long shaft or tunnel, crowded with houses piled one upon another, without order, distribution, or method of any kind. Its inhabitants, like those of Alexandria, are plunged in the most brutal ignorance, and regard with astonishment the prodigy who is able to read and write! This city, however, such as I have described it, is the centre of a considerable commerce, and the spot where the caravans of Mecca and India terminate their respective journies (My next will give you some account of these caravans).

I went yesterday to see the installation of the Divan, which Bonaparte has formed. It consists of nine persons(12). And such a sight! I was introduced to nine bearded automatons, dressed in long robes, and turbans; and whose mien and appearance altogether, put me strongly in mind of the figures of the twelve apostles in my grandfather’s little cabinet. I shall say nothing to you of their talents, knowledge, genius, wit, &c.—this is always a blank chapter in Turkey. No where is there to be found such a deplorable ignorance as in every part of that country—no where such wealth, and no where so vile and sordid is a misuse of the blessing.

Enough of this. I have now, I think, fulfilled my intentions: many topics have been doubtless overlooked; but these deficiencies will be well supplied by the dispatches of General Bonaparte.

Do not entertain any uneasiness on my account. I suffer, it is true, but the whole army suffers with me. My baggage has reached me in safety; I have, therefore, in the general distress, all the advantages of fortune. Once again, be easy; I am in good health.

Take care of your healths; in less than a year I hope to have the happiness of embracing you. I know how to appreciate that happiness in advance, as I will one day shew you.

I embrace my sisters with the sincerest affection, and am with respect,

Your most obedient son,

BOYER.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)This letter has embarrassed us considerably. It bears the same signature as the preceding; and yet we can with difficulty persuade ourselves that it was written by the same person. The letter which the reader has just seen, is from a master hand, confident of knowledge, and deciding on facts without periphrasis, or affectation. The present, which is also well written, and with a sufficient knowledge of the transaction it records, is very inferior to it in simplicity, and manly decision.

The writer is incessantly labouring to say every thing in the finest manner, and doles out his little modicums of information in a style of gravity and self-importance, that has sometimes made us smile. With all this, however, the letter is very creditable to the author’s abilities. It furnishes, besides, many important facts, and it discovers, amidst a great solicitude to conceal it, that the French troops have been miserably duped by their government, and that they are rapidly hastening to total and irremediable distruction.

We were at first inclined to believe that the difference which we remarked in the style and manner of the two letters might originate in their being written to different persons: one an experienced commander, to whom it was necessary to represent things as they really were! The other, a parent ignorant, perhaps, of military affairs, and likely to be much better pleased with a florid narrative of extraordinary events, than with a brief relation of storming towns without walls, and gaining victories without enemies!—But on reconsidering the matter, we think the variation too considerable to be even thus accounted for. We frankly confess that we have no other solution of the difficulty to offer; and we, therefore, leave the whole to the reader: only repeating our first assertion, that the writing and the name subscribed to this and the preceding letter, are to the best of our judgment the same.

(2)These were Venitian sixty-fours. In his enumeration of the forces embarked, Boyer, omits those that were taken on board, at Ajaccio, and who amounted to several thousand: his list of ships of war is correct.

(3)It is unnecessary to say that this was not the case. Once for all, we must observe, that we have seldom thought it necessary to take notice of such geographical and historical blunders as appear in this correspondence;--the present letter, for instance, has several of both kind; but we leave them to the reader.

(4)These, then, are the triumphs of the “Hero of Italy!” of the “fond object of Mr. Wakefield’s daily and nightly solicitude!” of—but we dare not trust ourselves with the subject. On this man, and his sanguinary admirers, be the blood of this innocent people; and the ineffable contempt and abhorrence that naturally follow cruelties without motive or end, and base and abject panegyrics on their savage perpetrators!

(5)This is a better reason for declaring war against them, than the perculations of a Bey who has been dead these twenty years. But this is not the only instance in which the hypocrisy and falsehood of Bonaparte have been completely detected and exposed by the inadvertency of his agents. It is true, indeed, that we want no testimonies but those of our own eyes and our own understanding to convince us of his real motives; but still, it is not unpleasant nor unprofitable to be told of them, from time to time, by persons whose information can neither be disputed nor denied.

We recommend the three or four paragraphs preceding this, to the reader’s serious attention.

(6)We have spoken of this organization in our Introduction. The “communication that was kept up with the rear of the “army,” is almost too ridiculous to be mentioned. It never existed, it never can exist, with Bonaparte’s present numbers; and every letter, and Boyer’s among the rest, proves that before the General was out of sight of Alexandria, his communication with it was as completely cut off as if the Alps stood between them.

(7)Boyer’s ideas of humour are not extremely correct. We see nothing very facetious in a blasphemous falsehood, nor in basely availing himself of the name of his murdered King, to deceive a hospitable stranger, ignorant alike of him and his nation. This little anecdote is not, however, without its use; it proves with what truth these secluded people are represented as having injured the French; and with what justice they are delivered over in consequence of it, to pillage, murder, and utter devastation!

(8)Boyer subjoins that this is an Asiatic phrase:--the phrase may be Asiatic for ought we know, but the idea we hazard little in affirming to be Europeans. It is but changing “Frenchmen” to the “slaves of despots,” and “cutting off heads” to “biting the dust,” and the dispatches of Bonaparte himself will furnish Boyer with a thousand of those empty flourishes.

Ut nemo in sense tentat descendere, nemo;
Sed praecedenti spectatur mantica tergo!

(9)Here are two or three words obliterated in the original; these we have ventured to guess at, we know not with what success.

(10)There spoke a true Frenchman. Every circumstance proves that Egypt is wholly incapable of becoming a profitable colony to France, and Boyer himself is fully convinced of it; yet, in spite of his better knowledge, he drops the assurance of the fact, and is the fallacious expectations of future advantages, consoles himself for present disappointments!

(11)Alluding, perhaps, to the massacre at Alexandria.

General Gives Unflattering Account of the Battle for Cairo

2007-11-06T12:40:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 131-134.

TRANSLATION.

Grand Cairo, July 28th.

Adjutant-General BOYER, to the Commander in Chief of the Army of England(1).

My General,

OUR entrance into Grand Cairo will doubtless excite that sensation at home which every extraordinary event is calculated to produce; but when you come to know the kind of enemy we had to combat, the little art they employed against us, and the perfect nullity of all their measures, our expedition and our victories will appear to you very common things.

We began by making an assault upon a place with out any defence, and garrisoned by about 500 Janizaries, of whom scarce a man knew how to level a musket. I allude to Alexandria, a huge and wretched skeleton of a place, open on every side, and most certainly very unable to resist the efforts of 25,000 men, who attacked it at the same instant. We lost, notwithstanding, 150 men, whom we might have preserved by only summoning the town—but it was thought necessary to begin by striking terror in the enemy(2).

After this we marched against the Mameloucs; a people highly celebrated amongst the Egyptians for their bravery. This rabble (I cannot call them soldiers,) which has not the most trifling idea of tactics, and which knows nothing of war but the blood that is spilt in it, appeared for the first time opposed to our army on the 13th of July.

From the first dawn of day, they made a general display of their forces, which straggled round and round our army, like so many cattle; sometimes galloping, and sometimes pacing in groups of 10,50, 100 &c. After some time, they made several attempts, in a style equally ridiculous and curious, to break in upon us; but finding every where a resistance which they probably did not expect; they spent the day in keeping us exposed to the fury of a burning sun. Had we been a little more enterprising this day, I think their fate would have been decided; but General Bonaparte temporized, that he might make a trial of his enemy, and become acquainted with their manner of fighting.

The day ended with the retreat of the Mameloucs, who scarcely lost five-and-twenty men. We continued our march up the Nile till the 21st, which was the day that put a final termination to the power of the Mameloucs in Egypt.

Four thousand men on horseback, having each a groom or two, bore down intrepidly on a numerous army of veterans: their charge was an act of fury, rage, and despair. They attacked Desaix and Regnier first. The soldiers of these divisions received them with steadiness, and at the distance of only ten paces opened a running fire upon them, which brought down one hundred and fifty. They then fell upon Bon’s division, which received them in the same manner. In short, after a number of unavailing efforts, they made off; and, carrying with them all their treasures, took shelter in Upper Egypt. The fruit of this victory was Grand Cairo, where we have been ever since the evening of the 22d.

I should be familiar with the language of the country, and, what is of still more importance, in the confidence of the Great, to be enabled to give you an idea of the resources found in this city; but, from the complaints I hear, and the demands of several Generals who wish to return, I can easily perceive that there are vast discontents in the army. Generally speaking, it is hardly possible to conceive the miseries endured by the army, during its seventeen days’ march; finding no where a bit of bread, nor a drop of wine, we were reduced to live on melons, gourds, poultry, buffalo meat, and Nile water.

Such, my General, is the succinct account of our operations. There is talk already of our ascending the Nile as far as the Cataracts: an expedition that will make a number of officers throw up their commissions.

I beg you to present my respectful homage to Madame Kilmaine, and to believe me.

Your subordinate, BOYER.

Have the goodness to remember me to my comrades, Rivaud, D’Arbois, and Villard.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)General Kilmaine. This is the letter of an experienced officer, giving an account to his superior, whom he neither dared, nor, perhaps, wished to deceived, of such military operations as fell under his immediate inspection.

The “account” we know, from the most indisputable authority, to be as correct as it is spirited. It derogates a little, it must be confessed, from the wonderful prowess of Bonaparte and his band of heroes—but what are we to think of a General, who gravely tells of the difficulty of scaling the ramparts of a town, which has scarce a wall or a gate that might not be forced by a serjant’s guard! Or of the prodigies of valour exhibited in defeating a horde of brave but undisciplined troops, with a regular and well appointed army, of more than six times their numbers!

(2)It was a branch of this necessity, we suppose, that prompted Bonaparte, with equal judgment and humanity, to give up the inhabitants of Alexandria to indiscriminate slaughter for the space of four hours! Mr. Gilbert Wakefield tells us, that this General (with whose character he appears to be as well acquainted as he evidently is with most of those with whom he meddles,) “prefers the preservation of a single citizen from death, to the melancholy glory that could result from a thousand triumphs of a conqueror wading through floods of slaughter.” All this is doubtless very fine and very true and we must, therefore, conclude that the General had just then forgotten that the unfortunate Alexandrines were “citizens”—a circumstance the more to be wondered at, as he had not long before, termed them so in his Manifesto.

Officer "Deceived" in "Expectations Respecting Egypt"

2007-11-05T12:01:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 124-127.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Grand Cairo, July 28th.

LE TURCQ, Aid-de-Camp to General BERTHIER, Chief of the Etat-Major, and General of the Army, to Citizen Le Turcq, his father.

Dear Father,

SINCE your letter of the 12th of May last, I have not received a single line from you: judge how wretched this has made me. I have omitted no opportunity of writing to you by the different couriers which have been dispatched to Paris, from Toulon, Malta, and Alexandria; and I now send to you by this, which is just setting out from Cairo.

I shall say nothing to you of the situation in which we find ourselves in this country, but content myself with observing once for all, that we have been miserably deceived in our expectations respecting Egypt. Happily for me, I have the good fortune to enjoy a tolerable state of health,--that is to say, I have been, down to the present hour, one of the healthiest in the whole army. I long most ardently to return to you, to lay before you a faithful picture of the country; from which you will easily be enabled to comprehend how many reasons we have to be disgusted with it.

I inclose, my dear father, a narrative(1) of what befell us in our march from Alexandria to Cairo, and of the different combats we had to sustain with the Mameloucs and the Bedouins. You will form a judgment without difficulty of our situation in the Desert. The whole army would have been destroyed, but for the assistance we derived from the Nile, a branch of a river which throws itself into the Delta! I conclude with repeating my hopes that I shall speedily enjoy the happiness of recounting these extraordinary events to you in person, by our own fire-side.

I will not pretend to deny but that it is a great advantage for me, already an old soldier, to be engaged in so important, and so instructive an expedition: but, knowing what the country really is, and the privations and sufferings to which we are exposed, I am not too sure, that if it were to begin again, I should venture to undertake it. Now, however, that I have overcome the major part of the evil which awaited me, I am not ill pleased with what I have done; and have made up my mind to persevere to the end(2).

We have been at Cairo some days. It is possible that we may stay here a fortnight longer, after which I think it probable that we shall march to Syria towards Upper Egypt(3). One division is already gone to Damietta.

I have no occasion to request you to communicate my letter, and narrative, to our kinsmen and common friends, particularly to Citizen Berthe and his wife, to my brother the merchant, to my uncle Le Turcq, and in a word, to all my relations. Tell them that I embrace them with my whole heart, and flatter myself that I shall have the pleasure of seeing them within six months.

General Berthier writes by this courier to his father, so does l’Huilier, who is this day promoted to a lieutenancy in the 14th regiment of dragoons.

Let me hear from you and all the family often. Do not forget the dragoon. I hope that my prompt return will identify him for the loss which he may sustain by my long absence in this expedition, in which I am forced to persevere—but tell him that he shall lose nothing by waiting. General Berthier has promised me every thing for him; and he is surely a man to be depended upon.

I embrace you a thousand times, and ever remain,

Your son,

LE TURCQ.

Pray tell me if you have heard from Cesar Berthe; he is either at Milan, or Paris.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)This narrative we have suppressed. It is in fact a tedious and ill-written detail of the same operations which are related with infinitely more ability by Boyer (XXII.); from whom Le Turcq differs only, in his enumeration of the hardships and losses of the army; which he states to be somewhat greater than Boyer does.

(2)It is impossible to read this paragraph, in which Le Turcq states his discontent so forcibly, in descanting to his happiness; without being immediately put in mind of the professing readiness of the reluctant Bull-calf.

“Bull-calf. Good master corporate Bardolph, stand my friend, and here is four Harry ten shillings in French crowns for you. In very truth Sir, I had as life be hang’d, Sir, as go: and yet, for mine own part, Sir, I do not care; but. Rather, because I am unwilling, and, for mine own part, have a desire to stay with my friends; else, Sir, I did not care, for mine own part, so much.”

SHAKESPEARE.

(3)This “old soldier” is rather young in his geography. Upper Egypt is not precisely in the road to Syria, any more than any part of Egypt is in the road from France to England—a mistake which the whole army seem to have made, and which is in a [illegible word] way of costing them dear.

Admiral Recalls Naval Battle in the Nile

2007-11-04T17:03:00.000-05:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 118-121.

TRANSLATION.

Grand Cairo, July 28th.

Rear Admiral PERRE’E, commanding the Flotilla of the Nile, to his Friend, LE JOILLE(1), Chief of Division, and Captain of the Genereux.

I TAKE the opportunity of the sailing of the Cisalpine, my dear comrade, to give thee some account of myself, as I promised to do in my last.

I arrived here the day after our army, after experiencing every degree of misery. We were six days without any thing to eat but water-melons—water-melons for our dinner, and water-melons for our desert! The peasantry of the country, commanded by Arabs or Bedouins, kept up a firing all day long about our ears. I can assure thee, that if these people knew how to level a musket, not a man of us would return alive. They have been a little more complaisant since the capture of Cairo. I now consider the Nile as open; our communication will, therefore, be more regular in future.

Thou wilt hear with pleasure that I was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral on the field of battle, immediately after the affair of the 13th. I am certain that if I had been supported by one gun-boat more, we should have seen the last of their flotilla, though they had seven and I had but six, three, of which were deserted by the crews, and in the possession of the enemy, who had the audacity to seize them within pistol-shot of my boat; it was then that I exerted myself to the utmost, sunk the flag-vessel, and compelled them to abandon my boats; which I afterwards put into a state of service. I had besides, two batteries of six field-pieces each opened upon me, at a very trifling distance; and the army was too remote to lend me any succour(2). The engagement began at a quarter before nine in the morning, and finished about half after one, when they fled on all sides.

I can assure thee that we have been miserably deceived respecting the navigation of the Nile. No vessel that draws more than five feet can ascend it at the period that I did; with respect to the fertility of the country too, great deductions must be made, or I am mightily mistaken(3). The ferocity of the inhabitants exceeds that of savages; most of them appear to be covered with reeds or straw. In a word, the country is not at all to my taste; however, after pain, pleasure, as the proverb says. At present I am tolerably well situated, both with respect to my table and my other amusements. The Beys have left us some pretty Armenian and Georgian wenches, whom we have confiscated to the profit of the nation. Do, prithee, my dear friend, send me a cask of wine; thou wilt confer an obligation on thy friend.

EM. PERE’E

Assure all my friends of my best regards

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)Le Joille escaped from the hands of Lord Nelson, and had the good fortune, in his flight to Corfou, to fall in, and after an engagement of six hours and a half, to capture the Leander, a vessel at no time of half his force, and then enfeebled by her recent engagement, and with scarce two thirds of her complement.

This is all well known:--what is not so notorious, though it well deserves to be so, is the brutal behaviour of Joille to the brave men, whose invincible courage (for they did not strike till the Leander was absolutely ungovernable) would have entitled them to the respect of a generous enemy. Would it be believed, that the wounds of the gallant commander were not suffered to be dressed for several days, and that the surgeon of the ship has his instruments taken from him while he was employed in performing an operation upon one of our unfortunate countrymen!!! Yet all this, and more than all this, is perfectly true.

We are at a loss to know on what principle of sound policy, or in conformity to what chapter in the code of candour, these and other traits of wanton barbarity, of ferocious rapacity, on the part of the French, are suppressed in our public statements. We have heard of one council abroad, in which it was taken seriously proposed to soften or conceal the insults of France, lest that country should be irritated! And we have seen one paper at home, which advised the same conduct.—Whether this was done through design or ignorance is not worth inquiry. We are surely too powerful to be insulted by the French, and we have too many means of retaliation in our hands to dread this irritation.

Let it also be considered, that the publicity for which we content, is due to the brave men who are fighting our battles—it is also due to the civilized world, of whom the French are the terror and the pest—since there cannot be a more effectual method of counteracting a nation, which derives much of its influence, and more of its power, from the base and hypocritical cant of superior justice and humanity, than unfolding every act of unnecessary cruelty, which their innate thirst of plunder, and of blood, induces them to perpetrate.

We have gone out of our way to make these remarks; but we hope the importance of them will excuse us.

To return to Joille.—We are happy to add, that he had not the satisfaction of possessing himself of the colours which Lord Nelson had put on board the Leander. They were sunk previous to the surrender of the vessel, together with the dispatches, and letters of every kind.

(2)This is not the fact: it was the appearance of the army (though it might not be actually engaged) that saved him from absolute destruction.

(3)It is curious to mark the progress of conviction amongst the French. Alexandria is universally allowed to be detestable,--there are no doubts expressed of that—“Oh! But then it will be delightful when we get to Rosetta!” “No,” say those who are stationed there, “Rosetta is not delightful at all, it is only a little less wretched than Alexandria.” “True! But then the Delta! That is surely rich and beautiful; and then there is Cairo, the wealthiest, the largest, and the most magnificent city in the world!” “As for the Delta,” says Perre’e, “I have just passed through it, and I can assure you, that it is any thing but rich and beautiful.” “And as for Cairo,” exclaim a thousand voices in concert, “it is the vilest and most miserable dog-hole on the face of the earth!” Thus delusion after delusion passes away, and the French, who are as sanguine as they are credulous, are finally resigned to disappointment and despair.

Brother of Famous Novelist Writes from Aleppo

2007-11-03T16:27:00.000-04:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 112-115.

TRANSLATION.

Aleppo, July 27th.

CHODERLOS(1), Consul-General of the French Republic at Aleppo and its Dependencies to the Citizen Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Citizen Minister,

IT was not till the 15th instant, that we first heard of the capture of Malta, and of the disembarkation of our troops at Alexandria. This news has since been confirmed by various letters from Cyprus, and from the ports along the coast: to the present moment, however, I have received nothing official on these important events; so that we are kept suspended, as it were, between the numerous contradictory stories which are propagated concerning this expedition; which appears to have excited a considerable degree of alarm, not only at Cyprus, but along the whole coast of Syria.

Without pretending to pry into the secrets of government, I cannot help saying I am astonished that, when the descent was once effected, the General, or at least the Consul at Alexandria, did not address a circular letter to the consuls of the neighbouring countries, to put them in a way of quieting the apprehensions of the Turks, who (as may easily be supposed) do not see so formidable an expedition without some degree of alarm.

The pacific language which I have continued to hold on this occasion has contributed greatly to calm the effervescence which was beginning to manifest itself, not only among the Turks, but even among a great majority of the French who are settled here.

“Whatever,” said I to them all, “may be the purport of this expedition, you ought to entertain no doubt but that it is undertaken with the full consent of the Porte. Let us wait for authentic intelligence from our respective governments—and till then, let us confidently repose on the knowledge we all have of the strict connection which has now subsisted so long between the two powers.”—(Precious villain!)

I then placed in the fairest point of view, the various advantages which would accrue to the Ottoman empire from our possession of Malta—and, to say the truth, this circumstance had a considerable effect in counterbalancing the disagreeable sensation, which the knowledge of having so formidable a force in the neighbourhood had already produced.

At this moment Aleppo is effectually quieted. I can see nothing to apprehend but a sudden convulsion, produced by some of those absurd and exaggerated accounts which terror frequently dictates, and which terror alone is capable of adopting.

The Pacha, and all the Grandees of the city are tranquil. If there be any explosion to dread, it is on the part of the Cheriffs, whom fanaticism may drive to violent measures—and, in that case, I should not be astonished if the Janizaries, who are fond of us, were to undertake our defence.

I take advantage, Citizen Minister, of a mode of conveyance, not altogether without suspicion, to transmit you this letter, which I have scribbled in great haste—because the only opportunity that offers is that of the courier of the ***** Consul, and because it is necessary to use every precaution, and even every article imaginable to save appearances, and prevent any obstacles being raised to is departure.

Health and respect.

J. CHODERLOS.

The reasons I have just given, prevent Citizen Beauchamp from writing to you. The packet would be too voluminous not to excite suspicion. He charges me to inform you, that he intends setting out the day after to-morrow for Latakia, where he will take measures for prosecuting his journey.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)This is the brother of the famous, or rather infamous La Clos known in this country as the author of Les Liasons Dangereuses, and in France, as one of the most active promoters of the Revolution. He was at once the agent, and the instigator, of that profligate idiot, Egalite; he was also a principal manager of the Jacobin Club, of which he was President in 1790.

His talents for intrigue made him redoubtable to Robespierre, by whom he was proscribed: he contrived, however, to escape, and, in 1795, was selected by the government (to whom his abilities and his want of principle were well known) as a fit instrument for promoting their iniquitous designs in Syria.

To return to Choderlos. He was sent to Aleppo some time after his brother (who was settled at Latakia) and one the same iniquitous errand. His letter shews that he was equally well qualified for the purpose. Much mischief would inevitably have followed, had not the presumption and folly of their rapacious masters precipitated measures, and plunged them in the abyss of misery which they were wantonly preparing for others.

They are both ere this, we truth, in the Castle of the Seven Towers: much too good a place of the imprisonment for men who, in strict justice, should long since have perished in the dungeon of Robespierre.

Life in Egypt Described as a State of "Perpetual Vexation"

2007-11-02T15:51:00.000-04:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 106-109.

TRANSLATION.

Rosetta, in Egypt, July 27th.

I HOPE, child, that this letter will reach thee; I send it by a particular opportunity, and it is, perhaps, the only one of all that I have written to thee since my departure from Malta which will come safe to hand. As for me, I have not once heard from thee since I left Toulon, notwithstanding two advice boats have arrived within the last six days, and brought a vast number of letters.

I presume that thy letters were put on board the corvette which was taken by the English; in that case, I cannot hope to hear from thee for some time, an idea that distresses me almost beyond bearing. My situation is so grievous, that I shall sink under it if I am deprived of that consolation. Exert thyself, therefore, my love, and write to me so frequently, that I may at least stand a chance of hearing from thee once or twice. Thou must needs be assured that my anxiety on thy account is very great. I could send thee but a little money by Capt. Collot; at present I have not the power of transmitting a single sous. I am more than hundred miles from Citizen Magallon(1), and I foresee that I shall be able to send thee nothing before I get to Cairo.

I fear that we have all been terribly deceived with respect to this expedition, so fine, and so cried up! Nay, I am even apprehensive, that if we succeed in conquering Egypt, we shall still find prodigious difficulties in drawing from it all those advantages which we so fondly promised ourselves. We experience every where a great deal of resistance, and a greater still of treachery. It is impossible for one of us to walk out alone a musket shot from any inhabited place without running the risk of being assassinated, or of becoming the victim of a detestable passion, much in the vogue in this country, especially among the Mameloucs, and Bedouin Arabs. I know several who were seized about nightfall in the very streets of Alexandria, and compelled to undergo this shocking outrage.

Rosetta is much more tranquil than Alexandria. Its inhabitants are more civilized, and we are consequently exposed to fewer dangers: notwithstanding this, however, we maintain the greatest circumspection in our individual conduct, and the strictest police, nay even a degree of severity in our general administration.

This country, so much celebrated, is by no means worthy of the character it has obtained; the most savage and uncultivated spot in France is a thousand times more beautiful. Nothing on earth can be so gloomy, so wretched, and so unhealthy as Alexandria, the most commercial spot in Egypt! Houses of mud, with no other windows than a hole here and there, covered with a clumsy wooden lattice; no raised roofs, and doors which you must break your back to enter; briefly, figure to thyself a collection of dirty, ill built, pigeonhouses, and thou wilt have an adequate idea of Alexandria.

The streets are all narrow and crooked, and without pavement, so that one is continually incommoded by the dust, and excessive heat. When the inhabitants take it into their heads to water the streets before the doors of their hovels, the remedy is worse than the disease; the dust is instantly converted into mud, and the streets become altogether impassable. Every thing there is very scarce and very dear; add to all this, the difficulty of making ones-self understood, and the thousand other disagreeable circumstances which I have not the power to describe, and thou wilt be able to form a tolerable opinion of our situation.

I must, however, allow, that since I came here, I have been less wretched. The face of the country is a little more agreeable. The Nile produces a small quantity of verdure; and the sight of the palm-tree (though extremely monotonous, from the circumstance of its being the only tree to be found here), in some trifling degree refreshes the eye; but nothing is calculated to engage or amuse the imagination, and thou may’st easily conceive, that in a country like this, and in a situation productive of so much pain and inquietude, that faculty must needs be extremely active; as the objects around us, therefore, are dark and gloomy, the thoughts necessarily take a tinge from them, and we live in a state of perpetual spleen and vexation----

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[British Translators' Notes]

The remainder of this interesting letter has received so much injury as to be illegible. We regret it the less, as after the correct and spirited picture of the country which we have just seen, the writer probably returned to his own immediate concerns. We know not who he is; it only appears from a few words which we can make a shift to decipher towards the conclusion, that he was first clerk to Poussielgue, Comptroller of the expences of the army.

(1)Consul General at Alexandria. He was at this time with the army at Cairo.

Frenchman Writes on Encounters with Turks, Arabs

2007-11-02T00:10:00.000-04:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 101-103.

TRANSLATION.

Army of England(1).

Grand Cairo, July 27th.

R. DESGENETTES(2) to the female Citizen DESGENETTES, Val-de-Grace, Rue St. Jacques, Paris.

I WRITE to thee, at last, my dear wife, from Cairo’ which will be, I think, the boundary of my expedition.

I wrote to thee twice on our voyage; once from Malta, and again from Alexandria. Opportunities do not often occur, and when they do, they are very unsafe. Not a single letter of thine has yet reached me, nor have I yet heard of thy arrival at Paris.

I will give thee hereafter a faithful history of all my travels; the battles which I have seen, and the dangers without number which I have shared.

My friend Sucy, first Commissary, is dangerously wounded(3) by a musket shot, as is the young Lannes.

Desnanotre, who was likewise recommended to me by La Repeded, is taken prisoner by the Arabs.

The natives of Egypt are ferocious savages: the Beys their masters, haughty oppressors. Their Mameloucs, that is to say, their best cavalry, their privileged cast, opposed nothing to our army but a blind and inconsiderate courage: they were beaten, of course.

There is something in the Turks which I cannot help admiring, and even loving—it is their predestination, which leads to results of the most philosophical nature, and which accommodates itself surprisingly to my circumstances, my nothingness, and my fates.

They have also some very singular customs here. A man may have as many as four lawful wives, besides mistresses. This I have only from hearsay; but I can vouch from my own knowledge, that they drink scarce any thing but water.

Here is a great deal of news for one letter—now to our private affairs.

We are not paid at all, my dear wife; nor have I received a single sous since I left Toulon. With all this, I am far from being the most unfortunate; for almost every body here has either been pillaged, or compelled to fling his baggage into the river and I have saved all mine.

At quitting Toulon I sent thee 700 livres, more or less. Courtal was charged to see them conveyed; which was done, I believe, by the government messengers. Do not forget to write to me about them, and in more than one letter, for they are lost, taken &c.

Citizen Girandi’s letter for Cairo was of service to me; I am lodged with the Physician in question, and I have in return placed him in the army.

The Commander in Chief has constantly treated me with kindness; and I still hope, my dear Lolotte, to be with thee at the period we fixed on.

Embrace, Julien, thy dear parents, and all our friends.

R. DESGENETTES.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)Desgenettes seems at some former period to have miscalculated his literary wants. His epistle is written on a supernumerary sheet of paper, prepared for the “Army of Italy,” which last words are very fairly printed at the head of it. These the good Doctor has carefully erased, and in their place, substituted “Army of England”—Such accuracy is above all praise!

(2)From an official document lying before us, Desgenettes appears to be first Physician to the army;--a situation for which the reader will conclude to be specially qualified, before he has gone through his letter.

(3)His arm was fractured in passing up the Nile.

French Captain Chronicles Arrival in Egypt

2007-10-31T19:47:00.000-04:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 96-98.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Cairo, July 27.

Dear Mother,

I TAKE the earliest opportunity of acquainting you with the arrival of the French army, in which I have the honour to serve, at Alexandria in Egypt. On our passage we took possession of the island, port, and city of Malta, which is 1100 leagues from Toulon; and now we are at Grand Cairo, the capital city of Egypt, which is 1000 leagues from France(1).

I suffered a vast deal during two months that our voyage lasted. During the whole time, I was sea-sick, without intermission, and brought up blood all day long. When we set foot upon land, however, under the walls of Alexandria, I was cured of my sea-sickness, but my sufferings were by no means at an end.

We lost 300 men in scaling the ramparts of the city. After a halt of four days, we set out in pursuit of the Arabs, who had retreated and encamped in the Desert: but the first night of our march was a very terrible one for me. I was with the advanced guard: we came suddenly upon a corps of the enemy’s cavalry; and my horse, which you know was always a very hot one, was the unfortunate cause of all my trouble. He sprung forward like a lion, upon the horses and horsemen of the enemy; but unluckily, in rearing, he fell quite backwards, and to avoid being crushed to death, I was obliged to fling myself on one side of him. As it was night, I had not time to seize him again: he got up, and set off like lightning after the enemy’s cavalry, which was quitting the field.

I had put on all my old clothes, for the sake of preserving my new ones, which were packed up in my portmanteau; so that I lost my horse completely bridled and saddled, my pistols, my cloak, my portmanteau, every thing that was in it, my clothes, twenty-four louis d’ors which I received at Marseilles to fit me out; and, what is still worse, my port-folio, which contained all my papers.

Thus I found myself in an instant stript of every thing, and obliged to march barefoot for nineteen days on the burning sand and gravel of the Desert; for the very day after this unhappy affair, I lost the soles of my old boots which I happened to have on my legs: my coat and my old breeches were very soon torn to a thousand tatters:--not having a bit of bread to eat, nor a drop of water to moisten my mouth, all the comfort I had was in cursing and damning the trade of war, more than hundred times a day.

At last, on the 22d of this month, we arrived at the gates of Cairo, where all the enemy’s army was intrenched, and waiting for us with great boldness; but without our usual impetuosity we marched to attack them in their intrenchments; in about three quarters of an hour, they had 3000 killed outright; the rest not being able to save themselves, plunged into the Nile, which is a river as large as the Rhine—consequently they were all drowned, or shot under water. After such a victory, we entered, with drums beating, into the city of Cairo; consequently masters of all Egypt.

I do not know, my dear mother, when I shall have the pleasure of seeing you. I repent much and much of ever coming here; but it is now too late: in a word, I resign myself to the Supreme will. In spite of the seas which separate us, your memory will be always graven on my heart, and the moment circumstances permit, I will break through all obstacles to return to my country.

Adieu—take care of yourself—a thousand things to my relations.

Your son,

GUILLOT.

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[British Translators' Notes]

(1)The French are poor geographers in general, but the ridiculous miscalculations above, is probably a mistake; it is, however, correctly translated. We have several other letters from this unhappy youth, from which it appears that he is a Captain in the 25th half-Brigade. As he afterwards relates that the enemy’s cavalry were all killed or taken, we hope we may congratulate him on the recovery of his charger, and his new clothes.

Napoleon's Brother is Told Victory over the Mameloucs was "Complete"

2007-10-30T14:06:00.000-04:00

From: Copies of original letters from the army of General Bonaparte in Egypt, intercepted by the fleet under the command of Admiral Lord Nelson. With an English translation (London, J. Wright, 1798-1800, 3 vols.), vol. 1, pp. 93.

TRANSLATION.

Head Quarters, Gizeh, July 27th.

To Citizen LOUIS BONAPARTE, Aid de Camp to the Commander in Chief, at Alexandria.

THE Commander in Chief charges me, my dear Louis, to announce to thee the victory which he gained on the 24th of this month, over the Mameloucs. It was complete. It took place at Embabet, nearly opposite Boulac. We reckon the loss of the enemy in killed and wounded at about 2000 men; 40 pieces of cannon, and a number of horses. Our loss was moderate. The Beys are fled to Upper Egypt. The General marches this evening to Cairo.

He charges me also to bid thee set out immediately with all his baggage, (his carriages, and his horses from Malta, and his carriage from Civita Vecchia) for Rosetta, where thou wilt find some boats of the country, a battalion of the 89th, and the Adjutant-General Almeyras, with whom thou wilt ascend the Nile, and join us at Cairo. Leave nothing of all thy brother's baggage at Alexandria, but his handsome travelling carriage.

Do not forget, my friend, the baggage which we left at Alexandria: we are all in the greatest want of it imaginable; nor yet the wine, the books, nor the two packages of paper, one marked with the General's name, and the other with Collot's. I embrace thee.

BOURSIENNE.